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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper attempts to paint a picture of the Russian military in the year
2000 and then to show the impact a reformed Russian military will have on the
security of the US. The authors researched original source material from the
former Soviet Union and the current Russian Federation. The source material
included the writings of non-governmental officials as well as military and
political leaders. From these sources the authors attempt to portrav the trends
and final destination that the current Russian military reform will arrive at in the
year 2000. Then the probability that this military could pose a thrt-dt to the
security of the US is explored, especially in light of current and proposed US
defense cutbacks.
The authors first provide an explanation of the origin of Russian national
security policy that is still in the process of being redefined since the dissolution
of the Soviet State in December 1991. The Russian national security policy is
being formulated in a new geo-strategic environment and this section explains the
impact of both the conservative and reform minded individuals in the
government.
Next, due to the importance that history plays in the Russian military
planning, a historical predecessor to the current military reform is examined. The
military reform of 1924-25 contained both interesting parallels and differences
vin
compared with the current reform, and these are duly examined. The
comparisons are examined primarily in the areas of the new geo-strategic
enviroment and the impact of economics upon the reforms.
A rough sketch of the future missions and structure of the Russian armed
forces is provided in order to lay the groundwork for an examination oi the new
national security strategy of the US. The authors then examine this strategy and
the impact of the Russian military upon it. It is determined that the US will
continue to be able to ensure its own security vis-avis the Russian military even
with a 50Vr cut in the US defense budget. An appendix dealing with the Russian
military budget is included because of the critical role that economics is playing,




The demise of the Soviet Union has left serious questions for US national
security planners as to the fate of the armed forces of the once great Soviet
Empire. US national security strategy has for the last fifty years dealt with the
threat from the Soviet military machine. Now that the USSR has formally been
dissolved what are the implications for future US national security planning? Are
there any signs of a threat from Russia that will prohibit US defense budget cuts
of as much as 50%? The republics that have emerged from the former USSR still
possess formidable military might that is not only in search of a mission but an
identity as well. While it is true that President Boris Yeltsin has declared that the
United States and Great Britain are no longer the enemy, it is still prudent for US
programming and war-planning purposes to study the evolution of the Russian
military machine for three important reasons.
First of all, there still remains a considerable nuclear arsenal on the territory
of the former Soviet Union. Even with arms control measures such as the START
treaty, the capability of Russia to attack the US is still very real. Additionally, the
latest agreements between US President George Bush and Russian President Boris
Yeltsin concerning further nuclear reductions have yet to be formalized and are
under attack from the "hardliners" in Russia as well as some conservatives in the
US.
Secondly, there is a distinct possibility that Russia might play a military role
in a regional crisis that would force a military response by the US. Evidence that
this type of scenario is a distinct possibility can be found in the Washington Post
and New York Times story of February 1992 that disclosed US government plans
for some seven different hypothetical scenarios that the US military might
respond to. 1 Specifically the so-called "Lithuania" scenario describes a Russian
intervention in the Baltics which escalates and eventually a US/NATO military
force responds in kind. Whether this is a credible scenario is open to question,
but the fact that it was postulated at all makes it logical for the US to study the
Russian military.
Lastly, as part of our published national security strategy, the US military
must retain the capability, often with little warning, to demonstrate US
commitment and, when necessary, to fight. A re-emergent reconstituted Russian
military could possess the capability to threaten the vital interests oi the US. The
national military strategy continues by explaining:
It is certain that US military forces will be called upon again, but predicting
the time, place, and circumstances will be difficult, as graphically
demonstrated by recent political and military crises in Liberia, Kuwait,
Somalia, Iraq, and Ethiopia, as well as natural disasters in Bangladesh and
in the Philippines. 2
Patrick E. Tyler, "War in 1990 ' s: New Doubts", New York
Times , 1^ February 1992, p. Al ; Barton Gellman, "Pentagon War
Scenario Spotlights Russia," Washington Post , 20 February 1992, p.
-The National Military Strategy of the United States ,
Washington, DC: US GPO, 1992), p. 4.
But more specifically the national military strategy goes on to say that:
We will also retain the potential to defeat a global threat, should one
emerge. However, our plans and resources are primarily focused on
deterring and fighting regional rather than global wars. 3
This concept is closely related to the aforementioned article which was leaked
from the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) and defined the danger of a generic
"resurgent/emergent global threat" (REGT) developing:
Into an 'authoritarian and strongly anti-democratic' government over about
three years, beginning in 1994. After four or five years of military
expansion, the REGT is ready to begin 'a Second Cold War' by the year 2001,
or launch a major global war that could last for years...
The usual western practice of analyzing the military of the Soviet Union in
the past was accomplished by observing a combination of primarily three
different factors: literature, hardware, and exercises. The breakup of the USSR,
has made the usual practice difficult. The previous monolithic nature of the
Soviet Union made it simpler to study, largely due to its predictability, fairly strict
adherence to doctrine, and hierarchical nature. There are several reasons why this
is no longer the case.
First, the multitude of forces impacting on the power structures of the
government have left the usual state of redundancy of foreign policy and military
affairs quite unpredictable. Secondly, large scale exercises of the Russian military
are now almost non-existent, with almost no forthcoming development of new
equipment and hardware. The only alternative then is trend extrapolation, an in-
lbid, 11.
depth analysis of literature, and examination of the remaining hardware despite
the vast reductions in the Russian military.
Total dependency on literature, content analysis, and trend extrapolation for
short term projections have their faults. An example of this problem with content
analysis is the explanation given in the West for the firing of Marshal N. V.
Ogarkov in 1984. Some Western experts claimed that Ogarkov was fired because
of his outspoken criticism on cutbacks in the military budget and his support for
increased spending on conventional weapons. 4 On the other hand, his departure
might have only been a simple retirement with no underlying reasons.
Conversely the "military revolution" of the 1950's appears to have been accurately
analyzed, although after the fact, through the use of formal content analysis."
Today, the absence of other traditional methods of analysis mentioned above
necessitates concentration on what the Russians, civilian and military, are
publishing in the open literature.
As the year 2000 approaches the Russian military will have evolved beyond
the current crisis into an as yet undetermined form, that may or may not come
into competition with the US military. Therefore this thesis will explore the
possible form of the main inheritor of the military assets of the former Soviet
4Brian Moynihan, Claws of the Bear: The History of r.he Red
Army from the Revolution to the Present , (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 19 39), p. 409-410.
For more insight on the value of Soviet literature see
Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed F:r?es of the
USSR , (Boulder: Westview Press, 1984), p. xiii-xvi.
Union, which is Russia. The question, which this thesis proposes to explore and
hopefully to answer, is whether the reformed Russian military in the year 2000
could pose a threat to the security of the US. We will attempt to answer this
question in light of the ongoing and future proposed reductions in the US
military.
To construct a composite of the Russian military in the year 2000 this thesis
will first provide an analysis and definition of the current policy, doctrine, and
strategy of Russia. Next there will be an analysis of the current military reform
in relation to a historical predecessor, which will then lead to some general
outlines of the different branches of the Russian military for the year 2000. Lastly,
there will be a discussion on the new US national security strategy, and the
implications to that strategy, in light of the facts and analysis presented.
Additionally, an appendix that covers the Russian military budget and other
economic considerations of the military is provided because of the crucial role the
economy will play in Russia's future. The research for the above stated goals will
be based on data available till the end of October 1992.
II. RUSSIAN SECURITY POLICY, DOCTRINE, AND STRATEGY
A. NATIONAL SECURITY AND MILITARY POLICY
One of the chief concerns of any nation is its security. Without security it
cannot ensure its very own survival let alone its continued prosperity and
development. National security and military policies are the means that most
nations use to set the priorities for securing this desire to survive and prosper.
For the USSR the chief guarantor of security was the military strength of the
nation/union. In Russia, now, that axiom is open to question. It is with this
uncertainty that we will begin to examine national security and military policies
for the future oi Russia. National security policy will determine military policy
in the future, thus the need to study both before we can make any suppositions
as to defense policy of the year 2000.
To understand the important changes in security policy that are occurring
in the Russia it is necessary to examine the policy definitions and past practices
oi the USSR. From this perspective the current debate in Russia will be more
understandable and some useful projections will be able to be drawn for the
future. The chief areas to examine are the political, diplomatic, military, and
economic aspects of national security and military policy making. The degree to
which these different areas affect the entirety of policy- making is significant and
caii be seen in the different periods oi the Soviet era. Therefore, after some
definitions, we will trace the historical path that these policies have taken and
then relate it to the debate of today.
National security policy can be described as the planned effort of a nation
to protect and achieve its national interests and objectives. All nations have some
interests and objectives that are essential to its character and survival as a distinct
entity. How they choose to safeguard these is a function of the national security
policy of that nation. The US for instance has a published a National Security
Strategy and National Military Strategy ." In the USSR there was no separate
national security policy, it was a constituent part of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU) total policy and it was overwhelmingly dominated by
military policy. Military doctrine was derived from that military policy and
equates to what we in the US would call a national military strategy. In Russia
now, with the CPSU gone, there is growing recognition of the need for an
over-arching national security policy with military policy subordinated to it. One
Russian official has stated that the "concept of security of ideology is now being
replaced by the concept of national security". 7 Other aspects of security such as
The National Military Strategy of the United States ,
(Washington, DC: US GPO, 1992), p. 1; The National Security
Strategy of the United States , (Washington, DC: US GPO, August,
1991;
This comment was made by Sergey Stepashin the chairman of the
Supreme Soviet Committee on Defence and Security Affairs. Sergey
Stepashin, "On the Future Defence Policy of Russia," RUSI -Journal ,
April 19 92, p. 35.
economics and environmental concerns are receiving more and more attention as
the concept of national security expands.*
In the Soviet Union the higher and driving force for military doctrine was
military policy, this will not change in Russia. Therefore to study the Russian
military of the future, which will be done from a doctrinal context, we need to
examine the military policy and the growing national security policy of today.
Several definitions of military policy will be useful at this point. Voxiennyy
Entsiklipcdichcskm Slovar (VES), the Soviet military encyclopedia in 1978 defined
military policy as follows:
Military policy, the relationships and activity of classes, states, parties, and
other social-political institutions directly related to the creation of a military
organization and the preparation and employment of means of armed
violence to achieve political goals. In its essence and content, military policy
acts as a component, organic part of the overall policy of classes and states.
... Military policy has as its primary object the sphere of people's social
activity, which is directly connected with war and with its preparation and
conduct. It is aimed at the creation and employment of the state's military
might.4
In the 1986 edition of the VES the definition of military policy had changed
somewhat to include "the defense of revolutionary achievements and social
:A recent article stated that security depended more upon the
"full realization of the country's economic potential, trusting
relationships in foreign and domestic policy, and the military anc
economic policy of Commonwealth states" than large military
establishments. Colonel D.A. Afinogenov "Political Fundamentals of
State Military Doctrine: Views, Perspectives and Contradictions,"
Moscow, Vovennava Mvsl . in Russian, no. 6-7, Jun-Jul 92, p. 2-7,
(JPRS-UMT-92-011-L, 14 September 1992, p. 4).
' Vovennvs Entsiklivedicheskiv Slovar , Moscow, in English,
vol. 6, 1973, p. 413-414, (Naval Intelligence Command (NIC),
translation )
.
progress, strengthening peace and avoiding nuclear-missile war". 10 Christopher
Donnelly also helps define military policy for us in his book Red Banner where
he sets the place of military policy in overall Soviet policy:
...the Soviet (Marxist-Leninist) view of war holds that war is the continuation
of policy by violent means; it is the continuation of domes tic as well as
foreign policy, it is fought primarily, but not exclusively, with armed forces;
it is also fought by other means, economic, ideological, diplomatic, etc. It
is policy therefore which plays the determining role in military doctrine.
Policy provides the reason for going to war and influences the ways of
waging it. It also influences the planning and conduct of war, determining,
for example, when, where and how hard to hit the enemy. 11
With these definitions in mind it is easy to see that the importance of
military policy cannot be overstated. The definition of the policy has changed
through the years as well, leaving the future policy of Russia open to question,
especially as the ideological component from the Soviet era has disappeared. 12




, p . 13 6-
137, footnoted in Christopher Donnelly's Red Banner: The Soviet
Military System in Peace and War , (London: Janes Publishing Group,
1 :' 88), p . 104.
•Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System in Peace and
War
, p . 10 2.
- _The ideological component of CPSU military policy can be seen
in the definition of military policy from the 198 3 edition of
Vovennvv Ent siklipedicheskiv Slovar where it is stated that
military policy was directly derived from total CPSU policy. The
definition then goes on to explain in good socialist detail the
ideological underpinnings of military policy, such as defense of
the socialist homeland. Vovennvv Encsiklipedicheski\ r Slovar ,
Moscow, in Russian, 1983, p. 109-219, ( JPRS-UMT-85-002 -L, -January
1985, p. 529-530) . The absence of the ideological component in
Russian policy today can be seen in the resolution passed by the
Supreme Soviet Presidium on military priorities. "Resolution on
Military Policy Priorities Issued, " Moscow, Krasnava Zv-?zda . in
Russian, 15 Apr 92, p. 2, ( FBIS-SOV-92 -075 , 17 April 1.992, p. 46).
That disappearance along with the changed economic, diplomatic, political, and
military situations leaves manv options open to the present day leaders of Russia.
If a national security policy is developed, then it will probably take on a much
broader scope than past security thinking which was usually narrowly defined in
terms of the military policy of the CPSU. However these options will still derive
from the historical precedents set by previous military policies. Therefore we
now turn to the historical precedents for some illumination of today's debate.
1. Historical Background
In studying the military policies of the Soviet era we must first note
that "policies" is indeed the correct word, for security planning and militarv policy
have gone through changes throughout the period. Helmut Sonnenfeldt and
William G. Hyland in their article "Soviet Perspectives on Security" use the
periods of the different leaders as convenient breakpoints for the changes that
occurred in Soviet security thinking. They also state that the military component
of power for the USSR "has long been considered the principal means of assuring
survival and the creation of conditions in which the regime can pursue its
domestic and other aims". 13 This assertion that the military component of security
was the dominant area of Soviet security thinking ties the study of national
security policy and military policy together. From this point it will be the practice
Helmut Sonnenfeldt and William G. Hyland "Soviet Perspectives
on Security," London, 1979, reprinted in Robbin F. Laird and Eril-
P. Hoffman's Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World , (Mew York:
Aldme de Gruyter, 1936), p. 221.
10
to use this theme as the outline of security policy for the Soviet state, although
this is changing since the collapse of the USSR as we will see later.
The initial period of Soviet security thinking coincides with the
revolution and its immediate aftermath. Lenin's belief in the spreading of the
revolution and the inevitability of clashes with the capitalists were put into
practice as the Bolsheviks attempted to spread revolution. Sonnenfeldt and
Hyland see this as the impetus behind the linking of regime and national
security 14 If the revolution was to succeed on a broader scale the societv and
state where it had already succeeded must be preserved for all to see. A
traditional sense of survival was beginning to take hold. This has also been
defined as the beginning of the era of isolation of the Soviet Union from
international systems, an important factor in future security policies. lr
The Stalinist era continued the transition of Soviet security concerns to
more traditional modes not so deeply associated with the spread of revolution.
The traditional needs of physical security of the borders and territories coupled
with the desire for regime security and to a lesser extent the desire to spread the
revolution, led Josef Stalin to expand his borders and enter into alliances of
convenience to ensure the Soviet Union's security. lb It can be seen that in this
"ibid, 224.
: Seweryn Bialer "'New Thinking' and Soviet Foreign Policy,"
in Vladimir Wozniuk's Understanding Soviet Foreign Policy , (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1990;
, p. 259.
Sonnenfeldt and Hyland, 226-7.
11
period that the primary emphasis of national security and military policy was
directed against local, territorial, and regional threats. The chief concern of Stalin
lay on his borders and within the regime itself. The economy after the revolution
and civil war was in poor shape. The New Economic Policy (NEP) made a
positive impact in the latter 1920's but this was cut short by other policies of
Stalin, like collectivization. The collectivization of agriculture and forced
industrialization would have a serious impact upon regime security, both good
and bad. The rise of other power centers on the periphery and internal uprisings
were of great concern also. Stalin even went so far as to ally himself with
Germany and call for nationalism to defend the rodina when they attacked.
The question of whether the action of gaining buffer states and an
expanded security zone actually made the USSR more secure by the end of the
Stalinist era is open to debate. The direct confrontation with the West, the
rearming of Germany, the Korean conflict and many other aspects of the cold war
can be seen as not in the Soviets' interest. 1 ' It is also extremely interesting that
this situation bears some resemblance to the state of Russian security today. This
will be examined more later.
The Khrushchev era has been seen by many scholars as the era when
Soviet security concerns switched from strictly regional to more global, and with




presents an interesting argument that the desire for "total security" initiated by
Stalin was not changed at all by Nikita Khrushchev's changes in military policy
and ideology. The expansion of this concept of "total security" to a global scale
may in fact have sown the seeds of destruction by laying the foundation for
bankrupting the nation by competing with the West for this supposed "total
security".
14
Some of Khrushchev's changes were significant such as his assertion
that war was no longer inevitable between socialism and capitalism. While this
had always been the Marxist/ Leninist teaching, that war was inevitable, the effect
upon policy of this shift was not enormous. The Soviets had to plan for the worst
scenario - world nuclear war. :o Michael MccGwire asserts in his book Perestroika
and Soviet National Security , that another reason for the change in policy
concerning the inevitability of war was the pressure of the huge defense budget
on the Soviet economy. Saying that war was no longer inevitable and that
nuclear war was taking precedence over conventional war were in fact arguments
designed to allow the drastic reduction of the Soviet military. 21
Khrushchev had another method to replace the overdependence upon
the military aspect of national security, going global through national liberation
•'Bialer, 259.
- Michael MccGwire, Perestroika and Soviet National S ecurity,
Washington: Brookings, 1991), p. 99-100.
-•ibid, 100-102.
13
movements. The calculus for this policy called for encircling the capitalists, as
they had encircled the USSR, and thus enhancing security at home by threatening
the West from their blind side. While the logic of the policy was appealing, the
practice was not so acceptable vis-a-vis Soviet security- The drains on the Soviet
system from this global confrontation were very heavy and did not significantly
weaken the West. It was a policy that in effect hurt more than it helped." This
again fits the model that Bialer presents that the reaction of other powers to this
desire for "total security" will in fact prove more detrimental to security than to
not have embarked upon the policy at all. 23
With the fall of Khrushchev from power the emphasis on security
turned even more towards military power as its chief guarantor. The military
buildup under Brezhnev to ensure national security cemented the dominance of
military policv in the national security architecture. Soviet militarv power grew
immensely in the 1960-1970's and with this increased strength and sense of
security some allowance was made for a "peaceful" approach to security through
the detente initiatives. The attaining of military parity or even superiority with
the US became a security goal of the USSR, despite the attempts at peaceful
openings. The West responded to most of the Soviet escalations, with the
consequent lowering of the benefit for security derived from the concentration on
military parity. While the Soviets were indeed in a better position militarily it
'Sonnenf eldt and Hyland, 232-233
Bialer, 259.
14
was not a dominant position, and the other aspects of security such as economics
and environmental safety were for the most part ignored. The peaceful solutions
may have been the recognition by Brezhnev and friends of the problems brought
on by military policy being dominant in security policy. 24 In any event the status
of the military and its impact on the security policy of the USSR was certainly
great and of immense burden to the Soviet economy.
Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of perestroika and glasnost would alter the
security and military policy of the Soviet Union considerably. As Michael
MccGwire states Gorbachev's reasoning for the changes in security and defense
policy were:
Democratization implied domestic destabilization, making a peaceful
international environment absolutely essential. Economic perestroika would
need assistance from the capitalist world. Both of these requirements meant
that good relations with the United States became an imperative, rather than
a policy option ... the two main obstacles were the size and shape of the
Soviet armed forces and the Marxist-Leninist theory of international
relations. The former was by far the more important. ...economic
perestroika, political democratization, changes in military doctrine, and new
thinking in international relations became truly interdependent. : ^
This explanation of the reasoning behind the changes made by Gorbachev makes
it much easier to understand the changes themselves. The priority of economics
driving the changes cannot be overstated, and this has serous implications for the
changes occurring today.
'Sonnenfeldt and Hyland, 240-241
"MccGwire , 5 .
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Some of the specific changes presented by Gorbachev are important for
today and deserve some closer attention. Seweryn Bialer notes three specific
areas of change that are especially significant:
The first is the idea of "nuclear sufficiency" which proclaims that nuclear
buildup beyond mutual assured destruction is meaningless, and that a much
lower level of nuclear weapons. ..will increase the security of both
superpowers and the world. The second is the concept of "common
security" (or "mutual security") that expresses in Soviet thinking a major
departure from the practice of traditional Soviet defense policies.
Gorbachev's redefinition of "national security" also concerns the inclusion of
factors that are not directly military. The most obvious broadening oi the
notion... concerns economic power. 26
These changes were of fundamental importance in the formulation of
security and military policy under Gorbachev. All three carry over their
importance into the post-Soviet era as well as some of the other concepts of his
leadership. The concept of parity underwent a change from quantitative to
qualitative paving the way for force reductions. 27 The reaction of the Soviet
military to the Gulf War and the success of precision guided munitions reinforced
the movement toward quality over quantity. 28 The change in the basic
assumptions underlying security and military policy, the likelihood of war and
- Bialer, 260
.
-"Raymond L. Garthoff "The tightening frame: mutual security
and the future of strategic arms limitation, " in Soviet Strategy
and New Military Thinking , Derek Leebaert and Timothy Dickinson
ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 71.
-"An article in February 1992 by Rear-Admiral (Reserve) V.S.
Pirumov went into depth on this subject. V.S. Pirumov "Two Aspects
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the nature of war, from not inevitable and global nuclear, to not possible and
conventional were key to the planning process tor Soviet leaders. 2" The change
in Soviet doctrine in 1987 to include the prevention of war as a key goal of the
Soviet military flows from these changed assumptions. 30 And finally the concepts
of "reasonable sufficiency" and a defensive military doctrine allowed the
reductions Gorbachev required and the lowering of tensions with the West31 The
broadening of the definition oi national security to include the strong emphasis
upon economics harkens back to Krushchev's attempts to lower the burden of the
military on society- This emphasis continued after the Soviet Union dissolved and
is the primary factor affecting the Russian military today. These concepts also
carried over into the post-Soviet era and are helping shape the debate today.
With these concepts to use as a reference point let us now turn to the post-Soviet
debate on national security and military policy.
2. Post-Soviet Era
The events in Russia since the coup have been making the news on an
almost daily basis. The obvious reason for the attention of the press is the
instability of a nuclear armed super-power government as perceived by the rest
of the world. The end of this military monolith has left an armed forces that was
deployed world-wide in complete disarray. The majority of heads of state of the
MccGwire, 9-10
i b i d , 315.
Garthof f , 72 .
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new Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and Russia specifically, have
been searching for the magic formula capable of maintaining a facade of unity.
Since the attempted coup in August of 1991 and Gorbachev's departure
in December 1991 the pace of events has been lightning quick compared to the
past 74 years. On December 8, 1991, the leaders of the Slav States (Russia,
Ukraine, and Belarus), met in Minsk to denounce the Treaty of 1922 which had
created the Soviet Union. 32 In Minsk the leaders also signed three documents, the
first of which established a Commonwealth, with membership open to all former
Soviet republics. The key part of this document was the agreement of single
control of the nuclear arsenal. The second document laid out the principles tying
the Commonwealth together with areas of cooperation. And the third document
gave guidelines governing the coordination of economic activity. The most
obvious omission was the lack of agreement on policy. Additionally, the Muslim
states were conspicuously absent in Minsk. Then on December 21, in Alma Ata
the Slav states, the five Muslim states, and Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova,
met and drew up a protocol which established the Commonwealth of 11
independent states (only Georgia and the Baltic nations remained outside the
Commonwealth). 33 Also at the Alma Ata meeting was a declaration reaffirming
Marshal of Aviation, Yevgeny Shaposhnikov, former USSR Minister oi Defense,
-Stephen Foye "A Disgruntled Officer Corps Threatens Future
Discord," F.FS-RL Daily Report , February 2, 1992.
ibid.
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as Commander-in-Chief of the joint Commonwealth Armed Forces, pending their
reorganization."4 Many other agreements were signed concerning ecology, control
of airspace throughout the Commonwealth, transport and tariffs, exploration and
use of space, and sharing out the former USSR property abroad. There was an
agreement for a joint strategic nuclear command between the four nuclear states
(Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) but no agreement was reached on
single command of conventional forces.^ This was the high point of the
Commonwealth.
Since the December summit, every other meeting of the
Commonwealth states has been engulfed in controversy. Agreements on strategic
forces that came out of summits on December 30, 1991 and February 14, 1992
failed to clarify the exact definition of these forces and left much room for the
debate between Ukraine and Russia over division of forces. 36 At another summit
""We Have a Commonwealth of Presidents. Will We Have a
Commonwealth of Peoples? Protocol of the Conference of Heads of
Independent: States," Moscow, Fra vda . in Russian, 23 Dec 91, p. 2,
(FBIS-SOV-91-246, 23 December 1991, p. 1-2).
"Mews conference by CIS heads of state at Alma Ata, broadcast
on Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian, 1300
GMT, 21 Dec 91, (FBIS-SOV-91-2 4 6, 23 December 1991, p. 33, 33).
"An Agreement Between the Member States of the Commonwealth
of Independent States on Strategic Forces," Moscow, Tass
International Service, in Russian, 0925 GMT, 31 Dec 91, (FBIS-SOV-
91-251, 31 December 1991, p. 17-18); "Additions and Amendments by
Some Republics to the Agreed Text of The Agreement on Defense




, in Russian, 3 Jan 92, p. 2,
( JPRS-UMA-92-004, 6 February 1992, p. 13-14); "Agreement Among the
Member States of the Commonwealth of Independent States on the
Status of the Strategic Forces," Moscow, Tass International
Service, in Russian, 0328 GMT, 13 Feb 92, ( FBIS-SOV-92-032 , 13
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in Kiev on March 20, 1992 a more precise definition of the authority of the council
of the heads of states placed policy, doctrine and nuclear strategy under their
auspices/ However the exact composition of the strategic forces could not be
settled and Ukraine refused to sign a protocol on that issue. 38 The situation for
coherent policy formulation by the CIS has not improved since then.
It appears that the countries of the CIS have drifted into three different
groups. The first group consists of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia. This group of countries' showed that they
were prepared to remain in a union with Russia by signing the Union treaty
proposed by former Soviet President Gorbachev. They have also signed
agreements on subordinating general purpose forces to the CIS High Command
and except for Belarus on collective security. 39
February 19 92, p. 18-21
Lieutenant Colonel A. Dokuchayev, "The Documents are Bemc
Drawn Up in Moscow, But What Will be Said in Kiev is Important, '
Moscow, Krasnava Z\rezda , in Russian, 11 Mar 92, p. 1, ( FBIS-SOV-92-
043, 11 March 1992, p. 11-13); "Agreement on the Powers of thi
Highest Eodies of the Commonwealth of Independent States or
Questions of Defense," Moscow, Tass International Service, ir
Russian, 1355 GMT, 23 Mar 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-057 , 24 March 1992, p.
21-23)
.
'"Agreement on the Joint Armed Forces for the Transitional
Period, " Moscow, Tass International Service, in Russian, 1906 GMT,
23 Mar 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-057, 24 March 1992, p. 23).
"Agreement Between the Republic of Armenia, the Republic ol
Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Republic of Kyrgyzstan,
the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenia, anc
rhe Republic of Uzbekistan on General Purpose Forces for the
Transition Period, " Moscow, Tass International Service, in Russian,
1206 GMT 18 Feb 92, p. 3, ( FBIS-SOV-92 -032 , 18 February 1992, p.
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The second group is comprised of the Baltics and Georgia, former
republics that want a complete severing of ties to the old Soviet system. The
third group consists of Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan. This
group has had many differences with Russia and has refused to sign numerous
CIS agreements, including the collective security pact and documents on the joint
armed forces, and have not approved the decision to create an inter-parliamentary
assembly. 4 " Some oi these problems have resulted from the division of the Black
Sea Fleet between Russia and Ukraine, to the division of former Red Armv assets
for the establishment of national armies by member states. The death-knell of the
Commonwealth for this third group was sounded when Russia decided to form
its own armed forces in the summer of 199241 and subsequently Yeltsin appointed
Colonel General Pavel Grachev to the post of Russian Minister of Defense.
As it stands now the Commonwealth exists mainly for the purpose of
controlling the nuclear arsenal, for providing some economic interstate
coordination (mainly for the first group mentioned above), and peacekeeping
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n Ann Sheehy "CIS Lirnps Along: Alive but Not Weil," Post
Soviet/ East European Report , vol. IX no. 35, October 6, 1992, p.
-Russian President Boris N. Yeltsin decree "On the Ministry
of Defense and Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, " Moscow,
Tass International Service, in Russian, 1743 GMT, 16 Mar 92, (FBIS-
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forces. Once all of the nuclear weapons are destroyed or moved from the other
three republics onto the territory of Russia, the Commonwealth will probably only
exist for controlling peacekeeping forces and economic coordination.
Obviously the fall of the Soviet Union left security questions very much
up in the air. With collective security being so difficult to implement among the
newly independent states and Russia an examination of the post-Soviet military
is important. What exactly are the national interests and objectives of the newly
independent nations, most notably Russia? It seems logical that the development
of security and military policy should conform to those interests, but no one was
coming forward with a reasonable list of them. To be sure, the concepts of the
Soviet era would carry over in Russian security thinking, after all the leaders of
the new state were leaders in the old state in most cases, and all had been
inculcated in socialism and its tenets.
The question of whether to create some kind of new union was
answered to a great extent in the negative as we have already seen. Additionally
the loss of allies in Eastern Europe, and the extreme difficulties it is having with
Moldova, Georgia and especially Ukraine leaves the prospects of collective
security on the western and southwestern borders unlikely for Russia. The CIS
joint command of strategic forces is unlikely to provide the sense of security that
22
Russia hopes for in collective security agreements. 42 This probably contributed
to Russia's decision to create its own armed forces.
Clearly the issue of national security and military policy was one that
had no ready answer but was of enormous consequence. We will look at the flow
of ideas on security and defense policy to try and draw a coherent conclusion on
the course oi future Russian national security and military policy. We look
specifically at Russia due to the overwhelming position she holds in the area and
the vast majority of the military and security apparatus she possesses. In our
look at Russia we will need to define her national interests to demonstrate on
what principles her national security and defense policies will be based. Integral
to this discussion is the examination of foreign policy and the question of
expatriated Russians living in the former republics. We will also examine the
state of the economy and the political landscape for their impacts upon policy
formulation.
3. National Interests
The issue of national interests and objectives is central to formulation
of security and military policy as we have noted previously. The May 1992 draft
military doctrine of Russia states that:
The supreme goal of Russia's policy in the sphere of national security is to
ensure favorable peaceful conditions for socioeconomic and spiritual
'"Ann Sheehy "CIS Limps Along: Alive but Not Well" Post'
Soviet /East European Report , vol. IX no . 3 5 , 6 October 19 92, p. 1,6
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development and the creation of adequate living conditions for all its
peoples. 43
This seems a relatively straight forward definition of objectives for Russian
security policv. As far as enunciating national interests Colonel-General I.N.
Rodionov, chief of the General Staff Military Academy, has divided interests into
global and regional categories. Globally he sees Russia's interests as:
progressive development of civilization; strengthening economic, political,
cultural, scientific and other relations with all countries; participating in
existing international and regional organizations and creating new ones
contributing to strengthened peace and stability in international relations;
and the establishment of it which would not rely on the domination and
diktat of one country or group with respect to other states, but on collective
resolution of urgent problems under UN auspices44
Rodionov then interprets these interests to include the neutrality o\ Eastern
Europe and the Baltics. The Baltics are also required to allow basing of Russian
naval forces and to guarantee the safety of the Russian expatriates living there. 4:"
However, the question of interests has, as Suzanne Crow puts it,
become for Russia "much more complicated than that faced by the Soviet Union.
Russia must now factor an entirely new region into its worldview, the former
"'"Fundamentals of Russian Military Doctrine (Draft)," Moscow,
Yovennava Mvsl , in Russian, May 1992, Special Edition, p. 3-9,
( JPRS-UMT-92-003-L, 16 June 1992, p. 1).
"Colonel-General I.N. Rodionov "Approaches to Russian Military
Doctrine, " Moscow, Vcvemzava Mvsl , in Russian, Jul 92, Special





republics". b Rodionov deals with this area in his regional view of national
interests and states that "Relations with them are of paramount importance for
Russia in the political, economic and military spheres". 47 Foreign Minister Andrei
Kozyrev and President Boris Yeltsin have both addressed the question of interests
with the need for such objectives as; a prosperous economy, observance of human
rights, democracy, improved relations with the West, rule of international law,
stability, no first use of force, lowering of confrontational nature oi foreign
relations, and good relations with the former republics. 48 The Charter for
American-Russian Partnership and Friendship signed 17 June 1992 by Yeltsin and
Bush codified this desire for better relations with the West. 49
The concern over Russian national interests was also addressed by
Sergey Rogov of the United States and Canada Institute. Rogov in his 6 March
1992 article describes a concentric framework for delineating Russia's national
interests. The first circle is stated as the relations with the former republics on
Russia's periphery, which corresponds to Rodionov's regional category, and that
4 Suzanne Crow "Russia Debates Its National Interests, " RF_ RL
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Rogov sees as the primary interest of Russia. The second area seen by Rogov is
the Near East, Far East and Eastern Europe. The last circle is the relations with
Western Europe and the US. These last two circles would correspond with
Rodionov's global category of interests. Rogov states his belief that Russia has no
pressing interests on a worldwide scale and the fear of foreign aggression on
Russia itself is very low.50 Rodionov on the other hand sees the real military
threat to Russia still existing and believes that the approach to security that states
that there are no enemies of Russia is "profoundly erroneous"/ 1
This concept of the threat or danger to Russia is especially important
to the formulation of policy for the future. Rodionov postulates four specific
areas of threat to Russia: global nuclear war especially with the US; major
conventional war, especially as the developed countries still posses such large
arsenals; local wars on the borders of Russia and the CIS; and internal
destabilization and uprisings on ethnic and religious grounds/2 Lieutenant-
General N.P. Klokotov chief of the Strategy Faculty of the General Staff Academy
went even further when he presented a conceptual framework for the topic of
threat perception at the May Military-science conference. Klokotov addresses
threat perception in terms oi the status of the CIS and the Russian state:
Sergey Rogov "Security Issues Facing Russia Discussed,"
Moscow, Mezavisimava Gazers. , in Russian, 6 Mar 92, p. 2, (FBIS-SOV-




disintegration into less developed countries; slow emergence from the economic
and political crisis it is now in with a gradual attainment of world power status;
and immediate recognition of Russia and the CIS as leaders in the world
community."
Klokotov then goes on to specifically delineate the threat of war in each
of these categories: in the first case he sees no major war by the US against a
weak and splintered CIS and Russia since the US can attain its goals through
other methods, but he calls for the study of low and high intensity conflicts on
the periphery; in the third case he sees no danger of a return to Cold War
confrontation or conflict; it is in the second case where he actually lists the
countries he sees as threats; the US, Germany, China, Japan, and the Muslim
world. In all of his cases it is worthy to note that he sees the US as the main
adversary."4
The more reform minded civilian Deputy Defense Minister Andrei
Kokoshin has stated that the US and NATO are not Russia's adversaries and that
a "critical conflict zone" has developed in Central Asia."" Even President Yeltsin
"Lieutenant-General N.P. Klokotov "Threat Perception for
Russia," Moscow, Vovennava Mvsl . in Russian, Jul 92, Special
Edition, p. 35-38, ( JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 September 1992, p. 19).
""ibid.
"Kokoshin, Dubynin on Strategic Forces in Byelarus," Moscow,
in Russian, T-pleradiokoinpaniya Ostankinko Television First Program
Network, 1700 GMT 23 Jul 92, ( FBIS-SOV-92-143 , 24 July 1992, p.
20) .
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has declared that the US and Russia are no longer enemies."' 1 Despite this
difference in perception of the US threat, regional and internal matters are the top
concern oi both conservatives and reformers. The use of a threat from the US
may very well be an attempt by the military to justify defense expenditures. The
concentration upon internal and regional threats has a direct affect upon the type
of policy to be followed. With the threat so close to home, a stable international
picture is critical.
The views expressed by Yeltsin, Kozyrev and Rogov are from the
moderate school of the current debate over national interests, those by Rodionov
and Klokotov are from the more conservative school. This debate is closely
related to the question of orientation of Russian foreign policy, i.e. East or West.
The so-called "Atlanticist" faction is the one associated with Kozyrev and Prime
Minister Egor Gaydar and the other young reformers. The "Eurasianists" are led
by Russian State Counselor Sergei Stankevich. This faction calls for less
concentration on relations with the West and more concentration on relations with
Central Asia and the Moslem world. They see the tilt toward the West as having
gone too far and that it is ignoring the strong ties Russia always has had in the
Asian landmass. It is true that neither camp wants to totally renounce relations
or contacts with any part of the world, they just see Russian interests better
"BBC Airs Interview With Yeltsin, " London, BBC Television
Network, in English, 2230 GMT 29 Jan 92, ( FBIS-SOV-92 - 020 , 30
January 1992, p. 21).
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served by their view of how to conduct foreign policy.57 The debate between the
two camps would be merely a theoretical debate if not for the topic of the safety
of Russian nationals living in the former republics.
The debate over Russian national interests, in the foreign policy arena,
has been a major area of contention that separates the old line communists and
nationalists, from the democratic reformers and the present government, one of
the aforementioned expatriate Russians. The protection of expatriate Russians
living in the former republics has the potential to redefine Russian national
interests and therefore the security and military policy of the country as well.
Sergei Stankevich of the Eurasian lobby has stated that the governments response
to the Dniester situation has for example been "invariably dilatory, weak, and
often, in my view, wrong""*. He goes on to say that, "all that this moderate line,
... promises the people of the Dniester Region is graveyard stability".^ This is the
typical position of the opposition parties when looking at the government's
programs to protect Russian nationals living in any of the former republics.
If the protection of these people is one of Russia's national interests
then the question of how to protect them will have to be addressed in the security
""Alexander Rahr " ' At lant icists ' versus 'Eurasians' in Russian
Foreign Policy", RFE/RL Research Report , vol. 1, no. 22, 29 May
1992, p. 17-13.
"Sergei Stankevich "Stankevich Takes Issue With Kozyrev
Credo," Moscow, Izvesciva . in Russian, 3 Jul 92 Morning Edition, p.
3, (FBIS-SOV-92--133 , 10 July 1992, p. 35).
i b i d .
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and military policies. Significantly the Russian Supreme Soviet Presidium did not
include any reference to these expatriates in its statement and resolution on
military priorities for the Russian Federation. l,u While this is not an explicit
military policy for Russia, it is the firm basis for the policy that is in formulation
today. It is interesting to note that the conservative communist/nationalist faction
of parliament has not had the influence to include this plank in the statement and
resolution on military policy. Whether this signifies their weakness or some other
agenda is unknowable at this point, however this subject will certainly be of great
consequence in the future whichever way it is decided.
The debate over national interests has profound implications for the
future of Russian national security policy and military policy- The goals and
interests expressed by Yeltsin and Kozyrev hold sway as of now but there are
areas of conflict and tension that could change composition of the government
and therefore the policy that it will formulate. The questions of the expatriate
Russians, and foreign policy orientation have already been mentioned. The other
area of greatest conflict is oi course the economy- The political battle over the
economy has been underwav since before the fall of the Soviet Union. The shock
Both the Statement on military priorities and the resolution
accompanying the statement deal with a general framework for
military policy but due not mention the problems of the expatriate
Russians. "Resolution on Military Policy Priorities Issued,"
Moscow, Krasnava Zvezda . in Russian, 15 Apr 92, p. 2, and
"Presidium Statement Released," Moscow, in Russian, Krasnava
Zvezda . in Russian, 15 Apr 92, p. 2, (FBIS-SOV-92-075 , 17 April
19 9 2, p . 46).
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of economic perestroika caused much discontent, but that was small when
compared to the political turmoil now underway in the country. The outcome of
Gaydar's economic reforms and the political battle it has engendered are central
to what future security and military policy will look like, it is important to look
at the reform and how it will affect the formulation of policy. Once the economic
reform has been examined the political landscape will be mapped out to illustrate
where the power lies for the formulation of policy. With that accomplished we
will then attempt to define where security and defense policy are and where they
will likely go towards the year 2000.
4. Economy
In the Soviet Union the economy was structured for the sole purpose
of preparing the state for war. The ability to command the economy was crucial
to all Soviet leaders from Lenin to Gorbachev in enabling them to maintain the
military machine that was seen as the guarantor of the state's security- That
command ability has now vanished and with it the underpinning of the military
might of the state. With market reforms the military may no longer be able to
count on the merchant marine fleet, Aeroflot or civilian trucks for transportation
in time of crisis. This may very well lead the government to establish programs
to deal with this as the West does, adding to the trouble of reduced budgets.
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The economic restructuring underway now in Russia has in fact led to
the greatest depression since the post-revolution era. bl The numbers that are
reported in the press each day are mind-boggling by any standard, for example
the price oi a common basket load of foodstuffs has risen a reported 750% from
December 1991 to September 1992. 02 Inflation has been estimated for 1992 to be
85009? while GNP has dropped steeply with an estimated fall for the 1990-93
period oi 40% ."^ Repayment of foreign debt of the former Soviet Union is a
serious problem, with Russia trying to reschedule their share of the already
overdue payments. 64 The value of the ruble continues its decline with the latest
rate of 241 to the dollar quickly eating into the value of incomes and the ability
of the state to conduct foreign trade. The news is indeed very gloomy.
However, there are aspects of the economy that are encouraging. The
vast reserves of natural resources are a great positive for the future. Labor costs
are low in relation to the rest of the world, and that labor force is fairly well
: Keith Bush "An Overview of the Russian Economy, " RFE/RL
Research Report , vol. 1, no. 25, 19 June 19 92, p. 50.
-Yuriy Yurkov "Basic Foodstuffs Costs Up 750% Since December,
"
Moscow, Izvestiva . in Russian, 9 Sep 92 Morning Edition, p. 2,
(FBIS-SOV-92-180, 16 September 1992, p. 25).
'Bush, 50.
'Keith Eradsher "Talks on Rescheduling Moscow's Debt Pit U.S.
and Russia Against Germany," New York Times , vol. CXLII, no.
49,096, 21 September 1992, p. A7 .
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educated. The population seems to be committed to reform also.65 Capitalist type
free enterprise has appeared in many areas with the population selling a wide
variety of goods openly. President Yeltsin has issued the decree on privatization
coupons for a massive effort to involve the population in business ownership.""
The number of businesses privatized by the end of July was stated by the
government to be 7,553, mostly of a small size."7 The International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and G-7 have also given conditional approval to the government's
plans for reform, paving the way for the aid package put together bv the West.
There are several problem areas though which offer serious concerns
for the future oi the reforms and of the government itself. The specific areas are;
the need for foreign aid at a time of worldwide economic slowdown, the costs
and feasibility of military-industrial conversion, the desire to increase arms sales
at a time of an already very competitive world arms market, uncontrolled money
supply and easing of credit controls by the head of the Central Bank, a lack of
reform in the agricultural area, the slow pace of privatization despite the voucher
giveaway, a decline in exports and imports and the consequent loss of revenue,
supplv interruptions accompanying the breakup of the Union, a steep drop in
"Bush, 5 3 .
"Yeltsin Decree on Privatization Checks Issued," Moscow,
R cssivskive Vest
i
, in Russian, 25 Aug 92, p. 1, (FBIS-SOV-92-166
,
2 6 August 1992, p. 19)
.
"Progress of Privatization Outlined," Moscow, Rossivskava
Gaze~ a . in Russian, 27 Aug 92, p. 5, (FBIS-SOV-92-163 , 28 August
1992, p. 22) .
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industrial output, and looming unemployment for millions. This is not an all-
inclusive list but it does go tar in illustrating the wide range of problems still
waiting to be solved in Russia.
The biggest problem facing the reform of the economy is pacing."8 The
military-industrial complex, managers of state owned enterprises, and some labor
unions have come closer together in a partnership trying to force the government
to ease the pace of reform. This group is headed by Arkadii Volskv a military-
industrial manager, described as one of the most powerful men in Russia."4 The
group seeks a slowdown in the reforms or a "managed transition" to a market
economy, ° and special treatment by the government to prevent the closing of
factories, threatening massive unemployment and strikes if its demands are not
met/ 1 This presents a very critical problem for the government's reform program
as the easing of credit and taxation of these industrial behemoths will fuel
inflation past already very high levels. The power of this lobby is to be reckoned
with. Yeltsin seems to be hearing the call of this lobby and has appointed more
industrialists to government positions as opposition to the pace of reform has
"Bush, 53.
Philip Hanson and Elizabeth Teague "The Industrialists ant
Russian Economic Reform," RFE/RL Research Report , vol. 1, no. 19






grown. Let us now examine the political spectrum to see where this challenge to
the government fits in the overall picture.
5. Internal Politics
Since the fall of the USSR the political scene in Russia has become more
and more fractured. The democratic forces that led the fight against the coup
have separated into many different groups with varying degrees of support for
the government and the rapid reforms it has put into practice. The many
different parties range from the old communist and nationalists who have formed
a "red-brown alliance", to the staunch supporters Yeltsin still has in parliament.
The most notable political event of the past several months was the formulation
of the Civic Union alliance. This alliance while ostensibly centrist has distinct
disagreements with the Gaydar government and a clearly conservative tilt. The
three heads of the alliance are the aforementioned Arkadii Volsky of the
industrialist lobby, Nikolai Travikin of the best organized party in Russia, the
Russian Democratic Party, and Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi.' 2 This
alliance professes its support for reform, democracy and Yeltsin but has much
criticism for the Gaydar government and its methods.
Civic Union calls for the "managed transition" to a market economy
that Volsky has espoused, a much more nationalistic trend in foreign and
domestic policy, and stronger ties to the former Soviet Union republics through
"-"Introducing Civic Union," The Economist , 27 June 1992, p
59 .
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the CIS. 73 The ability of this party to form a strong enough opposition to
Gaydar's group while not becoming as overtly nationalistic as Zirinovsky or
others of the "red-brown" faction, may well signal a basic change in how security
and defense policy will be formed. This alliance is more chauvinistic in foreign
policy than Kozyrev and more conservative in economic policy than Gaydar.
With the larger place in security policy being taken by economics and the
importance of relations with the former Soviet republics, the possibility of a less
reform minded conservative security and military policy coming to the fore are
strong. The real question is how long Yeltsin can or will withstand this push to
the right by the Civic Union.
The other critical aspect of the political arena is the formation of the
five member Security Council. The Security Council has the responsibility of:
Ensuring the realization of the functions of the Russian Federation president
in managing the state, shaping domestic, foreign, and military policy in the
sphere of security, preserving Russia's state sovereignty, maintaining
sociopolitical stability and protecting citizen's rights and freedoms.' 4
The power given to the council is enormous, it touches every aspect of Russian
life. It has even been likened to the old Soviet Politburo. 7^ The membership of
Elizabeth Teague and Vera Tolz "The Civic Union: The Birt]
of a New Opposition in Russia?," RFE/RL Research Report , vol. 1
no. 30, 2 4 July 1992, p. 1-3.
'"Decree on Formation of Security Council Issued, " Moscow
Rossivskava Gazeta . in Russian, 10 Jun 92, p. 5, ( FBIS-SOV-92 -112
10 June 19 92, p. 32) .
Yevgeniy Kiselev "Security Council Head on Coup"\Pos3ibility^,
Moscow, Ostankino Television First Program Network, in Russian
1800 GMT 26 Jul 92, ( FBIS-SOV-92 - 144 , 27 July 1992, p. 19;.
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the council is interesting also: Gaydar and First Deputy Chairman of the Supreme
Soviet Sergei Filatov, supporters of the radical reform program; Rutskoi and
Security Council Chairman Yurii Skokov who are opposed to the radical reforms
and are of a more nationalistic bend; and Yeltsin. This leaves Yeltsin as the fifth
and hence deciding vote on any decisive issue, a tough spot for the President and
one that may shift with the political winds.' h Not a position to be in for the
formulation of coherent and lasting security and military policy-
The uncertainty of the political world in Russia, as well as the weak
economy and halfhearted support at best for needed reforms leaves the question
of security and military policy murky at best. What we will now try and do with
this situation is to project where this confusing situation will go to facilitate our
later construction of a model of the future Russian military.
6. Direction of National Security and Military Policy
National security and military policy in Russia appears to be expanding
its definition and decreasing the importance or dominance of the military in
security planning. This is in part due to the greater role that the economy has
assumed in security thinking as well as the obvious decrease in tensions with the
West. The decreasing role of the military in security policy as well as the dire
economic situation of the country will lead to massive cuts in the military as well
Yeltsin's Coup," The Economist , 1 August 1992, p. 41
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as strong attempts at military-industrial complex conversion to civilian uses. 77 All
of this is very reminiscent of Khrushchev and Gorbachev's policies. Arms sales
will be used to bring hard currency into the country as much as possible but the
decreased demand for Russian equipment will limit sales to a few select items,
such as aircraft, ships and submarines. Much of this can also be drawn from
inventory as the Russian military draws down.
The defense of the homeland will be the primary mission of the
military establishment. The primary threat to this being seen as local and regional
conflicts. Worldwide military commitments will not arise outside of the United
Nations or other coalitions. Relations with the West will remain on a more or less
positive level as it is definitely in Russia's interests to have no security concerns
outside of its immediate region, and the influx of Western money is crucial to
success of economic recovery whatever the pace of reform. Collective security
under CIS auspices will be expedient for Russia in Central Asia but will not work
in the West, most notably because of the differences with Ukraine. The question
of defense of the expatriate Russians in the former republics is especially
dangerous, all the more so if Yeltsin shows signs of shifting more towards the
right. The major concern of the military will be with these peripheral conflicts
which will not necessarily assume the character of war between nations but more
As we have attempted in the appendix to show the size of the
military budget will decrease significantly. The actual size of
the budget is unclear at this point but our postulated figure of
4.5% of GNP is in our opinion reasonable. It is worth noting that
that is 4.5% of a GNP that has fallen by as much as 40% already.
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that of civil and guerilla wars. The importance of the military in relation to
society will decrease mainly due to the reductions and the overwhelming concern
with the economy for most Russians. The concern for the social welfare of the
servicemen will remain an important factor in Russian military policv, as the
military is an important political constituency. Military doctrine will be
promulgated but implementation of reforms within the military and the military-
industrial complex will be slow and may not be achieved by the target date of the
year 2000.
B. THE ROLE OF MILITARY DOCTRINE AND STRATEGY
1. Introduction
Historically Soviet military doctrine was formulated from the military
policy of the CPSU. Doctrine still applies not only to the concept of war itself but
also to the entire Russian approach to warfare. According to Marshal Grechko,
writing in 1975, and reiterated by Marshal Ogarkov in 1985, it is the function of
military doctrine to establish:
- What enemy will have to be faced in a possible war?
- What is the nature of the war in which the State and its armed forces will
have to take part?
- What armed forces are needed to perform the assigned missions and in
what direction must military developments be carried out?
- How are preparations for war to be implemented?
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- What methods must be used to wage war? 78
These guidelines are still being utilized in Russia's search for the
development of the correct and proper military doctrine for the country's defense.
Additionally, it is from the prescribed doctrine that leads the way along which
capabilities will follow. Military doctrine, derived from the military policy, is the
master blueprint from which the armed forces will be shaped and built. Doctrine
will define the size and structure of the armed forces and to ensure the
integration of organizations, operational art, tactics and equipments, all of which
enable the military forces to successfully wage war. In effect, doctrine is the glue
that adheres politics to the military.
The term "military strategy", like all other Russian military terms, can
be specifically defined. There is a great difference between doctrine and strategy
and one method of defining it is:
...in wartime, military doctrine recedes somewhat into the background since,
in armed conflict, we are guided primarily by military-political and military
strategic considerations, conclusions and generalizations which stem from
the conditions of the specific situation. Consequently, war is governed by
strategy, not doctrine (emphasis added)".
The quote is meant to emphasize the important relationship of strategy and
doctrine, but it must be remembered that at all times in war and in peace, the
actions of the government are guided by policy.
""M. V. Ogarkov, History Teaches Vigilance , (Moscow:
Voyenizdat, 1934), (JPRS-UMA-85-012 -L, August 30, 1935, p. 16).
"S.N. Kbzlov, The Officers' Handbook , (Moscow: Voyenizdat,
19 7 1), p . 65.
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Within the framework of strategy is the hierarchy of military art
between high-level strategy and low-level tactics, and between these levels is the
intermediate level of war - the operational level. The operational level of war is
defined as the actions of a front or armies within a strategic theater striving to
accomplish a strategic goal.*" The tactical level is defined as actions of divisional
size units and below and includes the distinctive theory and practices of
individual services and branches. Thus the term military art encompasses all
three levels oi warfare - strategic, operational, and tactical.
The "defensive" doctrine announced in the spring of 1987 initiated the
military reform process of the then Soviet Union. S1 Although today Russia is
significantly different from the Soviet Union of 1987, many of the same military
leaders and theorists that had laid the groundwork for the reform are still
debating the issues in the press. Therefore, one can conclude that this reform
process has and will play an important part in the future military-political
landscape in Russia. The current reform process, which is an extension of the
1987 reform, resembles the military reform of 1924-25 because it is highly complex
The correct Russian terminology for combat operations
involving Ground, Air, PVO, and Navy uses Che following scale:
OPERATIONAL STRATEGIC = Front /Army Group/Fleet /Air Defense
District, OPERATIONAL = Army, Corps, Flotilla, and OPERATIONAL-
TACTICAL = Corps, Fleet, Squadron.
For a more in-depth explanation of the defensive doctrine and
"reasonable sufficiency" see thesis by Scott Michael Stanley,
Assessing the Impact of "Reasonable Sufficiency" on the Structure
and Missions of the Former Soviet Naw , Naval Postgraduate School,
June 1992, Thesis Advisor: James J. Tritten.
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and enigmatic. We will first analyze the factors impacting on the reform process
associated with the lively debate that occurred after the 1987 public
announcement of a "defensive" military doctrine, and then provide a useful
framework for defining the Russian variants of military doctrine.
2. The 1987 Doctrine Reform
Although a new "defensive" doctrine was announced in 1987, there was
not much public debate within the Soviet Union mainly because the effects
perestroika and glasnost had not been fully felt by the Soviet society. The real
debut of the reform debate was brought into the limelight by the September 1988
issue of the monthly magazine Twentieth Century and Peace . 82 In this issue there
was an enumerated round table discussion of the cadre-militia system.
Participants in the discussion were members from the Main Political
Administration (MPA), representatives of IMEMO and the Institute of the USA
and Canada, and the journal International Affairs . The discussion centered on the
basic question of: "What type of army do we need?" 83 Some of the key issues that
were raised by the participants included: How to understand the concepts of
threat and security in the modern world? Whence the threat to the Soviet Union?
Was it militarv, political, or economic? What did the Soviet Union need to meet
"This article is consideied by many to be the first or one o:
the first discussing the new military doctrine.
Eugene B. Rumer, The End <jt a Monolith: The Politics o:
Militarv Reform in the Soviet: Armed Forces , (Santa Monica: RANI
Corporation, August 1990), p. 3-4.
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this threat? What kinds of forces were necessary?*1 These questions were not
specifically answered in the article but they reappeared in almost identical context
in the draft 1992 military reform text and have always been represented in some
part of the formulation of doctrine in the Soviet Union. The presence of such a
debate in the press managed to catapult the discussion of military reform into the
forum of open public discussion and could possibly be seen as the basis for some
of these questions in future doctrinal statements.
In November of 1988 LtCol Alexander Savinkin, who was part of the
earlier round table discussion, published an article in the Moscow News titled
"What Kind of Armed Forces Do We Need?"*" In this article Savinkin accepted
the premise oi a "defensive doctrine" and went on to discuss the future structure
of the armed forces. He presented the case that the USSR should adopt a cadre-
militia system, consisting of "a relatively small, perfectly technically equipped,
professionally trained and mainly voluntarily staffed military organization
supported by a broad network of local militia formations.'"*6 Savinkin's arguments
were similar to those of Trotskv which were based on ideology and economics.
Savinkin argued that a cadre system, founded on volunteerism, would
"'ibid, 5.
LtC'nl Alexander Savinkin "What Kind of Armed Forces Do We
Need?" Moscow News , November *' , 1 9 '•• '-' , no. 45, p. 6.
David Holloway "State, Society, and the Military under
Gorbachev", International Security , vol. 14, no. 3, (Winter
1939/90), p. 16-1".
considerably reduce the military economic burden, and more importantly, that the
reform is urgent because although the strength of the Armed Forces lies in its
popular support, there is a "certain dislocation of relations between Soviet society
and its armed forces." Savinkin blamed this dislocation on manv factors
including; the slower pace of pcrcstmikn in the military; the influence of the war
in Afghanistan; and the lack of information in Soviet Society about defense policy
and life in the armed forces/'
There was immediate reply from the military elite whom rejected the
cadre-militia system for various reasons. The concept of volunteerism was
attacked because instead of saving funds it would most likely increase military
expenditures and furthermore, there would probably never be enough volunteers
to man the large force that was outlined. The military elite were obviously still
undecided on how large a force was needed for the defensive doctrine of
"reasonable sufficiency." The opponents to a cadre-militia system went on to
argue that if the armed forces consisted of a territorial-militia system and part-
time soldiers, the majority of territorial militia troops would not be able to deal
with the complexities of modern weapons and warfare. Savinkin defended his
proposals with the help of the "classics oi Marxism-Leninism" and "true"
interpretations of the revolutionary experience. He explained that a proper
application of Marxist-Leninist teachings mandates the replacement of a regular
Holloway, op. cit., p. 1'
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army with a militia. Furthermore, Savinkin explained, the establishment of a
regular army during the civil war a temporary aberration resulting from the
extreme circumstances of the times and was corrected by the military reform of
1924-25.
Another important article in the debate emerged in the late summer of
1990. Major-General V. Ivanov wrote an article titled "Proposed Reform of Armed
Forces Outlined," in which he prescribed the reformed armed forces should
consist of three contingents:
The first contingent comprising personnel, weapons, hardware, and
military equipment and property will be kept in a state of permanent
combat readiness and will always be ready for combat employment.
It should combine nuclear and space-based weapons, the bulk of the
Air Defense Forces, part oi the Air Force, a specific section of the Navy
and the highly-mobile Ground Forces. Its strength and composition
could change depending on the military-political international situation
and the economic situation in the country. In all cases, it should be
sufficient in order to resolve a conflict in an individual region by
emphasis on its defensive role and in order to ensure the deployment
of the second contingent in the event of war. The second contingent
will be the largest. It will include reserve personnel, weapons,
hardware, and material and technical supplies intended for the
formation of units, combined units, and large strategic formations in
the event of war. Apart from the reserve elements, the units in this
contingent will also include regular personnel. The latter will make up
one-third of the first contingent. As regards the contingent's general
numerical strength and composition, this will be determined by the
strategic plans for the combat employment of the Armed Forces. The
third contingent will focus on training and alternative service. Its
principle function will be to ensure that all the country's citizens do
regular military service on the basis oi the Law on Military Service
Obligation. Approximately 600,000-700,000 persons will make up this
contingent. ...This contingent will be one of the main sources for
bringing the first and second contingents up to full strength on a
voluntary basis (according to contract) and in the transitional stage it
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will be the main source. Civil defense units can be included in this
contingent. 88
This article also made the point that the military needed to make transformation
from the reliance of quantity to that of quality- Of the many problems plaguing
the military, Major General Ivanov specifically identified cumbersome and
overlapping forms of command and control of the different branches of the
Armed Forces, poor maintenance of equipment, lack of social protection for
servicemen, and lastly even a criticism oi using the military to help with the
agricultural work every year. This document was highly critical of the military
and attempted to provide solutions for many of the problems the military had
and also attempted to provide a rough outline of what the force structure of the
military should be. Such specific proposals and public debate had never existed
prior to this time.
3. Russian Variants of Military Doctrine
In mid-1988 Andrei Kokoshin (then a renowned civilian analyst and the
current Russian Deputy Minister of Defense) and Major General Valentin
Larionov put forth four variants that could be used in assessing the nature of
future military doctrine for the USSR. 8" These four variants were originally
"'Major General V. Ivanov "Radical Renewal or 'Cosmetic
Repair'?," Moscow, Kommunist Voor^zliennvkh Sil , in Russian, no 15,
August 1990 (signed to press 27 July, 1990) p. 15-20, ( FBIS-SOV-90-
180-3, 17 September 1990, p. 40-44).
"'Andrei Kokoshin and Valentin Larionov, "Counterposit ioninc
Conventional Forces in the Context of Ensuring Strategic
Stability, " Mirovava Ekoncmika I M^zlb.iunarodnvve Otnosheniva ( Worlc
Ab
developed for evaluating the theoretical and schematic options that might be used
for the draw down and stabilization of the NATO-Warsaw Pact balance. In
evaluating the current reform package, the relevancy of the framework is still
appropriate.
Variant One: Each side configures its forces to respond to an attack
with an immediate strategic counteroffensive. Larionov and Kokoshin
characterized this variant as one in which each side would "strive to transfer
combat operations to enemy territory and airspace as rapidly as possible." This
variant can be characterized by the Battle of Manchuria where the Soviet military
pre-empted the Japanese with a attack that was a surprise on all three levels;
strategic, operational, and tactical. The key to this operation was advances of
between 30-80 kilometers per day in adverse weather over difficult terrain. Also
much of the offensive was conducted at night with simultaneous operations. This
variant was the predominant strategy oi the Soviet Union during the Cold War
and apparently still has substantial support in Russia today, but is economically
difficult if not impossible and geographically unnecessary. This variant is quite
dangerous since once hostile actions are taken by one side or another, a chain of
events could be unleashed that might inevitably lead to nuclear war. This variant
is definitely not contained in the current draft doctrine.
Economics and International Relation,.--. ) , no. 6, June 19 8 8, p. 23-31,
Translated by Dr. Harold S. Orens tie in, Soviet Army Studies Office,
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
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Variant Two: Each side renounces offensives in the initial stage of
conflict and resorts only to defensive operations. This variant is best
characterized by the Battle of Kursk in 1943. In Kursk, the Soviet Union absorbed
the first blow and was on the operational defensive, shifted to a tactical counter-
offensive, then they went to the operational counter-offensive, and eventually
crossed the border in an operational-strategic offensive and fought and defeated
the enemy on his own terrain. This variant is inherently less dangerous for
escalation than the first variant, yet can still lead to nuclear actions through
escalation. From the point of view of Kokoshin and Larionov, NATO's doctrine
of flexible response falls into this category since a conventional war could
eventually grow into a nuclear one. Additionally, the force structure needed for
this variant is the same as that for variant one, thus making it less than
satisfactory for the US.
Variant Three: Each side maintains forces sufficient only to rout an
attacking formation on its own territory without initiating a counteroffensive
beyond its own borders. This variant is epitomized by the Battle of Khalkin Gol
of 1939 (or the third period of the Korean war), where General Zhukov pushed
and ejected the invaders to the border but did not cross the border and carry the
battle into enemy territory. General Zhukov was forced to do this since he did
not have the capability to conduct an operational offensive. The danger in this
variant lies in defining the size of the territory lost and whether each side will or
will not agree to respond merely by restoring the status quo ante, and suppress
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its thirst for vengeance. The advantage to this variant is that the force structure
is observably different than that in variant two.
Variant Four: Each side agrees to settle for a purely defensive
posture without any means for conducting offensive or counteroffensive
operations. Napoleon's march on Moscow is the best historical example of this
variant which could also be named "General Winter" or "Field Marshal Famine."
In this variant, the enemy is attrited constantly with local/tactical counter-attacks,
but defensive forces lack the military strength to eject or push the enemy back to
his territory and cross the border. Kokoshin and Larionov suggested this was the
variant that Gorbachev's doctrine should be. They also noted that such a balance
"must not possess strike aviation or weapons that are sudden in effect (such as
reconnaissance-strike complexes) or that have great mobility and striking power
(tank and air-assault divisions)" - which were the main respective advantages of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact. They concluded that a military organized along the
lines of this variant would constitute a genuine "non-offensive defense." in which
"the concept of victory exists only on a tactical scale," and could be achieved by
both sides.
4. The 1990 Draft Military Doctrine and Reform
The debate over doctrine, strategy and structure, was ongoing for the
next eighteen months and finally resulted in the Ministry of Defense publishing
a draft "law on defense" (which would codify the specifics of military reform).
This law was then to be considered bv the Defense and State Security committee
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of the Supreme Soviet. This draft military doctrine was published in a Special
Issue of Voi/cijiuu/a Mysl in 1990, and was a product of the public discussion of the
previous two years. The draft stated that the content of the military reform is:
...creating a mechanism for ensuring national security and effective
military organizational development and bringing the USSR Armed
Forces into conformity with the level of real military danger and new
political, economic and social conditions. 4"
This military reform draft was then debated openly debated with the
only real consensus being that the military should become "professionalized."
There was still much disagreement on how large a military is needed for a
doctrine founded on "reasonable sufficiency" It is important to note that the
ongoing changes in Eastern Europe were having an effect on the debate by the
"hawks" who were not happy with the loss oi the military forces in the "buffer
zone." The internal political struggles within the Kremlin were also pulling the
military in different directions, as exemplified by the attempted coup in August
of 1991.Q1
After the attempted coup, the question of military reform still remains
and has probably moved to the forefront of any task facing Russia besides that
of economic reform. The debate is still in the open forum and the Russian
' Military Thought , 1990 Special Issue, Moscow, Vovennava Mvsl .
in Russian, (signed to press 30 Nov 90), p. 2, ( JPRS-UMT-91-001-L,
3 January 1991, p. 2) .
•Suffice it to say, most experts would agree that if the
military had obeyed all their orders and performed their tasks as
their superiors believed they would, the situation in Russia would
be much different today.
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Ministry of Defense has published another revised draft military doctrine that
superseded the 1990 draft.Q: There are major changes in the content and some of
the wording can be directly attributed to the new geo-strategic situation Russia
finds itself in. Nevertheless, this new draft doctrine within the realm of military
reform has been a matter for public discussion which until recently has been
unprecedented in Russia." 1
5. The 1992 Draft Military Doctrine
The 1992 doctrine debate is just as lively as that which proceeded from
the 1987 announcement of a "defensive" doctrine. A good sample of the public
discussion on the reform process and the emerging doctrine and strategy can be
found in almost any publication in Russia. For example, recently in the liberal
newspaper Nczavisunaya Gazetci there was an article that was openly critical of the
current military's forming of an overly aggressive doctrine and strategy which
said:
Despite the large number of dangers and threats, the international situation
for Russia on the whole now is more favorable than it has been at any other
time in the 20th century. The main threats have shifted to within the CIS.
There is no danger for example, that we are suddenly going to be attacked
''Military Thought , 1992 Special Edition, Moscow, Vovennava
Mvsl . in Russian, (signed to press i'< May 1992), p. 2, (JPRS-UMT-
92-00S-L, 16 June 1992, p. 1-12).
Mikhail Tsypkin, "Glasno.-.r and Secrecy in the Soviet
Military," Naval Postgraduate School, MPS-NS-91-002 , (December
1990) p. 3 8-39.
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by American missiles or that the Bundeswehr is going to embark on a
military campaign. 44
This open public discussion, with opinions coming from several
government officials, is difficult to interpret due to the great variance in the tone
and substance oi the declarations. Obviously, some of the officials in the Russian
government are pandering to the public's longing for the great imperial Russia,
while other pragmatists are attempting to initiate genuine reform. This
dichotomy of views can be seen clearly in the struggle between President Yeltsin
and Prime Minister Gaydar on one side, with Vice President Alexander Rutskoi
and Arkadii Volsky (Head of the military industrial complex) on the other side.
Vice President Rutskoi is one of the many officials of the Russian
government to discuss the reform process in public. Much of his interest in the
military stems from the fact that he was a highly decorated fighter pilot in
Afghanistan, and was probably put on the Yeltsin political ticket specifically to
get the military vote. He does have the support of the military and sees eye to eye
with the Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev. Recently Vice-President
Rutskoi outlined the three phases of military reform that he believes should take
place. Although the term "three phases of reform" has been used frequently in
Russian military literature in recent months, this outline was one of the most
'Daniel Proektor, "Opinion: What: Are the Real Threats We Face:
More on Russian Military Doctrine, " Moscow, Nezavisiinava Gazeta , ir
Russian, 21 July 1992, p. 4 ( JPR:.- I7MA-92-030, 12 August 1992, p.
4) .
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specific yet outlining the reform schedule and agrees with the later published
draft military doctrine:"5
First Stage (during 1992): To set up the Russian Defense Ministry,
while it obviously would be expedient to assign the functions of the
General Staff to the CIS Joint Armed Forces General Staff, with the
subsequent withdrawal from its composition of the organ which will
carry out the functions of the Commonwealth joint Armed Forces Staff.
To assume full jurisdiction over troops (forces) located on Russian
territory and abroad, including troops on the territory of CIS states
which do not form part of their national armies. To immediately
create a system of social guarantees for servicemen and members of
their families, as well as for persons who have either been discharged
(including prematurely) from military service into the reserves or have
retired on pension. It is important to speed up the elaboration and
ratification of the numerical strength and structure of the Russian
Armed Forces, and to define the procedure, stages, and deadlines for
reforming and reducing them. Particular attention should be paid to
creating a legal basis for the functioning of the Russian Army, taking
due account of the norms of international law and the agreements
reached within the CIS.
Second Stage (1993-1994): To continue reducing and reforming troops,
and basically to conclude the withdrawal of troops onto Russian
territory (from Germany, Poland, and Mongolia) and creating Armed
Forces groupings. During this stage, it is necessary to stabilize the
situation in the Armed Forces: To switch to a mixed acquisition
system, combining the draft with voluntary entry into military service
by citizens on a contract basis; to raise the prestige of military service
through legal protection, preferential access to all material comforts,
high wages in excess of, or commensurate with, those received in
industry and taking account of the risk factor, and introduction of
insurance policies providing not just an existence but a dignified life
for servicemen and members of their families in cases of disability or
death. The branch structure of the Armed Forces (Strategic Rocket
Forces, Ground Forces, Air Defense, Air Force and Navy) should be
retained until the end of this stage. This will make it possible to
preserve the existing system of command and control safety and
Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, "We Must Build an
Army Worthy of Great Russia," Moscow, Krasnava Zvezda , in Russian,
22 May 1992, p. 1-2, ( JPRS-TAC-92-02 , 29 June 1992, p. 43).
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combat ability while avoiding any extra expense. Clearly, at the least
in the transition period, there is a need to retain military districts,
given their important role in settling troops withdrawn onto Russian
territory, organizing, and providing for them.
Third Stage (1995-2000): To completely withdraw the troops from the
Northwestern Group of Forces (the Baltic countries).This process could
be accelerated if these countries were to agree to reciprocal actions
(that is, we leave garrison installations and housing facilities in the
Baltic countries, and the Baltic countries build garrison installations
and housing facilities in Russia for the troops being withdrawn.)
Furthermore, it is necessary to complete the cutbacks in the Armed
Forces in line with the START and CFE Treaties, and to reform them
and transfer them to new organizational structures taking due account
of the reorganization of the Armed Forces' branches and categories of
troops. In particular, it is necessary to set about gradually reducing
and reorganizing the command and control of military districts. And
through this, to strengthen army and corps organs of command and
control and their complement.
The predominant themes of this outline are the slow and methodical
consolidation of former out-of-area Soviet forces onto Russian territory, combined
with an orderly restructuring of the military from the top down. As one can see
from this program, the Russian military has a very challenging task to complete
by the year 2000. Also the timetable reference to the withdrawal of forces from
the Baltics is being influenced by certain government officials wanting to ensure
the safety and rights of ethnic Russians living in those countries. This is an
ongoing point of contention between the Baltics and Moscow, and will no doubt
continue in the near future.
The 1992 draft military doctrine appeared in a special edition of
Voyennaya Mysl ( Military Thought ) in May. This draft was somewhat different
54
from the 1990 draft in that it was developed on the basis of defense documents
that were approved by President Yeltsin and that it:
...assumes cooperation with member-states of the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) in accomplishing joint defense tasks based on
bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental treaties and agreements. 4 ' 1
The doctrine also includes the standard Soviet view that military
doctrine is a "historical category" based on several factors, which include the
state's domestic and foreign policy; its sociopolitical, economic, and geographic
characteristics; and the level of development of science and production. Also the
new doctrine adheres to the view that two integral parts of military doctrine are
political and military-technical, the political aspect addresses issues such as the
balance of forces in the world; the probability and sources of war; the
sociopolitical dimension and goals of war; and the state's attitude toward war as
an instrument of policy.
The military technical aspect is more concrete in that it defines the
strategic assessment and planning; the employment and preparation of the armed
forces; and the training, equipment and preparation of the armed forces. This
doctrine like the 1990 predecessor, considers the political aspect to be more
important than the military-technical aspect.
Not to be forgotten, is the possibility of another doctrine for the CIS
joint forces. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turmenistan have announced
Military Thought . 1992 Special Edition, (JPRS) p. 1
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that they will form their own armed forces on the basis of the old Soviet army
units that are deployed in their respective territories, but reportedly these units
will remain under CIS joint command for several months.97 These joint forces will
eventually become purely national forces but this transition is likely to last more
than a few months, and consequently they will require a separate doctrine or
these states will adopt Russia's new defensive doctrine. This concept does have
a historical precedent since in the Civil War, such coalition forces existed.
The definition of a threat is key in formulating military doctrine, and
this search has been ongoing in Russia. Some Russian literature implied that the
prevailing mood of the Russian military was that the main threats to Russia
existed mainly on the periphery and with internal conflicts. This view was
immediately under attack when the Defense Planning Guidance scenarios were
leaked in February of 1992. The so called "Lithuanian scenario" was directly
aimed at Russia as was the definition of a possible future "re-emergent regional
threat." The Russian literature immediately published responses to the article
and the tone resembled the following excerpt:
...all the United States' actions and intentions unequivocally suggest that
Russian is still its potential enemy, and only people totally devoid of
patriotic feeling cannot see this.
98
'"Dmitriy Trenin, "Divide and Flourish?," Moscow, New Time;
International , in English, No. 36, Sep 92, p. 12-14, ( JPRS-UMA-92J
038, 21 Oct, 19 92, p. 7) .
: Eduard Volodin, "Our 'Potential Ally' is Watchful," Moscow,
Sovetskava Rossiva . in Russian, 24 Mar, 1992, p. 3. ( FBIS-SOV-92-




This type of reaction in the open literature will no doubt have an impact on the
future policy, strategy, and doctrine of Russia.
6. The New Strategic Missions of the Draft Doctrine
Previously the major strategic goals and strategic missions of the
former Soviet armed forces were openly discussed in military literature. These
had gone through visible changes in the past and US national security was
influenced by these variations through the years. The traditional post World War
II strategic missions of the USSR that were derived from military doctrine were
clearly offensive. These missions were: (1) strategic nuclear strikes, (2) military
operations (voyennyye deystviya) in a land theatre, (3) defense of the nation from
enemy strikes, and (4) military operations in a naval theater. The formula for
defensive war in defense of the homeland could not be reduced to only defensive
operations and it was necessary to defend one's land with offensive strategic
operations (strategicheskaya operatsiya) on foreign territory (variant one).
These strategic missions did not change greatly in the Brezhnev years.
Since doctrine does serve as a blueprint for the development and strategy of
military art this resulted in an armed forces organizational development practice
which was clearly offensive.
Although there were attempts to conceal it, the offensive flavor of the
military doctrine was present to the mid-1980's. The great change most likely
occurred in the military doctrine of the Warsaw Pact that was adopted in May
1987. The new thesis of "preventing war and preserving peace" combined with
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concepts of "reasonable sufficiency" and a "defensive defense" appeared to be a
clear departure from the previous offensive doctrine and strategic missions. The
strategic missions in the mid to late 1980s were apparently changed to: (1)
repelling enemy aerospace attack, (2) suppression of enemy military-economic
potential, and (3) destruction of groupings of enemy armed forces^ The missions
included in the 1987 announcement and the draft doctrine that appeared in 1990
have been debated on both sides of the Atlantic as to their real meaning;
defensive-defense or offensive-defense?
The new strategic missions of the 1992 draft doctrine has put that
question to rest. Not only are the following missions defensive in nature, they
also appear to be in harmony with the economic realities of Russia :
- (1) deterrence of a potential enemy from aggression;
- (2) the repelling of a surprise aviation-missile attack and protection of the
main administrative-political and industrial centers and other important state
installations;
"Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Sergey Georgiyevich
Gorshkov, ed
.
, The Naw : Its Role Prospects for Development, and
Employment , in Russian, (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1983), (Naval
Intelligence Command translation, p. 27-33); Captain 2nd Rank V.
Dotsenko, "Soviet Art of Naval Warfare in the Postwar Period,
"
Moscow, Morskov Sbornik . in Russian, No. 7, July 1939, p. 22-28
(NIC-RSTP-113-89
,
p. 31-39) ; Georgxy M. Sturua, "A View on the Navy
through the Prism of Military Perestroika, " Moscow, Mirovava
Ekonomika I Mezhdunarodnvve Otnosheniva . in Russian, No. 5, 1990,
( JPRS-UMA-90-016, 11 July, 1990, p. 49-51). In addition, two of
the new strategic missions, "repelling of a missile attack frorr
space" and the "utter routing of the armed forces and military
potential of the enemy, " were specifically criticized by Aleksey G.
Arbatov, thus indicating that they exist. See his "Defense
Sufficiency and Security," Moscow, Novove v Zhizni. Nauke,
T^khnike: Seriva "Mezhdunarodnava" , in Russian, No. 4, 1990, (JPRS-
UMA-9 0-0 08-L, 2 June, 199 0, p. 20).
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- (3) delivery of retaliatory strikes to deprive the aggressor of the opportunity
to continue to conduct large-scale military actions, the disruption of his ability
to reconstitute his armed forces, and the weakening of his military-economic
potential;
- (4) the repelling of an invasion from land, sea and air, holding the most
important areas of the country's territory, and the destruction of penetrating
enemy groupings;
- (5) disruption of new attempts to renew the aggression. 100
These strategic missions and the doctrine they are derived from are clearly
different than the pre-1987 strategic missions. Only the prevention oi nuclear
missile war has carried down from the previous doctrine (also the reference to
high-technology is noteworthy).
Under this new 1992 defensive doctrine, James Tritten puts it best
when he says "the revised military mission is to defeat the invading force and to
prevent vertical and horizontal escalation or the escalation of the conflict over
time." This is in compliance with the 1990 USSR draft and the previous 1987
announcement of a "defensive defense" but has visibly crossed the line into the
defensive arena and does not even appear to inlude even a reference to an
offensive-defense. Most importantly, the visible lack of emphasis upon the old
theatre strategic offensive operations that warranted NATO and a strong US
presence in Europe, is conspicuously absent. Admittedly, the authors of the 1992
draft see the prevention of war more economically feasible than preparing for and
conducting war. The authors also refard political means as the most stable and
reliable way of establishing security.
- Vovennava Mvsl , Special Edition, (signed to press 19 May
1992) p. 2.
59
Also noteworthy is that the new doctrine commits the Russian military
to continue to support and participate in multinational security forums. Mutual
security both within the CIS and globally is present and based on the assumption
that security is established through mutual action and consideration. No state or
coalition of states may seek to enhance its security at Russia's expense.
The possible threats to Russia present in this doctrine take basically
two forms. First the statement of intent to protect ethnic Russians has never
before been part of the tenets of any Soviet doctrine and is clearly aimed at the
Baltic nations:
A violation of the rights of Russian citizens and of persons who identify
themselves with Russia ethnically and culturally in former USSR republics
can be a serious source of conflicts. 101
The second threat is a reference to the danger and possible danger that
can be expected if foreign states or coalitions station or build-up large
concentrations of of military forces near Russia's borders. This statement is
probably intended to discourage the US, NATO, or any other country attempting
to fill the vast vacuum created by the strategic withdrawal of Soviet forces from
Eastern Europe. This is also most likely a veiled warning to the southern Muslim
nations to discard any notions about interference within Russian /CIS affairs.
In sum, from the epoch of the October Revolution to 1987 Soviet
military doctrine did not envisage preventive, predatory wars. It was always
•Mill tar-/ Thought . 1992 Special Edition, (JPRS, p. 2
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based on the repulsing of possible agression as the the principal political goal
which in the military-strategic aspect translated into varying offensive structures
which could effectively enact a surprise strategic offensive on a global scale. The
willingness to carry out the bulk of defensive operations on Russian territory in
war of defense of the homeland has been the Wests' defining measure of a truly
defensive doctrine. This change form an offensive doctrine probably changed in
1987 with the announcement of "defensive-defense" and with this new 1992 draft
doctrine the debate has been adjourned; there is no question on its defensiveness.
C SUMMARY
The future of the Russian military will be determined by the national
security policy, military policy, doctrine and strategy adopted by the state. As we
have seen the driving force for the changes that we see today and will most likely
see in the future is the economy. From the economic perestroika of Gorbachev to
the radical reforms of Gaydar the impact upon the military of economic change
has been enormous. This will continue for the foreseeable future. The estimated
budget from the appendix may be a rough guess but if the figures are anywhere
near correct the Russian military faces continued inability to train, perform
maintenance, construct new weapons and will even have difficulty in research
and development. This will have a major impact upon the force structure as we
will see in succeeding chapters.
61
The political changes in Russia will also have an enormous effect upon the
policy and doctrine the military will operate under. The swing toward
conservatism by the Yeltsin government carries with it the seeds of even worse
economic and ethnic troubles. These factors will no doubt be reflected in the
drastic reductions called for in the latest doctrine and the emphasis upon local
and regional threats. Again these factors will help shape the force structure for
the future. Also the temporary, and maybe longterm, presence of joint forces
under CIS Russian command translates to a univeral CIS doctrine or a variant
doctrine specifically for these joint units.
The language of the 1992 draft doctrine and it's apparent adherence to the
third variant has set the stage for the structural reform of the armed forces. It
should be kept in mind that both variant three and four represent General Major
Alexander Svechin's views of a "war of attrition" that will be discussed in the next
chapter. It is with these thoughts in mind that we now examine a historical
precedent for the current reform process.
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III. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT FOR CURRENT MILITARY REFORMS
A. INTRODUCTION
Currently in Russia there are at least three types of reform: political,
economic, and military. Admittedly all three are intertwined but the latter clearly
has the most pertinence to the national security of the United States. Russia is
definitely not an economic power and her impact in the foreign policy arena has
decreased significantly with the death of communism. For over four decades the
US military was poised to act against Soviet and Warsaw Pact military aggression.
Today it is a foregone conclusion that in the near future there is a greatly
diminished chance of a coordinated operational-strategic level military offensive
against the US or NATO by any military that was part of the former Soviet
Union. It is also presumed that if such a threat to the US national security were
to exist in the future there would be sufficient time to reconstitute the US military
in order to respond to that threat, specifically "8-10 years." 102 The next logical
question then is whether the U.S. will have enough warning time to act against
any threat and whether that threat will be posed by the reformed armed forces
of the Russian Federation or any other former republics acting unilaterally or in
a coalition. By understanding the dynamics and trends involved in the current
"Admiral David E. Jeremiah, USM, "Beyond the Cold War, " U. S
Naval Institute Proceedings , 118, no. 5 (May 19 92), p. 55.
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Russian military reform, US policy-makers may be able to better address this
question.
B. THE HISTORICAL PRECEDENT
When the Soviet Union declared a move toward a more "defensive" doctrine
in 1987, many western strategists in the world were puzzled and questioned
whether this was just another form of Soviet "nuiskirovka."m This doctrine, based
on a concept of "reasonable sufficiency", was also analyzed by Soviet civilian and
military theorists in order to determine the impact of such a doctrine on military
art, strategy, structure, and equipment.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union and the emergence of Russia as the main
inheritor of the armed forces of the USSR, Russian authorities have continued the
discussion of military reform, mainly because of the new world security
environment and the economic situation in their country. In typical Russian
military fashion, many of the theorists attempting to define the new doctrine in
• The concept of defensive sufficiency originated early ir
Gorbachev's tenure as General Secretary of the CPSU. It providec
a means by which to challenge the military's monopoly on national
security policy. In its original life it was meant to describe a
level of armed forces sufficient to 'repulse any possible
aggression but incapable of being used for offensive purposes.
(Reply, dated 16 November 1937, from Mr. Gorbachev to a letter fror
four members of the Pugwash Study Group on Conventional Forces ir
Europe. See, Journal of the American Scientists, vol 41, no. 2,
February 1988) 'Reasonable and reliable sufficiency for defence
was officially enshrined in Gorbachev's landmark UN speech ir
December 1988.
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specifics searched for an historical precedent for the current reform process and
found it in the Soviet military reform of 1924-25.
The 1924-25 military reform has been a topic of study for many western
analysts, as can be shown in the various references in this paper. Additionally,
the use of the Soviet military reform of 1924-25 as an historical surrogate was
discussed and recommended to the authors in Moscow, in Julv 1992. This
recommendation was made by several high ranking officers of both the Military
Historical Institute of Russia (which is subordinate to the Ministry of Defense),
and the Frunze Military Academy.
The present military leadership in Russia will no doubt review the reform
process of 1924-25 and try to reproduce its successful elements while ensuring
that errors made earlier are corrected in the present reform process. The mixture
of economics and politics today is admittedly quite different than the 1924-25
reform, yet the effects of both of these are most assuredly the driving forces in
both reforms.
One of the major military theorists/strategists important to the 1924-25
reform was General-Major Alexander Svechin. His writings are enjoying a
resurrection and are being studied by many authoritative figures in Russia. 1U4
1
'General Alexander Svechin ' s book Strategy , (Minneapolis:
Eastview Press, 1992, A translation of: Strateaiia . Moscow:
Voennyi vestnik, 1927. Edited by Kent D. Lee) has been republished
in 1991 with forewords by General Lobov, former Chief of Staff of
the Soviet Armed Forces, and the current assistant Minister of
Defense of Russia, Andrei Kokoshm. Additionally the rebirth of
the writings of Svechin was evident in the discussions conducted
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Additionally the lengthy debates between M.V. Frunze, Ye. Vorishilov, Leon
Trotsky, and Alexander Svechin among others can also be used in a parallel
manner to shed some light on the murky reform process that will have a direct
impact on the Russian armed forces of the future. The study of the 1924-25
reform is even more appropriate today than in 1987 when the "defensive" military
doctrine was announced. This is due to the many parallels, both internally and
externally, that Russia finds itself in since the attempted putsch and the break-up
of the Soviet Union.
This section will examine the military reform of 1924-25 in comparison to the
ongoing military reform, and then analyze the parallels and differences of both
reforms within the context of economics, politics, and geography. Lastly, this
analysis will offer some conclusions about the outcome of the current reform
process and its effect on the armed forces of the Russian Federation in terms of
doctrine, strategy, and structure.
C. THE MILITARY REFORM OF 1924-25
The end of World War I and the subsequent end of the Civil War in Russia
left the country in dire economic straits. Agricultural and industrial output by
1921 was less than 50% of prewar levels. 1 " -1 A number of plants and factories
between the author and representatives of the Russian military
during the author's trip to Moscow in July of 1992.
1
" Jstoria SSSR v dokumencakh i illvustratsivakh (1917-1980
[ History of the USSR m Documents and Illustrations (1917-1980) 1 ;
Moscow, 1931, p 89. Footnoted in article by LtCols P.F. Vashchenkc
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were not operating due to the lack of fuel and raw materials, and the agricultural
output was devastated by a bad harvest. This appalling economic condition made
it infeasible to maintain a 5.5 million man army. The Lenin government
understood that it had to act quickly in order to keep the populace under control
by improving economic conditions. A New Economic Policy (NEP) was put into
effect while at the same time the strength of the army dropped to 516,000 men by
October 1923." 1" The move to reform the military for "peacetime" was also
impacted by the more stable and less hostile international environment of the
time. On the 16th of April, 1922, the Soviet Union and Germany signed the
famous Treaty of Rapallo and by 1925, a sizeable number of Asian and American
nations, and a majority of the European states, established diplomatic relations
with the Soviet Union. 107
By the mid-twenties the domestic situation in the Soviet Union had
considerably improved. The NEP was proving to be successful and this in turn
insured the temporary control of the peasant population. This improvement,
and V. A. Runov : "On Military Reform in Prewar Era, " Moscow,
Vovenno - 1s i or i cheskiv Zhurnal , in Russian, no. 12, Dec 89, p. 3 3-
40, ( JPRS-UMA-90-010, 25 April 1990, p. 53).
: Panov, B.V. , Kiseiev, V.N., Kartavtsev, I.I., ec al., The
History of Military Arts: A Textbook for Mi lit air/ Academies of the
Soviet Armed Forces , (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1984), p. 84 (JPRS-UMA-
35-009-L, 21 March 1985, p. 84)
.
"LtCols P.F. Vashenko and V.A. Runov: "Military Reform in the
USSR, " Moscow, Vovenno-Isvoricheskiv Zhurnal , in Russian, no. 12,
Dec 89, p. 33-40, (JPRS-UMA-90-010, 25 April 1990, p. 53).
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though, was to be reversed in the near future due to a change in leadership. On
21 January 1924, Vladimir Il'ich Lenin, founder and leader of the Communist
Party and the Soviet state died. The death of Lenin had a palpable effect on the
military since he was also responsible for laying the foundations of the Soviet
regular army and had shared many of Trotsky's views of reform in the context
of the post civil-war environment.
1. The Debate
Throughout the 1920's there was extensive debate on the future role of
the armed forces of the USSR and its military doctrine, strategy, and structure.
As mentioned above, one of the key figures debating these issues was the former
Imperial Army officer and General Staff Academy professor, General-Major
Alexander Svechin. Another key figure in the debate was the People's Commissar
of War, Leon Trotsky. Both had similar views on military concepts and both
became political casualties of Stalin's rise to power.
Svechin agreed with Trotsky that the concept of offensive and
defensive military actions were as important in the military as they were in the
political sphere, claiming that the offense and defense were dialectically
connected. Svechin also believed that a military strategy of attrition should be
adopted by the Soviet Union because of the poor economic state of the country.
This strategy of initially accepting the defensive and trading real estate for time




10K The offense of World War I and the Civil War was still a vivid
memory in the minds of the ruling elite and combined with the theory of the
superiority of the socialist revolution, led to a preferred offensive military
strategic concept. 109 Furthermore, the proposition of trading space for time was
a form of criticizing the state of economic affairs in the USSR with little faith for
its improvement in the future.
Svechin and Trotsky also did not find the battle record of the Red
Army in the civil war awe-inspiring. They both were wary of formulating a
military strategy out of historical experiences, such as the Civil War. instead,
Svechin and Trotsky adhered to the belief that each military confrontation should
be evaluated within the temporal and spatial context in which it occurs. In their
opinion, strategy and doctrine should only have general guidelines since it is
difficult to classify something that is ever-changing and fluid. 110
Whereas Svechin agreed with Trotsky on the view of the equality oi
offensive and defensive actions at the political and military level, he took the
problem one step further with his views on "types of wars." In Svechins opinion,
1
'This was exemplified in the Treaty of Brest -Litovsk .
"
'The offensive was conventional wisdom prior to World War I
in the context of the czarist offensive strategy. Additionally the
experience in the civil war illustrated that offensive accion was
needed to expel the "whites" and the intervening forces of the West
and Japan
.
Sally W. Stoecker, Historical Roots of Contemporary Debates
on Soviet Military Doctrine and Defense , (Santa Monica: RAND
Corporation, 1991), p. 1-6.
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the greatest military decision facing the political leadership was to decide whether
to employ a war of attrition or a war of destruction. His view was that a war of
attrition would be strategically correct for the Soviet Union. This belief would
lead to his eventual demise in the late 1920's. (Coincidentally, this strategy was
actually applied by Stalin during first two stages of the 2nd Great Patriotic War.)
Svechin's writings and his ideas were under attack by the military establishment
(most importantly Mikhail Tukhachevskii) and the majority of the military
establishment while the socialist "offensive" military doctrine and strategy came
into effect with the leadership change of the late 1920's.
2. The Gusev Commission
In an effort to resolve the problems of military reform, the plenary
session of the Revolutionary Communist Party (RKP(b)) Central Committee, held
in January 1924, appointed a special commission headed by S.I. Gusev to conduct
an investigation on the situation in the Armed Forces and to recommend action
to strengthen their combat efficiency. 111 The commission noted many major
discrepancies and concluded that "our Red Army at present does not exist as an
organized, trained, [and] politically educated force supplied with mobilization
reserves. At present, in its present form, the Red Army is not battle-worthy." 112
Frunze was Chen replaced by Voroshilov as head of th
People's Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs and A.S
Bubnov took over the post of People's Commissariat for Military an
Naval Af fairs
.
••-LtCols P.F. Vashchenko and V. A. Runov, "Military Reform i
the USSR," p. 33-40, (JPRS, p. 53).
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These deficiencies in the Armed Forces were ascribed to Trotsky, who was the
head of both the Revolutionary Military Council of the USSR and the People's
Commissariat for Military and Naval Affairs. Most importantly, the Commission
also decided that the structure (size) and combat training requirements of the
Armed Forces was incompatible with the country's economic means. 113 The
measures proposed by the Commission and subsequently approved by a Central
Committee Plenum became the program which was termed the military reform
of 1924-25 (In practical terms the reform continued through 1928). 1U The purpose
of the military reform of 1924-25 was:
aimed at bringing the organization of the troops, the system of their
manning, training and indoctrination into accord with the new conditions
in the life of the Soviet State and the tasks of protecting the nation.""
In May of 1924, the 13th RKP(b) Congress approved the resolutions of
the Gusev Commission. The basic resolutions of reform were a reorganization in
the leadership bodies of the Armed Forces, an improvement in the organizational
structure of the military and the axioms of their training and indoctrination, the
introduction of one-man leadership, and most importantly the conversion to a
•' ; S.A. Tyushkevich, The Soviet Armed Forces: A History of
Their Organizational Development , Moscow, 1978, p. 14 3. Published
under the auspices of the United States Air Force and translated by
the CIS Multilingual Section Translation Bureau Secretary of State
Department, Ottawa, Canada.
:
-"LtC'ols P.F. Vashchenko and V. A. Runov, "Military Reform in
the USSR," p. 33-40, (JPRS, p. 53).
• :
'
History of Military Arts: A Textbook for Military Academies
of the Soviet Armed Forces , (JPRS, p. 35).
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new manning system. Ub The conversion to a new manning system was by far the
most controversial reform presented and enacted on. The debates on the
conversion to a new manning system would be prophetic for future reforms as
well.
3. The Restructuring
During the reform there were several streamlining measures adopted,
one of which was to have the RKKA (Worker-Peasant Red Army) Staff include
the following directorates: Operations, Organizational-Mobilizational, Military
Lines of Communications, Intelligence and Combat Training. 117 Also the
personnel strength and the bureaucracy of the higher command organizations was
severely reduced leading to increased efficiency and a 70% reduction in reporting
requirements for the army. Lastly, there was legislation introduced to render
legitimacy on the structure of the Armed Forces.
Also, related to the leadership structure reform were similar initiatives
in training and indoctrination. This took the form of formulating original
regulations and manuals which had never existed in the RKKA. In order to
create this written framework for the military input was solicited from many
sources: chairs of military academies, military publications, and other civil-
• : The History of the Military Arts: A Textbook for Militar
Academies of the Soviet Armed Forces , (JPRS, p. 85)
.
TsGASA (Central State Archives of the Soviet Army) , folio 4
inv. 1, file 743, sheet 21. Footnoted in "Military Reform in th<
USSR, " by Runov (JPRS)
.
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military officials. In this area the undisputed leader was Frunze because of his
inventing of the basic precepts of Russian military theory which up to this time
had never existed in written form. The guidance of Frunze was evident by his
input to the regulations and manuals being written. He personally edited the
second portion of the RKKA Provisional Field Manual (Division, Corps), and
wrote several articles concerning war and the army. 118
The concept of one-man leadership was an indicative sign of reform
because of the leadership's view of the unreliability of certain former "White
Officers" in command positions. This particular reform had two steps. In the first
step the unified command concept was split between the complete and the
incomplete. A complete command organization was defined as an organization
where there was only one commander who was in charge of all the normal
military duties in addition to being responsible for the duties assigned to the
commissar. An incomplete command organization was defined by the commissar
being responsible for the party and political work while everything else was the
responsibility of the commander. 119 Because of the paranoia of the Communist
party over their retention of power, this reform went quite slow since only party
members who had both command experience and the proper ideological
background were difficult to find.
'Runov, "Military Reform in the USSR, " (JPRS, p. 60
'Erickson, op. cit
.
, 1961, p. 195-199.
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4. The Cadre-Militia System
As mentioned above, one of the most consequential measures debated
and ultimately adopted was the issue of establishing a qualitatively new system
for manning the Armed Forces. The crux of this debate centered on a territorial
militia system verses that of a purely professional force. Initially, the Communist
civilian leadership was leaning toward the creation of a territorial militia system,
and at the Ninth Communist Party Congress in 1920 the decision was made to
transform the Red Army into such a system. 120 This decision was greatly
influenced by Trotsky, who supported the territorial militia system on both
ideological and economic grounds.
Frunze, on the other hand, vehemently opposed the territorial militia
system. 121 Frunze and the majority of the military elite, were fearful that such a
system would severely weaken what little military professionalism was left in the
armed forces. The argument against a territorial militia system was made during
1920 and early 1921 and resulted in a compromise being reached at the Tenth
Communist Party Congress in March 1921. The final result was a compromise
between the Trotsky and Frunze proposals which became known as the cadre-
militia system.
-Roman Kolkowicz. The Soviet: Military and the Communist
Party , (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985), p. 44.
:
-'D. Fedotoff White, The Growth of the Red Army , (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1944), p. 183.
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When the system was originally organized, the cadre consisted of a
562,000 strong regular standing force including the entirety of naval and air force
personnel. 1" In the ground forces, the cadre accounted for two-fifths of the
artillery and infantry, four-fifths of the cavalry, and all of the technical personnel
(tank, armored-car units, engineers, signal service troops, air force personnel,
etc...)
123 The composition of the military clearly shows that the well-trained cadre
dominated the more elite sectors of the armed forces while assigning most of the
unskilled foot soldiers to the militia. This form of the cadre-militia system was
in reality a victory for Frunze since it was based in large part on the strength of
the cadre forces but it would not stand the test of time.
In the incipient stage of the cadre-militia system the territorial militia
had far more personnel. This balance changed in the middle 1930's when by 1936
the cadre strength was 77% of all divisions. 124 This was the predominate trend
and continued till the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 which eradicated the
territorial system completely and reverted back to the full-time conscript force.
•--Michael Garder, A History of the Red Army , (Washington:
Praeger, 1966), p. 58. A cadre-militia system in this context is
an army that has a smaller regular active-duty militia force and
also has professional active-duty cadre personnel in key positions
of skeleton military organizations that could quickly assimilate
reserve personnel into the organization and use the structure to
build effective military units.
:: ibid.
: - 4 ibid.
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D. PARALLELS OF THE 1924-25 AND 1992 REFORMS
The most evident parallel of both the 1924-25 and the ongoing reform period
is that they are taking place in a post-war environment. The end of World War
I, and the Civil War in Russia precluded the earlier reform period, while the
epilogue of the Cold War is just now being written.
Secondly, the end to hostilities and /or confrontation in history has always
been related to economics, and in both of these reform periods the reform is
inextricably linked with economics again. The economic situation is a major
driving force in Russia today and no doubt will continue to be early into the next
century. 12 ^ The economic situation is a factor in every decision that is being made
whether it affects the political leadership or something as simple as the transition
to an all volunteer military. The danger here is that the economic situation in
Russia today could also be said to be quite similar to that of "Weimar Germany"
after World War I, which brought Hitler and Fascism into power.
Thirdly, the political maneuvering that is taking place in Russia today is also
very analogous to the earlier reform of 1924-25. Several months ago, President
Yeltsin declared that he would not run for the presidency again in 1996. 12" This
was probably an attempt to prove to the Russian populace that he has no long
term aspirations for power, and that he is holding the office solely for patriotic
-The attached budget appendix provides an in-depth look at
the budget problems facing the Russian military today.
•-Alexander Rahr , "Challenges to Yeltsin's Government, 1
RFE/RL Daily Report , 4 March 1992.
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sentiment to the "Motherland" and to introduce and establish democratic reform
to Russia. Unfortunately, this tactic has backfired in a sense that since his
declaration prospective leaders seem more eager to criticize the Yeltsin
government while putting forth their own agendas. As discussed earlier, the
future political scene in Russia is murky at best but conservative nationalistic
tendencies appear to be on the rise.
In more practical terms, a good example can be given in the military-
technical sphere of doctrine. In working out the procedures for purchasing
military material the Russian Defense Ministry is attempting to reduce the
nomenclature of the military gear and is trying to adopt a policy of unification
and standardization. 127 The size and inventory of the Russian combat vehicle
inventory was so vast that it was resulting in costly operation and crew training.
This practical problem will be solved by "streamlining" the inventory to fewer
basic combat vehicles.
E. DIFFERENCES IN REFORMS OF 1924-25 AND 1992
The vital dissimilarity between both the 1924-25 and ongoing reform period
would unquestionably have to be the appearance of nuclear weapons. These
weapons have drastically changed the strategic landscape of the world ever since
•- Interview with First Deputy Minister of Defense of the
Russian Federation Andrei Kokoshin by Marina Cherunukha and
Vyacheslav Terekhov; place and date not given; from the "Nation and
Society" feature - transmitted via Kvodo . Moscow, Interfax in
English, ( JPRS-TAC-92-025 , 17 August 1992, p. 9-10).
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their appearance in 1945. Nuclear weapons permanently impacted the nature of
geo-strategic thinking and their existence will most assuredly still play a key role
in Russia's doctrine, strategy, and structure in the future.
Another striking difference in the reform periods was the way the Gulf war
was viewed by many senior military members as a "revolution of military affairs.''
This was seen by some as providing proof positive to the predictions of General
Nikolai V. Ogarkov who predicted, as early as the 1970's, an impending "Military
- Scientific Revolution." 128
The problem of converting the populace to any specific ideological system,
such as Communism, is also conspicuously absent in this reform period. This
was a motivation for many of the actions taken by the government in the earlier
reform period that does not have relevancy in the current reform. Some argue,
however, that the move to democratic reform in Russia will be met with the same
amount of resistance as the conversion to Communism was several decades ago.
Geography, as always, has been a major determinant in the military policy
of Russia and the Soviet Union, and may be even more so during the 74 years of
Communist rule. The most important point about Russia's borders of today is
that they are completely unique. Never before in the history of Russia has the
- : For an in-depth look at the Soviet view of the recent
"military- technical revolution" see Mary C. Fitzgerald, "The Soviei
Image of future War: 'Through the Prism of the Persian Gulf',
Comparative Strategy , vol 10, no. 4, (1991): p. 393-435.
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country had this geographical configuration. This aspect of geography and its
impact on military doctrine will be discussed in the following chapter.
F. SUMMARY
In summary, the comparison of the military reform of 1924-25 with the
current military reform is useful in terms of analyzing the similarity and
differences of economics, politics, and geography present in both reform periods.
Most importantly this comparison can also prove useful in forecasting the general
direction that the current military reform is taking. Basically the similarities of
both reforms can be summarized as a vast restructuring of the armed forces, a
move to a cadre-militia system, and a new military strategy. The emphasis of this
comparative analysis lies in the impact that economics will have on the emerging
military doctrine. The economic constraints will force a more defensive strategy
(variant three), that is probably going to be based on the Svechin strategy of
trading ground for time while at the same time protecting valuable strategic
assets. Secondly, economics will force the vast reduction and restructuring of the
military and force it to accept a manpower concept of a mixed conscript-volunteer
force that will be based on a combination of territorial and extra territorial
principles. And lastly, the unpredictable mix of politics and economics will also
play a vital role during the reform process.
79
IV. RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES IN THE YEAR 2000
A. INTRODUCTION
Now that we have examined the policy, doctrine and strategy that the
Russian military of the year 2000 will be drawn from, we turn to the individual
services for a more in depth study of how each will fair under the new reforms.
The strategic nuclear forces are all grouped together for ease of study and will be
dealt with first. The ground forces will then be discussed and will include a
section on the impact that the CFE treaty will have on Russia. The air defense
forces, air forces and the navy will follow. It is not the intent of this section to
postulate exact numerical order of battles (OOB) for the different services. It is
the intent of this chapter to examine trends in reform of each service in order to
present a reasonably accurate macro view of their status in the year 2000.
As noted earlier, according to the reform plan for the Russian military, by
the year 2000 the total personnel of the Russian Armed forces will probably stand
at close to 1.5 million. 129 The ground forces then will most likely still occupy the
largest percentage of the force though not to the extent of the past and probably
""This was also seated by President Yeltsin who envisages ai
Army which is professional, mobile, unburdened by administrative
structures - small, but large enough to defend the country. Ii
this same article the cut of the armed forces is said to be fror
2.5 million to 1.5 million or 1.25 million. "Armed Force;
Resurrection Linked to Statehood," Moscow, Teleradiokompaniy<.
Ostankino Television First Program Network, in Russian, 2000 GMT,
9 May 1992, ( FBIS-SOV-92-092 , 12 May 1992, p. 27).
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stand at approximately 720,000. The existing general purpose forces will be
professional, structured around a defensive doctrine that emphasizes high
mobility and high operational readiness, and most importantly equipped with the
some of the most modern conventional equipment.
B. THE STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES
With the breakup of the Soviet Union the question of the fate of the nuclear
weapons it possessed has been at the top of Washington's list of priorities. It has
also been a high priority for the former republics, especially those that possessed
the strategic nuclear weapons, Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus. The
process of all tactical nuclear weapons being delivered to Russia is well underway
but the status of strategic systems is a little less certain. The view of the strategic
nuclear forces as a tool of deterrence and as "a guarantor for Russia and all CIS
countries against the initiation of any war, not just nuclear war" 131 is still strongly
held by many in Russia. The statement on military priorities issued by the
Supreme Soviet Presidium also shows the high importance and reliance upon
nuclear deterrence when it states that "adequate means of preventing world wars
" This figure is based on Che assumption of 60 divisions with
approximately 12,000 personnel per division.
* ;
'General Grachev even goes on to say that development of
strategic arms should be given priority along with certain other
areas of weaponry. P.S.Grachev "Basic Content of Russia's Military
Doctrine and of the Russian Armed Forces Organizational Development
Concept, " Moscow, Vovennava Mvsl , in Russian, Jul 92, Special
Edition, p 103-117, ( JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 September 1992, p. 59-
60) .
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directed against Russia and other CIS member states is provided by the strategic
nuclear forces". 132 The continued presence of strategic nuclear weapons is not in
doubt for either the former Soviets or the West, the question is however, the
number that will be in the Russian/CIS arsenal in the year 2000, who will control
the weapons and what do they intend their policy for them to be? This is a
question we need to answer to facilitate formulation of a projected force level for
the year 2000.
1. Control of Strategic Nuclear Forces
The four nuclear holding states of the former Soviet Union have agreed
that eventually the Russian Federation will be the only nuclear power. 133
However the problems that have arisen from this agreement have not yet been
solved. Kazakhstan and Belarus have agreed in total to the removal of strategic
nuclear weapons from their soil, to Russia. Ukraine on the other hand has
insisted that all nuclear weapons it now holds must be destroyed on Ukrainian
territory, not transported to Russia. This in essence has left Ukraine holding
strategic nuclear weapons which it has then exerted dual administrative control
over with the CIS Joint Armed Forces. 134 This has potential for trouble not only
-"Presidium Statement Released," Moscow, Krasnava Zve zda , ir
Russian, 15 Apr 92, p. 2, ( FBIS-SOV-92 - 07 5 , 17 April 1992, p. 47)
LTCol Anatoily Dokuchayev "Outcome of CIS Nuclear Force;
Debate Viewed, " Moscow, Krasnava Zvezcia , in Russian, 14 Oct 92, p.
1, (FBIS-SOV-92-2Q0, 15 October 1992, p. 2),
; ibid.
82
between the former republics but also with the West over the START treaty and
the Washington agreements. The four former republics have signed a protocol
to the START treaty but implementation may be difficult with the friction arising
from this dispute.
The operational control of the weapons stands today under the aegis
of the CIS Heads of State and the commander in chief of CIS Joint Armed Forces
Marshal Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov. The Russian Federation President has
operational control over all strategic nuclear weapons in consultation with the
leaders of the states in which the weapons are located, all exercised through
Marshal Shaposhnikov. 1 '^ Presumably, when all weapons are on the territory of
Russia complete control will pass to Russia's General Staff and be delegated to the
CIS Joint Armed Forces commander in chief as deemed necessary. As it is now
the forces located in the former republics are administratively controlled by
Russia, jointly only in the case of Ukraine.
The distribution of the strategic nuclear forces is relevant at this point.
The numbers of deployed strategic nuclear warheads as of June 1, 1992 for all of
the former Soviet Union stood at 10,053 and are distributed as follows: 13"
Andrei Naryshkin "Ministers Discuss Nuclear Strategy,"
Moscow, Itar-Tass , in English, 1524 GMT, 3 Sep 92, ( FBIS-SOV-92-
173, 4 September 1992, p. 5).
• The numbers for this table are drawn from the study of
nuclear issues by the International Institute for Strategic Studies












In terms of these warheads; Russia possesses 80%, Ukraine 10%, Kazakhstan 6%,
and Belarus 4% of the former Soviet Union's strategic nuclear arsenal. n7
Specifically: Ukraine has a reported 176 ICBM's and 43 bombers; Kazakhstan has
104 ICBM's and Belarus has mobile ICBM's, none have nuclear submarines. 138
These numbers are significant in light of the Washington agreements of this
summer as we shall show shortly.
It is also important to note that the strategic nuclear forces are still
divided between the Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Force and the Navy. The reform
program expounded by Alexander Rutskoi and other officials calls for
reorganization of the branches of the military in the third stage, from 1995-2000.
The creation of a new force comprised of the strategic nuclear forces and PVO
warning and ABM systems has been called for in recent years. The new service
would be called the Strategic Deterrent Forces (SDF). 139 This reorganization has
•"Dokuchayev, (FBIS) 2.
:Air Force Major General (Ret:) Boris Surikov "Russia Urged
Mot To Ratify Arms Cut Accord," Moscow, Pra vda . in Russian, 21 Jul
92, p. 7, (FBIS-SOV-92-143 , 24 July 1992, p. 3).
- Army General and at the time Chief of the General Staff of
the USSR Armed Forces Vladimir M. Lobov dealt with this
reorganization in his article "Military Force Generation
[Scroitelstvo] : On a New Foundation," Moscow, Vovennava Mvsl . in
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not been talked about much lately in the Russian press which may indicate
resistance by particular services or the acknowledgement that the funds will not
be available for the proposal in the near future.
2. Nuclear Strategy
The strategy for strategic nuclear weapons that Russia and the CIS are
proceeding from is that the possibility of world nuclear war is not permissible.
The conclusion is then drawn from this statement that the real role oi these
weapons is deterrence of attacks, conventional and nuclear upon the homeland. 140
The prevention of war and the rejection of the first use of nuclear weapons appear
to be hallmarks of the new military doctrine of Russia. 141 Retaliation with massive
strikes would also appear to be part of the doctrine. 142 This is consistent with
counter-value targeting vice counter-force. As Raymond Garthoff has said it
would appear that the American idea of "deterrence by punishment" has taken
some root in Russian strategic thinking. 143 Transitioning from counter-value to
Russian, No. 10, October 1991, p. 2-10, ( JPRS-UMT-92-004-L, 11
February 1992, p. 4).
' 4 LT . General Prof. Yevgeniy Volkov "Conditions for Cuts in
Strategic Arms Listed, " Moscow, Krasnava Zvezda , in Russian, 31 Jul
92, p. 3, (FBIS-SOV-92-149, 3 August 1992, p. 2).
"-Grachev, (JPRS) 59.
:4
"LT. General Volkov "Strategic Missile Troops: Purpose,
Missions," Moscow, Vovennava Mvsl , in Russian, Jul 92 Special
Edition, p. 57-60, (JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 September 1992, p. 31).
•"Raymond Garthoff "The tightening frame: mutual security and
the future of strategic arms limitation" in Soviet Strategy and New
Military Thinking , Derek Leebaert and Timothy Dickinson ed., (New
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counter-force targeting is not just a matter of doctrine but must take into account
that the high levels of warheads still constitute a counter-force capable arsenal.
Deep reductions called for by START and the 17 June 1992 Washington
agreements are a good step in lowering the counter-force capabilities of the
Russian strategic nuclear force. Unfortunately the status of these cuts is uncertain.
Also, fames J. Tritten points out, correctly, that the present levels of Russian
strategic nuclear weapons along with ongoing research and development give
credence to the belief that the Russians have not accepted mutual assured
destruction completely. Tritten then goes on to say that this offensive capable
arsenal does not necessarily mean an offensive nuclear doctrine. 144 For the time
being the declaratory policy of the Russian doctrine will have to be looked at
closely until the numbers come more in line with the espoused targeting regime.
The policy of no first use of nuclear weapons has come under much
scrutiny of late in Russian military circles. The direction that this scrutiny has led
to calls for a renunciation of this policy and removal of any mention of nuclear
weapon use from the doctrine. 14 " The arguments have been raised that no nation
can predict what situation will arise in the course of a conflict which will call for
York: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 59.
;
"James J. Tritten, Our New National Security Strategy:
America Promises to Come Back , (Westport: Praeger, 1992), p. 74-75.
•"Colonel-General I.N. Rodionov "Approaches to Russian
Military Doctrine, " Moscow, Vovennava Mvsl . in Russian, Jul 92,
Special Edition, p. 6-14, ( JPRS-UMT-92 -012-L, 30 September 1992, p.
6) .
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the first use of nuclear weapons, and that the avowal to not use them first
actually gives the aggressor the advantage.' 4" While it does not appear that the
statement calling for no first use of nuclear weapons will actually be removed
from the doctrine, it is probable that a looser interpretation of it will be adopted
by the Russian military. Defense Minister Grachev has stated that Russia retains
the right to use "those kinds, forms and methods of military action which are
most effective in a given situation". 147 This is not only in connection with nuclear
weapons but all methods of repelling aggression.
The concept of parity has been much debated lately in the Russian
press. The question has come up due to the perceived injustices of the
Washington agreements of 17 June 1992. The military establishment has pulled
out all the stops in calling for the maintenance of the "military-strategic parity
between Russia and the United States". 148 The Russian military establishment has
even called for increases in funding of nuclear systems while asserting that the
"nuclear parity unquestionably must be maintained" 149 There have been
statements to the contrary saying that the concept of parity has become obsolete
and that Russia can even survive without it, as France and Great Britain have,
4 Major General A.I. Vitkovskiy "Principles of Employing the
Russian Armed Forces, " Moscow, Vovennava Mvsl . in Russian, Jul 92,




^ Volkov, (JPRS) 31 .
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however these comments have come from non-military personnel. 1?,) While it is
true that parity can be achieved at lower levels of warheads the conservative
faction in Russia today does not feel that the lower levels offered by the
Washington agreements equal parity at all. The warhead levels that are being
discussed are only one aspect of parity, it is in the other areas that the
conservatives feel the balance is tilted in the US favor. The agreements of 17 June
1992 and the START treaty have had a tremendous impact upon the debate over
strategic forces in Russia so it would benefit us to look a little closer at these two
accords.
3. START and the Washington Agreements of 17 June 1992
The START treaty was originally signed by the US and the USSR on
July 31, 1991. With the coup coming only days later and the subsequent fall of
the Soviet Union the US sought guarantees from the newly independent states
that the terms of the treaty would be met by all. Russia, Ukraine, Belarus,
Kazakhstan and the US signed a protocol to the treaty in Lisbon on 23 May 1992
addressing just this problem. Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus pledged their
desire to become nuclear-free countries and to abide by the treaty- Russia will
receive the weapons that will be removed from the other three and conduct
-
r
~ Sergey Blagovolin "Revised Concept of U.S. Nuclear Parity
Viewed, " Moscow, Krasnava Zvezda , in Russian, 14 Jul 92, p. 3,
(FBIS-SOV-92-136, 15 July 1992, p. 4), and P. Belov "Impact of
Nuclear Force Ceilings Questioned," Moscow, Komsomol skava Pravda .
in Russian, 20 Aug 92, p. 3, ( FBIS-SOV-92 - 163 , 21 August 1992, p.
2) .
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destructions in accordance with the treaty stipulations. However, the problem of
destroying the weapons in place was addressed by Ukraine obliquely in its letter
to President Bush, lr>1 and more directly in later weeks. If Ukraine continues to
insist that the covered weapons be destroyed on Ukrainian soil there may well
develop serious problems with treaty compliance by the former Soviets.
Russian leaders accepted START and the role as the nuclear successor
to the Soviet Union. While this agreement was being signed in Lisbon the
groundwork was being laid for the radical cuts put forth by Presidents Bush and
Yeltsin on 17 June 1992. These proposed cuts went far beyond anvthing in
START. The main provisions of the agreement were as follows:
Within the seven year period after START goes into effect
-overall number of warheads down to 3800-4250 as each nation will decide
-1200 MIRVed ICBM warheads
-650 heavy ICBM warheads
-2160 SLBM warheads
By 2003 or earlier with U.S. financial assistance
-overall number of warheads down to 3000-3500 as each nation will decide
-elimination of all MIRVed ICBMs
-SLBMs down to 1700-1750 as each nation will decide 152
•The oblique reference noted was "Chat the process of
elimincic ion of nuclear weapons in Ukraine should be carried out
under reliable international control which should guarantee the
non-use of nuclear charge components for repeated production of
weapons and should prevent their export to other countries". This
clearly is in reference to Russia gaining material if destructions
are conducted in Russia vice Ukraine. Leonid Kravchuk ' s letter to
President Bush, dated May 7, 1992, Official Text: The Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty , U.S. Arms Control And Disarmament Agency
Washington D.C., Office of Public Affairs, 22 June 1992, p. 3.
•
-George Bush and Boris Yeltsin "Joint Understanding On The
Elimination Of MIRVed ICBMs And Further Reductions In Strategic
Offensive Arms," Washington D.C. 17 June 1992, US Arms Control And
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The changes called for in this agreement created deep discontent in the
conservative Russian military establishment. The themes most used by Russian
conservatives in calling for the rejection of the agreement are; the loss of parity
with the US, the unfairness of eliminating ICBMs such as the SS-18 where Russia
has the advantage and preserving SLBMs where the US has a decided edge, the
cost of destruction in so short a time period, the destabilizing factor of a proposed
global ballistic missile defense system, the lack of controls on other strategic
weapons such as cruise missiles, and the perceived vulnerability of a lower
number oi nuclear weapons to conventional attack.153 The strong criticism of this
agreement comes at the same time that President Yeltsin, Prime Minister Gaydar
and Foreign Minister Kozyrev are under heavy attack by conservative political
forces. Even Russia's Defense Minister has stated that reductions in strategic
Disarmament: Agency Fact Sheets: Arms Control-Related Material From
The Summit Meeting Between US President Bush and Russian Federation
President Yeltsin, Washington, D.C. 16-17 June 1992, Washington,
D.C. , 2 2 June 1992
, p. 7 .
•'There are numerous articles and speeches that stamp out the
conservative opposition to the agreement. Some examples are: P.
Belov "Impact of Nuclear Force Ceilings Questioned," Moscow,
Komsomol skava Pravda . in Russian, 20 Aug 92, p. 3, ( FBIS-SOV-92
-
163, 21 August 1992, p. 2); an interview with Gennadiy Khromov of
the Ministry of Industry, "'Expert' Interviewed on Nuclear Arms
Cutbacks, " Moscow, Krasnava Zvezda . in Russian, 25 Aug 92, p. 3,
(FBIS-SOV-92-166 , 26 August 1992, p. 2); Air Force Major General
(Ret) Boris Surikov "Russia Urged Not to Ratify Arms Cut Accords,"
Moscow, Pravda . in Russian, 21 Jul 92, p. 7, ( FBIS-SOV-92 - 143 , 24
July 1992, p. 3); Lt . General L.I. Volkov "Conditions for Cuts in
Strategic Arms Listed, " Moscow, Krasnava Zvezda , in Russian, 31 Jul
92, p. 3, (FBIS-SOV-92-149 , 3 August 1992, p. 2) and "Conditions
for Cuts in Strategic Arms Listed, " Moscow, Krasnava Zvezda . in
Russian, 31 Jul, p. 3, (FBIS-SOV-92-149, 3 August 1992, p. 2).
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nuclear forces must be militarily and economically optimal for Russia and not
alter the parity between the US and Russia. 1 "4 This does not bode well for
implementation of the agreement. The agreement has not been met with
universal condemnation, support has come primarily from the civilian institutions
that have stated the need for a new approach to Russia's strategic nuclear
policy. 1^ As James Tritten shows the possibility of levels of strategic nuclear
weapons with the equivalent megatonnage value of as low as 400 had been
discussed since 1987 by reform minded persons in Russia. 156 However the
discussion today contains little reference to these radical proposals and seems to
be solely concerned with high numbers of warheads only. The positions of the
conservative detractors of the agreement carry far more power and influence than
these civilian 'think tanks', and consequently the chances of the conservative view
becoming more influential in policy formulation is high. Again this does not
bode well for the prospects of the agreement. Now from this point we can
develop some sort of a projection for the shape of Russia's strategic nuclear forces
for the future.
•"Grachev, (JPRS) 60.
"Sergey Blagovolin, president of the Institute of National
Security and Strategic Studies, has written two articles addressing
two aspects of the agreement: "Revised Concept of US Nuclear Parity
Viewed," Moscow, Krasnava Zvezda , in Russian, 14 Jul 92, p 3,
(FBIS-SOV-92-136, 15 July 1992, p. 4); "Necessity of Global
Protection System Viewed, " Moscow, Krasnava Zvezda , in Russian, 7
Aug 92, p. 3, ( FBIS-SOV-92 - 15 6 , 12 August 1992, p. 2).
•
T
Tritten, Our New National Security Strategy , p. 73-74.
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4. Towards the Year 2000
Undoubtedly Russia will maintain strategic nuclear weapons for the
foreseeable future. The deterrent factor of these weapons against world class
aggression, will be especially useful in the period where Russia is chiefly
concerned with its internal and regional problems. During this period the ability
to ward off major extra-regional aggression will allow the Russian military to
concentrate on issues such as protection of national minorities and conflicts with
peripheral countries. This would seem to argue for maintenance of a strong
nuclear potential that is not threatening to the other nuclear powers. Large
reductions in strategic nuclear forces below START levels, publishing of a military
doctrine that renounces first use of nuclear weapons, joint inspection and
cooperation agreements on research and development would help lower the fears
of other nations. The agreements of Washington were a large step in this
direction. President Yeltsin's desire to decrease the nuclear inventory may even
lead to attempts at even deeper reductions. 1 "7 This represents the best scenario
the US can hope for in the strategic nuclear field. Unfortunately this is dependent
upon the good standing of reform minded individuals in positions such as
• Grachev stated that reductions below this number of 3000-
3500 are possible but only if negotiations include China, France
and Great Britain. He also stated that the ABM treaty needed to be
strictly observed, no doubt a reference to SDI . This statement was
made shortly after the agreements were signed and before the
conservative tilt was so pronounced in Russian political circles.
This coupled with his previously conservative remarks at the May
conference leaves his true inclinations open to question. "Grachev
Says More Nuclear Cuts Possible, " London, Financial Times , in
English, 25 Jul 92, p. 2, ( FBIS-SOV-92 - 152 -A, 6 August 1992, p. 1).
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Foreign Minister, Prime Minister and Defense Minister not to mention President.
As we have seen this is increasingly doubtful with the rise of the conservatives.
The chances for the codification of these agreements into a treaty is becoming
more problematical by the day.
The worst scenario for the West would be total repudiation of both the
Washington agreements and START due to the rise of an ultra-conservative
government. This scenario would obviously be cause for great concern and a re-
evaluation of US security priorities. Fortunately the chances of this happening
appear slim. The strongest political alliance in Russia now is the centrist Civic
Union. While this alliance and the conservative Russian military have called for
revisions in the Washington agreements they have not called for scrapping
START nor total repudiation of the proposed agreements. Downsizing in all areas
of the military appears to be most likely as the economic situation is so poor.
Thus some reductions are actually agreed to even by the conservative elements
of society.
There is a middle ground between these best and worst case scenarios,
one in which START is fully implemented and where negotiations will take place
for the implementation of the new agreements. These agreements will have to be
substantially modified in the Russian view but the principle of lowering strategic
nuclear weapons has been accepted by most players on the scene. The pressure
placed upon the government by the more conservative elements of the military
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and the opposition parties will in our opinion prevent codification without major
changes being included in the agreement.
The changes most needed in the conservative Russian view include
extension of the ABM Treaty to preclude any Western fielding of an SDI type of
system which is argued to be fundamentally destabilizing. 158 This debate over
ABM systems is still ongoing between conservative and reformers. The
contentious question as to whether even a limited system, such as the proposed
Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), is acceptable remains
unanswered. The conservative opposition to even GPALS will be significant if
the swing to the right by Yeltsin continues. The reduction of the Strategic Rocket
Forces by such a considerable amount as seen by the huge drop in ICBMs is
another serious problem in the conservative view. This may be institutional bias
against the loss of prestige of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) but probably also
reflects the traditional philosophy of the Russian military. The creation of the
Strategic Deterrent Forces may be an attempt to ameliorate the ruffled feathers of
the SRF. The weighting of strategic arms to a more sea-based component is not
seen as in their interests either. With these and other arguments on the
agreements the Russian conservatives fear losing "parity" and will most probably
call for re-negotiating the agreements. 159 President Yeltsin will be unable to
'Volkov, (JPRS) 32.
Volkov, (JPRS) 31-32, and Grachev (JPRS) 60
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withstand the political pressure to step back from the accelerated reductions he
has already agreed to with President Bush.
The re-negotiation of the agreements will not effect START which will
be adhered to, but the level of reduction over and above that treaty will have to
wait till beyond completion of START reductions, i.e. the year 2000. The numbers
of strategic nuclear weapons will probably be in the range of 6000 warheads for
Russia, MIRVs will not be eliminated totally, and the structure of Russian nuclear
forces will remain weighted towards landbased systems. 160 Some illustrative
numbers for a future Russian strategic nuclear force in terms of deployed












:The numbers for this table are drawn from an analysis by the
authors of which type of weapons the Russian are most likely to
destroy as they reach obsolescence. It is assumed that only the
most modern delivery vehicles will be retained and will be capable
of carrying their full compliment of warheads. The vehicles
include: six Typhoon and seven Delta IV submarines; all SS-13's;
all mobile ICBM's; a small number of other ICBM's; and most ALCM
capable bombers. These estimates are based upon the extreme
economic difficulties posed by maintenance of existing older
vehicles and developing newer ones. Original numbers are drawn
from The Military Balance 1992-1993 , p. 227.
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It must be noted that these numbers are highly subjective at this point but could
represent the approximate level of warheads by the year 2000. Reductions beyond
the year 2000 are possible. The ICBMs will be the most modern including the SS-
18 and mobile launchers. The SSBN fleet will continue to operate as a deterrent
but at reduced levels in terms of actual hulls. The quality per hull will increase
however as the older, less reliable vessels are decommissioned. The newer
Typhoons and Delta IVs will probably be the only remaining SSBNs by the year
2000. This is in part due to budgetary restraints and to the START which calls
for reductions of 47.9% in ICBMs and SLBMs 162 . As we have stated earlier the
conservative swing of the government and military may make it difficult to ratify
the Washington agreements of this summer. If this can not be accomplished the
Russians may be more inclined to reduce SLBMs and retain heavy ICBMs where
they have an advantage. Therefore we will assume that the order of battle will
consist of: six Typhoons with twenty SS-N-20 MOD 1 or 2 missiles each, totalling
960 -1200 warheads 11'3 ; and seven Delta IVs with sixteen SS-N-23 misses each,
totalling 448 warheads 164 . As stated by Andrei Kokoshin and Rear-Admiral Pauk
earlier the SSBNs will patrol the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea.
1
"Eric Schrnitt "Sharp Senate Debate Over Pact Seen" The New
York Times , 19 July 1991, p. A7 .
Duncan Lennox "Soviet Naval Strategic Nuclear Weapons"




Return of strategic nuclear systems from the other republics will be
completed but only after much negotiation with Ukraine. Research and
development of future generations of strategic nuclear systems will remain a
priority and continue but will be hampered by the greatly decreased budget.
President Yeltsin has declared that production of the Tu-160 Blackjack will stop
at a level equivalent to the Bl-B and that production of the Tu-142 Bear will stop
altogether.'^ Russian strategy will be deterrence by punishment through the
threat of massive retaliatory strikes, but the interpretation of when aggression
actually begins and the use of nuclear weapons is then permissible will remain
ambiguous.
C. THE GROUND FORCES
1. Introduction
It cannot be disputed that the ground forces, more than any other
branch, are being affected by the most drastic reform since the previously
discussed 1924-25 reform. Part of this can be explained by the apparent loss of
stature of the ground forces. As will be explained in the following paragraphs,
it appears that the historic dominance by the ground forces over the General Staff
has apparently come to an end based on several important events.
The first was the appointment of Air Marshall Yevgeniy I.
Shaposhnikov as head of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS. The appointment of
Jane's Defense Weekly . (08 Feb 92), 186
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an Air Force officer to head the Armed Forces was a first in the history of
Russia. 166 This was a political-military decision that can be attributed to the
dedication of Shaposhnikov to democratic reform, and also to the leadership's
view of the importance that air power had in the Gulf war. Related to this event
is the fact that the newly appointed Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev has
a background of light infantry and airborne operations. This will no doubt affect
the future structure of the military since Grachev is a proponent of mobile forces
that are equipped with "high-tech" weapons.
The many changes taking place in the ground forces will no doubt set
the stage for the reform process that will reconfigure all parts of the armed forces.
This is due to many factors, one of which is the previously mentioned fact of the
historical seniority that has traditionally been held by the ground forces. Since
the ground forces have traditionally been held in high esteem within the military
community/ the changes taking place within this branch will influence all the
other branches.
Just one example of the many important vast changes taking place in
the military that will have far reaching ramifications is the restructuring of the
military district system, which will result in there being probably only eight
At the time of the appointment of Marshal Shaposhnikov, it
was still believed that there was a possibility of a CIS armed
forces based on former USSR armed forces. Since that time many
republics have declared to form national armies and have done so,
thus forcing Russia to do the same.
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military districts spread out within the three new TVDs of Russia. 167 This is a
direct reaction to the new geographical borders of the Russian Federation.
As discussed earlier, the military reform is predicted to go through
several phases with the transitional phase lasting two to three years and by the
year 2000 all changes should be firmly established. 168 There are many factors
specifically affecting the ground forces during the reform process with the major
ones being the impact of the Gulf war, the socio-economic situation in the
military, the CFE treaty, the new geo-strategic environment, and most importantly
day to day politics.
This section will first visit these topics that are having wide-sweeping
effects on the ground forces of the Russian military, and then attempt to paint a
picture of the future force structure and missions of this force. The first topic that
will be addressed is the impression the Gulf war had on the military decision
makers in Russia.
2. Impact of the Gulf War
Another historical event that will no doubt provide input to the
Russian armed forces was the Gulf war. From an analysis of the 1992 draft
Interview with Alexander Kotenkov, deputy leader of the
Russian president's State-Law Administration, by Captain Second
Rank O. Odnokolenko, "Kotenkov Interviewed on Armed Forces Role,"
date and place not given: "We Should Create Ministry of Military
Reform," Krasnava Zvezda . in Russian, 14 April 92, p. 2, (FBIS-SOV-
92-074, 16 April 1992, p. 32-34).
•
: This transitional period is prevalent in all of the public
statements coming out of Russia.
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military doctrine and other literature sources it appears that the political-military
leadership is holding air assets in higher esteem in view of the post Gulf war
analysis. But the debate is far from over and the Russian military has been
actively publishing articles on the "lessons learned" from the Gulf war showing
varied reasons for the US decisive victory over Iraq. This has lead to the basic
question of whether the ground forces will play a predominant role in future
wars.
The Gulf war was viewed by many senior military members as a
"revolution of military affairs" and gave credibility to the predictions of General
Ogarkov concerning the "Military-Scientific Revolution." The leadership of the
then Soviet Union watched in awe on CNN the devastating precision-guided
munitions used by the US military in the Gulf war. 169
This is exemplified in the following description of the future of the
army, which was described by the first Deputy Minister of Defense Kokoshin as
being:
...a professional army above all. We can easily have a small army - up
to approximately 1.5 million men, including all branches of the Armed
forces. It must have a powerful strategic reserve and highly mobile
" 'Instructors of the Frunze Academy told the authors in July
of 1992, that the reason for the preponderance of publications in
Russia dealing with the admiration for the use of "smart" weapons
in the war should not be taken as a factor in the reliance on them
in the future for Russia. They went on to say that the Russian
military also possessed such "high-tech" weapons, but that they
were kept secret from the public. Videos of U.S. Tomahawk cruise
missiles flying over downtown Baghdad shown on CNN in Moscow




forces. As specialists believe, there must be several airmobile brigades
with their own army aviation and highly equipped not only with
firepower but also with systems of radio-electronic combat and
intelligence systems for combating optical-electronic instruments. This
is what we are concentrating on now and not the buildup of firepower
17(1per se.
This prospective view of the armed forces easily meshes with the
phases of reform laid out by Vice President Rutskoi. Once again one can see the
impact that the Gulf war had on the military elite who are making the reform
decisions in Russia. More importantly, the lessons learned from the Gulf war
have fueled the debate between ground and air superiority that had been
adjourned originally by Marshall Nikolai V.Ogarkov.
On one side of this debate are the "Ogarkovites", for a lack of a better
term. These people believe that the Gulf war greatly emphasized the importance
of "high-tech" weapons and air forces in future battles. The proponents of this
position want to put the majority of military expenditures into this area and
would take the assets away from the ground forces and the armor forces in
particular. Massed armored formations, it is argued, are a thing of the past, and
should be relegated to a secondary role in any future conflict.
The other side of this argument finds its support from the ground
forces community, who claim that the Persian Gulf war was an aberration and
nothing else. The argument's premise can be best described as saying that a
• "Kokoshin Airs "Concerns" for Armed Forces," Moscow,




desert war with a force structure like that Iraq on one side and the US led
coalition on the other side was a unique historical occurrence - an anomaly.
Because of its uniqueness, future military reform policies shouldn't be formulated
on it. This is a clear reference to Svechin's thoughts on the ever-changing fluidity
of confrontation.
Another point in favor of the tank proponents is the fact that
production of tanks in the countries of Germany, Britain, and most importantly
the US, has not decreased. In fact as the author of one article points out:
...at the end of 1990 the United States began drawing up a program to create
an entire family of fighting vehicles and auxiliary armored vehicles (ASM)
to meet requirements in the year 2000. It is proposed to spend $59 billion
on this. If the program is implemented, approximately 6,000 new fighting
vehicles will join the U.S. Army's arsenal, including the new Block III main
battle tank. 171
The author of this article goes on to say that according to Colonel General A.
Galkin, chief of the Russian Federation Defense Ministry Main Armor Directorate,
Russia currently has a varied inventory of tanks but that 25% of it is comprised
of the most modern T-72 and T-80 models. Colonel General Galkin also claims
that not only is series production planned for next year, but also that it will be in
sufficient quantities to carry out the necessary research and development. It
appears that some of the momentum toward eliminating the "World War II
dinosaurs" has been slowed or even halted. The question of what part these
•"'Major Alexander Yegorov, "Russia's Tank Pool," Moscow, in
Russian, Krasnava Zvezda . 12 Sept 92, p. 3, (FBIS-SOV-92 -184 , 22
September 1992, p. 23)
.
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"heavy forces" will play in the future force structure of Russia will be examined
later.
The ongoing debate in the Russian military hierarchy will most likely
be won in the long run by advocates of air superiority and the proponents of
ground armored formations will hold on to a smaller piece of the future force
structure.
1 ' 2 Nevertheless, there appears to be general consensus that the coalition
air forces and advanced conventional munitions were at a minimum the critical
force responsible for the quick and decisive victory. This, in addition to the
appointment of General Grachev, an airborne/light infantry officer, to First
Deputy Defense Minister will most likely translate, in the short run reform period,
to a lower stature for the ground forces in general and more specifically to the
advocates of massed armored forces. 173
• "There is a plethora of literature that is leading in the
direction of air power superiority in the greater context of the
military technical revolution.
General Grachev was quoted as saying that "alongside the
traditional branches of service (Rocket and Ground Forces, Air
Defense Forces, Air Forces, and the Navy, which it is planned to
preserve until 1995) there is a need for mobile forces - a new
operational strategic formation of along the lines of the rapid
deployment force. These will include airborne assault combined
units, military transport and Army aviation, and mobile support
services for all arms of service, and will be capable of carrying
out their mission in any sector of operations." Reported by
Colonel O. Falichev, "Grachev Details Armed Forces Creation
'Concept'," Moscow, Krasnava Zvezda in Russian, 26 May 92, p. 1,
(FBIS-SOV-92-101, 26 May 1992, p. 24-25).
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3. The Unique Border Problem
As previously mentioned, the geographic situation that Russia is in
currently is unique in the history of the country. Since the sudden demise of the
USSR, the new borders of Russia (or even the CIS because of the Baltics and
Georgia) have left hundreds if not thousands of miles of border uncontrolled and
basically open. This has basically left the previous strategic reserve military
districts now as the frontline forces that are on the borders opposing foreign
armies.
Currently Ukraine and Belarus have sizeable armed forces that are
considerably well equipped. The equipment that was located in both Ukraine and
Belarus was the top of the line because of the geographic proximity to the west
and NATO forces. This was admitted in an interview with Deputy Defense
Minister Kokoshin:
Admittedly, a lot of most updated combat material has remained on the
territory of Ukraine and Byelarus. I would like to specially emphasize that
in terms of proportion the ratio of outdated to up-to-date equipment in
those countries is much better than in Russia. The same situation is with
the tanks, artillery systems, fire support helicopters, etc. 174
Additionally, the former Red Army located in these locations have
traditionally had better living conditions and therefore many of these first echelon
^Interview with First Deputy Minister of Defense of the
Russian Federation Andrei Kokoshin by Marina Cherunukha and
Vyacheslav Terekhov; place and date not given; from the "Nation and
Society" feature - transmitted via Kvodo . Moscow, Interfax , in
English, ( JPRS-TAC-92-025, 17 August 1992, p. 9-10).
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well-trained soldiers have sworn loyalty to these countries. 175 The question,
though, of these so-called "traitors" is loyalty- For example could a Russian born
soldier, who has sworn allegiance to Ukraine, be relied upon to fight against
Russians or other "Slav" soldiers?
On the other hand, with the loss of the former Warsaw Pact "buffer
zone", the Russian Federation can take some solace in the fact that a new "buffer
zone" has been de-facto created against Germany by the presence of these former
Republics. Just as the question of loyalty of soldiers between Russia and Ukraine
was mentioned above, most assuredly the nuclear-weapon equipped countries of
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus would collectively defend against any aggression
from the West, whether it be from Germany or NATO.
This unforeseen border relationship that exists now in Russia which has
resulted in many areas of the Russian border being unpatrolled on the ground
and in the air has presented other problems of an internal nature. Obviously
there are no problems in areas where the former Soviet Union's borders coincided
with the present day borders of Russia. But in particular, the situation of borders
with the Baltics and the central asian states has turned into a tactical and logistical
nightmare. An example of an ongoing quagmire that has no end in sight is the
current situation in Moldova concerning the 14th Army. This conflict is
interesting in that Russia does not have a direct line of communication with its
"Thomas Ries, "Russia's Military Inheritance, " International
Defense Review , no. 3, 1992, p. 223-224.
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forces in Moldova and has received the cooperation of Ukraine in getting supply
and personnel in the area. Lastly, Moldova and the several other "hot-spots" are
providing the world and the Russian government with a preview of the possible
"Yugoslavization" that could appear all over the former USSR but most
importantly within Russia or on its periphery.
Additionally, the PVO (Air Defense Troops) has lost key facilities to
former republics, and large gaps now exist in the air defense network. These
border security deficiencies are no doubt going to be solved in the future, but in
the meantime, they represent a serious gap in the defense and security of a
historically paranoid Russia.
4. Withdrawal of Forces
The withdrawal of general purpose forces (GPF) from the former
Warsaw Pact, Mongolia, Cuba, Libya, and other areas around the globe is a
number one priority for not only the Russians but for some of the host countries,
such as is the case with the Baltic Republics. The problem here is the already
strained logistical resources in Russia are not capable of removing these forces or
providing them decent living conditions when they do return. Moreover,
recalling the ground forces is more complicated that air and naval assets, since
these forces will have to transit across what is quickly becoming unfriendly if not
hostile areas. This recall of GPF troops has resulted in a paradox since the
government of Russia desperately wants to gather all of the personnel and
equipment of the GPF, yet they do not currently have the resources to support the
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move.
176 This inability to immediately recall all of the GPF, especially in the
Groups of Forces Germany, is being driven by the socio-economic conditions in
Russia. Keeping the military content in the near future is definitely a high
priority of the Russian government.
5. The Socio-Economic Impact
A very prevalent theme in the Russian government is the necessity to
provide for the social concerns of current and former military members. The
Russian government consideration over these social concerns are based on the
historic respect and stature of the military but most importantly the current
leadership clearly understands that the military prevented the success of the coup
and has been surprisingly passive in the momentous events that have taken place
over the last three years. It is therefore valid to assume that reducing the military
in the transitional stage is as dependent on the socio-economic forces as any
perceived military threat. Lastly, the vast problems of the withdrawal and the
socio-economic impact are also intertwined with the difficulties of implementing
the CFE treaty and its many provisions.
: " In this newscast the text read "RIA today carried a
statement by Dmitriy Volkogonov, Russian Peoples deputy and
President Yeltsin's military affairs counselor, in which he said
Russia intends to take under its wing all military units that have
not yet been taken under the jurisdiction of other republics. Not
a single Russian soldier or officer must remain without political
and social protection, Dimitry Volkogonov said." From the
"Novosti" broadcast carried by the Moscow Teleradiokompaniya
Ostankino Television First Program Network, in Russian, 1700 GMT,
8 April 92, (FBIS-SOV-92-069, 9 April 1992, p. 19).
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6. Impact of the CFE Treaty
The CFE treaty will have an enormous impact on the future force
structure of the Russian armed forces. 177 While it was being negotiated it was
considered a "watershed" in terms of arms control agreements, but since the
signing of the treaty the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union disintegrated. This
has to many criticisms waged against it from both sides of the Atlantic. The most
fundamental criticism waged by all signatories is that the CFE is an already
worthless arms control agreement that has been overtaken by events and should
be consigned to history books. IK Nevertheless, the CFE is an important arms
control agreement that will have a significant impact on the force structure of
Russia and therefore bears close examination. This section will give a short
summary and explanation of the original CFE treaty and show the impact it will
have on Russia. Additionally, there will be a short discussion on the impact that
the follow on CFE-1A might have on Russia. 174
"The CFE Treaty that was signed in Paris on 19 November 1990
was hailed by the participating heads of government as a historic
landmark. The CFE Treaty was an important event if for no other
reason than for the speed and the current European environment of
the time in which it was negotiated and finalized. The CFE was
negotiated and completed within 18 months concurrently with the
break-up of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) . The timely
completion of the treaty was a political testament of the
signatories that they desired stability in Europe.
"Peter Corterier, "Transforming the Atlantic Alliance," The
Washington Quarterly , vol. 14, no. 1, (Winter 1991) : p. 30.
:
"
nThe United States, along with most of the Western nations,
ratified the CFE on 26 December, 1992.
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a. Summarif of the CFE
Basically the CFE Treaty can be summarized into four main
components: 1) numerical limits both on categories of military hardware most
critical for conducting offensive operations and on their deployment in differing
sub-zones of the treaty's area of application from the Atlantic to the Urals
(ATTU) 16"; 2) reductions in the levels of military assets of the 22 signatories of the
agreement and the destruction of equipment in excess of allowed national
holdings; 3) a detailed verification regime that includes extensive information
exchange; and most importantly 4) implementation provisions. 181 Besides the
treaty itself, there were several vital associated commitments. These commitments
limit the number of land-based aircraft and also restrict the size of the German
Bundeswehr.
The original CFE treaty was signed in Paris in November 1990, and
ratified by most concerned parties by the fall of 1992, yet there were still some
ambiguities which were agreed by all signatories to be clarified with follow-on
Jane M.O. Sharp "Conventional Arms Control in Europe, " SIPRI
Yearbook 1991 , 1991 ed., p. 407-60. The CFE covers battle tanks,
armored combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack
helicopters, deployed by the 22 NATO and former WTO countries on
the land territory defined as the ATTU. According to data that was
released at its signature, the Treaty requires 44,329 Treaty
Limited Equipment (TLE) items to be removed from the ATTU zone' and
'27,0 00 and "7,00 items to be destroyed for the former WTO and
NATO, respectively'
.
"'Michael Moodie "Arms Control and Disarmament," Jane ' s NATO
Handbook . 1991-92 ed., p. 109.
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negotiations.
'* 2 Some of these loose ends' were manpower limits, stabilization
measures, and Open Skies. l83 Furthermore, since the signing of the treaty and the
fall of the Soviet Union, many questions arose concerning which republics will be
responsible for either part or all of the obligations of the former USSR.
b. The Tashkent Agreement
The CFE could have turned into a major altercation between
several of the former Republics of the USSR had not the May 15, 1992 Tashkent
agreement been brokered. 184 Prior to this agreement all of the affected former
Republics had made public statements to the effect that they support ratification
of the treaty in their legislative bodies. The problem though, was that the former
republics have also made statements declaring the formation of their respective
armies and with the stated size of these armies the combination of the numbers
:
"-John W.R. Lepingwell and Alfred A. Reisch ed. "Military and
Security Motes," RFE/RL Research Report , 29 October, 1992. The
Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Belarus ratified the CFE Treaty
at a closed session on 21 October, ITAR-TASS reported. The treaty
came into force on 17 July 1992, and Armenia is now the only one of
the twenty-nine signatories not to have ratified the treaty, though
they are expected to do so in the near future.
:;Open Skies was signed as a separate agreement on 24 March
1992 .
'" 4Text of CIS Agreement on CFE Implementation, Tashkent, May
15, 1992: "Agreement on the Principles and Procedures for
Fulfilling the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe," Moscow
Diploma t
i
cheski v Vestnik . in Russian, no. 12, 30 June 92, (signed





of Treaty Limited Equipment (TLE) would be in violation of the CFE.' 8 " This
altercation could have resulted in the first major conflict between the major
players involved. In connection with this is the problem now that Russia is
experiencing with small local conflicts, such as in South Ossetia, Chechen-Ingush,
and Moldova, just to mention a few. These local wars are hampering Russia from
fully implementing the terms of the CFE. 18 ''
c. Unforeseen developments
The first unforeseen development that has arisen in the CFE is
concerning the displacement of TLE which is defined by the term "cascading."
Cascading can best be defined as transferring the best modern equipment from
the superpower allies to the less wealthy allies which in turn destroy their inferior
combat equipment to meet the TLE provisions. This transfer preserves the best
equipment among allies. Cascading is a major logistical problem that is difficult
to accomplish, yet nevertheless happening on both sides of the signing parties to
This problem was supposedly solved at the May 1992 CIS
Tashkent Summit, but might still become a problem as reported in
the article "General Staff Officer on Division of Weaponry" by
Ma j or-General Vadim Grechaninov, chief of the Center for
Operational-Strategic Research of the General Staff of the Armed
Forces of Ukraine: "Divorce Moscow-Style," carried in Kiev, Golos
Ukrainv . in Russian, 2 April 92, p. 3, ( JPRS-UMA-92-014 , 22 April
1992, p. 4-5)
.
'Unidentified own correspondent report, "Problems for
Disarmament People Too," Moscow, Krasnava Zvezda , in Russian 23
June 92, p. 3, ( JPRS-TAC-92 -022 , 27 July 1992, p. 36).
Ill
the CFE. The cascading can even be taken one step further. The poor allies
upon receiving modern equipment are then able to sell or transfer their weapons
to other parts of the world instead of destroying them. 188 Additionally, this
internal distribution between the Cold War allies is politically tenable. The CFE
calls for the destruction of withdrawn equipment, and, although it can be argued
that this applies to the net reduction and does not prohibit internal redistribution,
such a move is likely to be seen by the West like another possible treaty
'loophole' 1
*4
much like the transfer oi motorized rifle divisions to the coastal
defense forces. 190
: = Rene Luria, "CFE armor windfall for Spain, " International
Defense Review , vol 25, 1992, p. 92-93. Although this article
describes a NATO type "cascading" this is most likely taking place
internally within Russia and between former republics of the USSR
and some members of the former Warsaw Pact. In effect cascading is
providing some countries a cut-price global modernization program.
•"'There are provisions in the CFE for certain amounts of
equipment that have to be destroyed, but there is still vast
amounts of displaced equipment that is being exported worldwide.
"Brian Holden Reid & Michael Dewar, Military Strategy in a
Changing Europe , (London: Brassey's, 1991), p. 87.
The USSR attempted to use a 'loophole' during the CFE
negotiations by transferring three motorized rifle divisions to
their coastal defense forces and other TLE equipment to the
Strategic Rocket Forces. Col. Mike Rafanelli of the J-5 on 2 June
1992 at a briefing at the Defense Language Institute in Monterey,
Ca . stated that "The transfer of the TLE to the Soviet Naval
Infantry gave it more tanks than all of the British Army." This
transfer in effect made them part of the naval infantry and
excluded their equipment from the TLE provisions. This problem was
eventually rectified in negotiation and under the terms of the
treaty all land based naval forces fall under the TLE.
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Russia no doubt sees many short term benefits in the CFE and a
CFE1-A follow on. The commitment of limiting the size of the German
Bundeswehr was an important component of the CFE. This commitment did
quell Russian worries about a united Germany. This provision alone with some
modification in CFE-1A will allow a continuing nondiscriminatory vehicle for the
discussion of the size and shape of an all-German military power and the nature
of superpower involvement and the guarantee roles they can play during the
transition at specific levels of deployment and preparedness. 141
Also the legality of the CFE, in view of the heightened role being
played today by the United Nations, is of concern to Russia. A legal document,
such as the CFE will force any potential aggressor to blatantly violate a binding
treaty considerably prior to a planned attack. 142 Additionally, if implemented the
verification procedures should provide enough warning time for the other
members of the treaty to prepare for military operations. This can be interpreted
in Russia as a security guarantee or as a possible means of the world community
"ganging up" on Russia in the future under the auspices of the CFE provisions.
Depending on the Russian leadership at the time of negotiating the CFE1-A, it
could include the critical components of non-compliance punishment, similar to
1
^Catherine M. Kelleher, "Arms Control in a Revolutionary-
Future: Europe," Daedalus , vol. 120, no. 1., (Winter 1991), p.
125-126
.
"Jenonne Walker, "Mew thinking about conventional arms
control," Survival , vol. XXXII, no. 1, (January/February 1991), p.
55 .
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the once proposed Baruch plan of the United Nations for nuclear non-
proliferation. 1
'"1
Additionally, a democratic reform minded Russian leadership
might look favorably upon other CFE related agreements such as confidence and
security building measures (CSBMs). The Russian Federation might perceive
CSBMs as important instruments to be utilized in the short term for promoting
regional security in the new multi-polar world. ig4
d. CFE Summary
The CFE has paved the way as the first ever major international
agreement on the reduction of conventional arms. 19 "1 The question though is how
the future Russian leadership will view the document. On the one hand the CFE
can be viewed as a valid security document that can prevent Germany, or any
other European aggressor, from staging an operational-strategic attack on the
motherland. But the conservative forces most like see the CFE as a bad treaty for
Russia and disagree with the Tashkent agreed limits. Furthermore the
Coit D. Blacker & Gloria Duffy, International Arms Control ,
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), p. 97.
,;Also signed in November 1990 and endorsed at the Paris
summit v/as the Vienna Document 1990 which represented the
culmination of extensive negotiations on CSBMs among the 34 members
of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).
Two important components of this document were the Unusual Military
Activities (UMA) measure and the Conflict Prevention Center (CPC)
.
Both of these measures will further strengthen the already solid
foundation laid by the CFE.
•"Walther Stutzle "Introduction: From the known past to the
unknown future," SIPRI Yearbook 1991 , 1991 ed., p. xxxii.
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conservatives most likely perceive the CFE as a possible excuse for Western
intervention in their country- Most importantly in the new world environment
where the U.N. and international law is becoming paramount it is important to
keep in mind that the treaty does legally bind the signatories. 14" Depending on
the future Russian government, CFE1-A negotiations might address such things
as limits on tactical nuclear weapons and military personnel, sharing of multi-
national, and national technical means of information.
The CSBMs and the openness that will be fostered during the
treaty implementation is currently being warmly received. This was even stated
post-coup by the Soviet Chief of Staff, and North Atlantic Assembly associate
delegate General Vladimir Lobov, when he stated on 29 August 1991 that he
remained a continued advocate of "widening contacts both with the armies of the
East European countries and with NATO, at all levels, in any form". 14 '
In sum the CFE has both positive and negative affects on the future
of Russia depending on the motivations of the Kremlin leadership. If a
conservative force comes to power in Moscow the West could expect to see Russia
violating the CFE or demanding a renegotiation of the TLE limits set by the treaty
itself or the Tashkent agreement. If the current democratic trends continue with
Richard N. Perle, Reshaping Western Security (Washington
D.C. : The AEI Press, 1991), p. 154.
Bruce George ed. "Introduction, " Jane's NATO Handbook , 1990-
19 91, p . 2 8.
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a reform minded leadership the treaty will most likely be observed and add much
needed stability in a post cold-war europe.
7. Ground Forces Force Structure
The new military doctrine will be a painful pill to swallow for the
ground forces, and more importantly, for the tank troops. The tank troops have
been the historic muscle behind the ground forces and were considered a source
of great strength for the Russian military. That is all changing. Besides the
attacks from the "high-tech" proponents, the impact of the CFE, there is a growing
sentiment in higher military circles that light forces are key now if for no other
reason than peacekeeping. President Yeltsin's military aide General Dmitriy
Volkogonov in an interview expounded on this:
I propose that our country sell around half the 40,000 tanks we have and
give half the money raised by the sale directly to military personnel, so they
can purchase apartments, [as to military doctrine] ...that of the former
Soviet Union was quite offensive - otherwise why so many tanks? - and we
are now seeking a defensive doctrine based on being ready to defend
Russia's sovereignty and being able to take part in neutralizing conflicts.
The chance of a world war is zero, while that of regional conflicts is
increasing. For that reason, in agreement with our neighbors and allies, we
are organizing peacekeeping forces, as in Ossetia or Moldova, and we will
take part with our contingents where the United Nations decides, as in
Yugoslavia.'^
The above passage basically expresses the gloomy future for the "iron dinosaurs"
in a variant three defensive doctrine.
'"Interview with General Dmitriy Volkogonov, military adviser
to President Yeltsin, by Rafael Poch in Moscow, date not given,
Barcelona, La Vancruardia . in Spanish, 2 Aug 92, p. 8, ( JPRS-TAC-92-
026, 20 August 1992, p. 17).
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This is not to say that another tank will no longer be seen on the
Russian plains, but indeed there priority within the military has fallen
precipitously. Also, not to be dismissed in connection with the CFE treaty, is the
strategic importance of the some 21,000 tanks of different models that are located
on the eastern side of the Ural mountains. 1^ Many of these tanks were moved
there quickly so that they would not have to be declared in the CFE negotiations
and be subject to the TLE limits.
Another facet to this argument is that there does appear to be a need
for "light" armor that is easily transportable. Since regional and local wars are a
priority in Russian defense planning now, there will be a shift to produce this
type of vehicle. When Deputy Defense Minister Kokoshin was recently
interviewed on the new military doctrine he said:
..Russia is going to place special emphasis on mobile forces with relatively
light armor. I don't think we will ever again produce tanks in such
enormous quantities. At the same time, we do not want to forfeit our
preponderance in tanks. 2""
The implication here is that Russia will attempt to develop and produce more
light armor vehicles, but that they will also maintain the armor assets they have




The Military Balance 1992-1993
, p . 9 2-101.
- Interview with First Deputy Minister of Defense of the
Russian Federation Andrei Kokoshin by Marina Cherunukha and
Vyacheslav Terekhov; place and date not given; from the " Nation and
Society " feature - transmitted via Kvodo , Moscow, Interfax in
English, ( JPRS-TAC-92-025, 17 August 1992, p. 9-10).
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Also for economic considerations, Russia will find it necessary to make
maximum use of existing military potential and the existing infrastructure of the
armed forces stationed on Russia's territory. This will be combined with the
troops being withdrawn from Germany, Poland, Mongolia, and the Baltic States,
troop units from the Transcaucasus, and combined units and units which do not
form part of the CIS member states' national armies. Eventually, they could be
transformed into highly mobile units and rapid reaction combined units. 2" 1
a. The new TVDs
Within the context of the many limitations of Russia currently and
in the near future it would be unfeasible for Russia to maintain major combined
arms formations on all strategic axes which could pose also pose a threat for her
neighbors and therefore force them to arm themselves. However, the military
experts in Russia do agree that Russia needs to maintain a definite number of
combat readv division-sized and smaller units on the most dangerous axes in any
case so that one is tempted to provoke a "crisis situation" or military conflict.
And lastly, Russia will need and provide for the capability to reinforce a
formation using a mobile reserve. 202
-
-Russian Vice President Alexander Rutskoi, "We Muse Build an
Army Worthy of Great Russia, " Moscow, Krasnava Zvezda , in Russian,
22 May 92, p. 1-2, ( JPRS-TAC-92 - 02 , 29 June 1992, p. 40-44).
--Colonel A. Dokuchayev, Krasnava Zvezda correspondent,
"Experts, Predictions, Percentages. . .An Attempt to Analyze Opinions
on the Prospects of Military Structural Development in the CIS,"
Moscow, Krasnava Zvezda . in Russian, 8 May 92, First Edition, p.
1-2, (JPRS-UMA-92-019, 17 May 1992, p. 55-57).
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The mobile forces will be arrayed in three TVDs (Western, Siberian
[Also labeled Southern or Central]
,
and [Far] Eastern). Operating within these
TVDs there will be four strategic commands: West, Southwest, East, and a
reserve command. 2 "3 The military district commander (of the strategic axis) will
carry out ground and air defense, and in essence conduct true integrated
combined arms operations. This is something that is currently not being taught
at the such military academies such as the Frunze Academy in Moscow.
Instructors from the Frunze academy told the authors that they train for combined
arms operations only in the sense of organic equipment that is in the inventory
of the army. The Russian leadership will attempt to train for true combined arms
integration combining the PVO, navy, air forces, and ground forces.
The forces by their nature of being mobile and defined as "light"
will have a limited ability to conduct aggressive combat operations, or for that
matter to stage any type of strategic-operational offensive operation. The variant
three defensive type doctrine is clearly evident here in what is being predicted for
the future of ground forces. Humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping and possibly
peacemaking will be the predominant missions for the Russian ground forces in
the near future and most likely will stay that way to the year 2000.
Additionally, the Russian military recognizes that the defensive
sufficiency concept, in regards to quality and quantity of the armed forces, varies
ibid
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by TVD. For example, in the Southern and Far East TVDs defensive sufficiency
can be provided with a lesser number and lower quality of forces. This is
predicated on the type of threat that is perceived by Russia in these TVDs. Russia
does not consider China or some Central Asian countries as having an advantage
in quality or quantity of armed forces.
As far as the defensive sufficiency in the Western TVD is
concerned, the Russian military clearly recognizes that the impact of technology
and therefore quality of the military is vastly different. In this TVD the military
must be a force that has both quality and quantity. The impact of the Gulf war
might be a driving force in these decisions, since there was prior discussion of
only requiring a quantitative advantage in the Far East and Southern TVD, while
in the Western TVD the emphasis has always been on quality. The correlation of
forces computations combined with budgetary constraints, will be the driving
force in equipping and manning the forces in each TVD.
Therefore, if we estimate a sixty division ground force based on the
proclaimed reductions, we can assume that these forces will be roughly divided
in the three TVDs equally. The difference of the quality of the weapons and the
manning of the divisions in each TVD should reflect the nature of the threat on
each axis. The "groups of forces" will cease to exist after the complete
'Presentation by Major-General S.K. Lopukhov, chief of a
scientific research institute, at the General Staff Military
Academy's Military-science Conference from 27-30 May 92, (JPRS) p.
46.
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withdrawal of forces from the former Warsaw Pact, and the consolidation of
former USSR military forces on Russian territory. The military district system will
probably survive the reform and there will probably be two to three in each TVD.
Lastly, the CIS (and possibly also Russian Federation) will form and employ a
rapid-response force that will consist of special military and militia subunits that
will be primarily trained for conducting tactical level defensive operations. 205 The
primary mission
,
which for now is being tasked to the airborne forces, is that of
peacekeeping/ peacemaking.
b. Peacekeeping/Peacemaking
As for peacekeeping, this is becoming a growth industry in Russia
and the job has fallen to the Airborne troops of the ground forces. 206 The
proportion of airborne divisions within the estimated sixty divisions of the
Russian military will grow significantly. In the Red Army there only existed eight
divisions within the ground forces that numbered near 120. In the year 2000
these airborne divisions will probably grow to comprise at least one-sixth of the
- "Interview with Colonel Vasily Petrovich Volkov, permanent
representative of the High Command of CIS Armed Forces at
Commonwealth Headquarters, by Yuriy Bekhterev and Yevgeniy
Gorellik, associates at the press center of the CIS Working Group,
under the rubric, "In the CIS Working Group: A Unified Army:
Arguments of the Military," Minsk, Sovecskava Belorussiva , in
Russian, 14 Aug, 92, p. 2. ( JPRS-UMA-92 -0 3 6 , 30 Sept, 1992, p. 2).
A. Khckhlov interviewing Colonel General Ye. Podkolzin,
commander of the airborne troops, "Airborne Troops: Mo Sign Of
Eternal Peace," place and date not given, Moscow, Koinsomolskava
Pravda . in Russian, 9 October 1992, p. 3, (FBIS-SOV-92-200 , 15
October 1992, p. 19-20).
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total amount of ground forces divisions. This is quite significant because the
offensive combat potential of an airborne is considerably less than that of a T-80
equipped motorized rifle division.
More local peacekeepers are at work in the outer areas of the
former Soviet Union than in any other part of the world. Most of them are
Russians. Forces claiming to represent the CIS have gone to both Moldova and
South Ossetia, a part of Georgia. In the near future Russian peacekeepers might
be summoned to Tajikistan and the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan.
And lastly Russian forces are already struggling to keep the peace in another part
of Georgia, Abkhazia, and in other parts of Tajikistan.
In September the same members of the CIS who agreed to a treaty
on collective security agreed to had over command of the peacekeeping
operations to the CIS armed forces. :u7 The bulk of these peacekeepers have been
Russian, thus opening the door to the charge that Russia is using peacekeeping
as a means of pursuing its own interests. It remains to be seen if the Russian
military (or CIS) will attempt to offer the excuse of peacekeeping in order to
justify regional intervention.
~~I. Chernyak, "Where Do We Get the Dye for the Blue
Helmets?, " Moscow, Komsomol skava Pravda , in Russian, 31 March 1992,
p. 1, (JPRS-UMA-92-014, 22 April 1992, p. 44-45).
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8. Other Military/Para-Military Forces
a. The KGB and Border Troops
The KGB and Border Troops are also being reconfigured and they
will no doubt have a larger part to play because of the previously described
unique border situation in Russia. Primarily Russia does not feel the need to
have full-scale, army-protected borders with all of the former republics. In the
case of the Baltics there will be full-scale borders, guarded by troops and with
customs posts and visa control. The transparency of the borders with the Baltics
is costing the Russian Federation hundreds of millions of rubles because they are
basically transparent.^ In areas of republics have created their own border forces
(Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova), but yet do not control the traffic on the
border, Russia will most likely close these borders. Conversely, the adjacent
republics that have common border practices (Byelarus and Uzbekistan) will
remain open with a single external border regime. 20g And lastly, Russia will
provide border security for states that have not formed their own border forces
(Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan).
-
"A. Uglanov correspondent for Arcriunentv I Faktv , interview
with A. Kotenkov, deputy chief of the Department of Constitutional
Law of the President of Russia in charge of questions of security
and defense, "On the Third Strategic Line," place and date not
given, in Russian, no. 13, May 92, p. 1-2, ( JPRS-UMA-92-019 , 27 May




The missions of these troops will also include play a larger role in
the peacekeeping role since they will be equipped with helicopters, light armor,
and limited artillery assets. 21 " Since these troops will be full-time and also more
professional, an extra burden might be placed on them for regional threat
detection along the some 60,000 kilometers of the Russian border.
b. The Strategic Rocket Forces
The ground troops of the Strategic Rocket Forces are a very small
force that will probably not be affected much in the reform period. These troops
have only some 1,700 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 140 helicopters. Of
these numbers that were declared under the CFE Russia will inherit only 700
APCs under the limits of the Tashkent agreement. This is the smallest contingent
of ground forces and clearly plays no strategic or operational role, though they
do reinforce the appearance of a variant three type defensive force, because they
are so inconsequential. 211
c. The Russian Naval Infantry
In the early 1980's the naval infantry was reorganized when the
Coastal Defense Force (CDF) was restored by the Soviet Navy and absorbed two
former branches, the Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI) and the Coastal Missile Artillery
Force (CMAF). This reorganization of the Navy's land-based coastal defense force
~ : ibid.
-"International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military
Balance 1992-1993 , (London: Brassey's, Autumn 1992), p. 93.
124
was probably initiated as a result of Soviet force reductions and their declared
defensive doctrine. One Soviet source has stated that the Coastal Force is a
revival oi the old Coastal Defense Service that was a major branch of the Navy
from 1926 until its abolition in the early 1960's. 212
In 1990 three Motorized Rifle Divisions were transferred to the
Soviet Navy in an attempt to exempt their equipment from the Conventional
Force in Europe treaty (CFE). Currently each fleet's land-based coastal defense
force now combines a former motorized rifle division, renamed a coastal defense
division (CDD), Naval Infantry, and a Coastal Missile Artillery Force. The same
structure had previously existed within the Pacific Ocean Fleet.
As stated above, although the RNI is under the control of the CDF
its primary mission and training emphasis has not been restricted to defense of
the coast but rather toward amphibious assaults/landings. This is a military
operation of the RNI that has both tactical and operational significance especially
since the transfer of the MRDs to the Fleet.
After the military reform, the future total strength of the Soviet
Naval Infantry with the recently transferred MRDs should not exceed 70,000 men
including the higher staffs and support troops as well as the training elements.
The presence of the MRDs in a coastal defense role would not exclude their
--Department of Defense, 1991 Military Force in Transition
[Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), p. 58.
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availability for amphibious warfare operations since the majority of their
equipment is compatible with amphibious warfare ships.
The merchant marine fleet of the former Soviet Union was key to
the deployment of the naval infantry and other ground forces. As part of the
military reform and privatization of many state assets, the capability of the
military to use merchant ships for military operations has significantlv been
downgraded. Additionally RO/RO (Roll-on /Roll-off) ships, all of which can
serve as military sealift or logistics ships, are on order. 213 These ships will
probably be completed since they also hold important civilian use, but again their
availability in the future for combat operations is not as secure as in the past
when the civilian industry of the USSR would immediately heed to orders from
Moscow. Lastly, as noted in the appendix, future construction will be limited
to small combatants and some submarines. Therefore there will be no growth in
amphibious capability.
By the year 2000 the RNI will have completed the transition under
the military reform program since it is a smaller force and is not undergoing as
much restructuring as the rest of the military. During the transitional period,
though, the RNI will be degraded considerably, probably only being able to
provide regional security and defense missions. This decline in military capability
will be short lived.
-^Department of Defense, Understanding Soviet Naval
Developments , (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1991), p. 103.
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9. Ground Forces Summary
In the transitional period of reform (3-5 years) the general trends that
can be expected are sizable force reductions, degradation of operational readiness,
reduced mobilization potential, and most importantly an inability to conduct large
scale offensive operations. The key concept to keep in mind for the future is that
intentions are very difficult to recognize, while capabilities are not.
When the reform process is complete ground forces will definitely
resemble the "meaner and leaner" concept and will attempt to become a genuine
professional military. This will be accomplished by the downsizing of personnel
and equipment in all parts of the ground forces to generate effective mobile type
forces to operate in the proposed three TVDs (Far East, South and West). The
internal transfer of newer combat equipment (cascading) and personnel will at a
minimum replace older assets and at a maximum greatly strengthen the combat
potential of the ground forces. The military will have a mostly professional force,
that is highly trained, very mobile, highly motivated and equipped with modern
conventional arms. 214
""'In an "'Appended 1 Statement Issued" to the Resolution on
Military Priorities, it was stated "The Russian Armed Forces should
be designed exclusively for the protection of the independence and
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, and
also for the fulfillment of Russia's international
commitments. . .the deterrent to the unleashing of large-scale
conflicts and local wars against Russia and other CIS member states
should be forces possessing high-accuracy weapons and means of
delivery. . .For the prompt neutralization of possible local military
conflicts, it is necessary to create highly mobile general purpose
forces consisting of several ground forces groupings and naval
groupings." Statement on the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet
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The concept of operations of the ground forces will in general remain
the same, but will probably attempt to incorporate much more combined arms
integration, and defense training aimed against enemies with advanced
conventional munitions. Furthermore, the ground forces will with much difficulty
strive to develop their own equipment in line with the "military-technical
revolution."
Although research and development for ground forces will be cut
drastically we can expect to see the deployment of weapon systems already
developed, such as the BMP-3 improved armored personnel carrier. The older
equipment in the inventory will either be destroyed, sold, or stored east of the
Urals in compliance with the CFE treaty.
The reconstitution capability of the ground forces will remain high
since the vast majority of TLE stored east of the Urals will not deteriorate due to
the cold dry climate. The exact number and type of these armored vehicles in
unknown though it will remain an important strategic asset since many of the
armored vehicles can be easily brought up to working condition by some routine
maintenance and battery replacement. Much of this TLE is modern equipment
and will most likely be kept, while the obsolete TLE and excess equipment will
be destroyed or sold in the arms export business for hard currency-
Presidium on the Russian Federation's Military Policy Priorities,"
appended to 1 April 1992 resolution, carried by the Moscow,
Rossivskava Gazeta . in Russian, 8 April 92, ( FBIS-SOV-92-069 , 9
April 19 92
, p. 37-33) .
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In the long run the ground forces, after a painful reform, could
transform into a force that would have the capability to execute the Pentagon's
Lithuanian invasion scenario on the Northern Flank of NATO, though this is
unlikely. This is predicated on the assumption of the predicted size of NATO and
the U.S. forces (Base Force 1) in Europe in 1995. The bottom line is that although
the vast quantities of troops and equipment still present in Russia will get smaller
they will become more lethal, defensive oriented, and truly represent a variant
three type doctrine.
Training will be a problem with the smaller military budget, and
therefore more emphasis will be placed on extensive command post exercises for
headquarters elements combined with simulator training for vehicle crews.
Additionally, the ground forces might be inclined to volunteer their forces for
external peace-keeping duties, if for no other reason than for minimal training
value, deferment of training costs, and the implied political gains of showing the
Russian flag and to provide for a more stable environment which is beneficial to
Russian economic reform. There will probably be an emphasis on low intensity
conflict intervention, in view of the problems arising in the new multi-polar
environment.
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D. THE AIR DEFENSE FORCES
1. Introduction
The old mission of the Soviet Air Defense Troops was the responsibility
for the air defense of industrial areas, military installations, deployed troops and




accomplished this mission by having control of non-ground force surface-to-air
weapon systems, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile defenses, space, ground- and
air-based early warning radar systems and fighter interception, the national
warning and monitoring organization, and all civil and military air traffic
control. 21 '
The USSR air defense system was based on "a series of separate, highly
defended 'islands' (of valuable targets) in a vast, largely undefended wasteland.217
This system, which was the most practical because of the geographical vastness
of the USSR, had its flaws. The system was developed and intended to detect
and repel large scale air attacks on the country. Anything short of an all out
attack from NATO or other forces was the inherent weakness in the system. The





-"Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner: The Soviet Military System




The first event was the 1983 incident in which the Korean Boeing 747
(KAL 007) was destroyed over Sakhalin. This incident demonstrated the problem
of communications and control of an air defense system that spans eleven time
zones. But as Christopher Donnelly explains:
Despite the fact that the KAL 007 disaster proved the Soviet system to be
somewhat inappropriate for peacetime, theirs is an eminently sensible
solution for major war, when there is likely to be less sensitivity to the
destruction of a civilian airliner in error. :is
The second event that had a measurable impact on the Air Defense
Forces was the Mathias Rust incident in 1987, when a nineteen-year-old West
German computer operator, landed his Cessna 172 by the Kremlin Wall on a iMay
evening in 1987. Rust had flown his single engine Cessna through over 650
kilometers of some of the most heavily guarded air defense districts of the
country. The flight was a great embarrassment to the Soviet military and
provided Gorbachev with an excuse for sacking the defense minister Marshal
Sergei Sokolov, and the PVO chief Marshal of Aviation Alexander Koldunov (a
survivor of the 1983 KAL 007 incident). 211* Both of these incidents seriously
affected the PVO and the situation did not improve in the ranks with the
announcement of a new defensive doctrine and the recall and reduction of forces
- :: Donnelly, 20.
-"'Brian Moynihan, Claws of the Bear: The History of f.he Red
Army from the Revolution to the Present , (Boston: Houghton Mifflin
Company, 19 89), p. 406-407.
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that Gorbachev was calling for. The situation did not change considerably till the
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet empire.
2. The Current Status of the PVO
Obviously the paramount problem facing the PVO today is the new
geographical border situation of Russia. Additionally, the loss of key facilities on
the borders of the former Soviet Union, especially in the Baltics, has left large
gaps in what was once considered an effective network. But the question remains
as to how will a security conscious Russian state cope with a less than adequate
air defense shield. The logical solution would be for the CIS to coordinate the
former PVO system under the logic that it is tied in with nuclear security and
ABM defenses. But as everyone now knows, logic is not part of the decision
making process when historical animosities, ethnic problems, and raw nationalist
sentiment are evident.
Logic and economics though, temporarily appear to be prevailing. It
appears that at least for the short term the CIS will try to maintain its air defense
system since each new Republic cannot afford to re-invent a new effective air
defense system. The chief of staff of the PVO has accurately stated:
I want to particularly point out that it would be extremely difficult to
establish an effective air defense system for individual republics.
Furthermore, this would require large forces and funds. I am profoundly
convinced that the air defense system - and in the future an aerospace
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defense system - must be a unified system for our entire Commonwealth of
Independent States. 220
3. Future of the PVO
The future restructuring of the PVO will be one of the most difficult
of all the other branches because of the nature of its mission and the loss of key
facilities on the periphery of the former USSR. This branch, as explained above
has had its share of difficulty in adapting to the new geo-strategic position of
Russia. Plainly, the first needed change for the PVO is to revise the above stated
mission statement to conform to the new doctrine and geo-strategic position of
Russia. Secondly the PVO will be a key player in the new "high-tech" war of the
future.
The impact of the technology utilized in the Gulf war was far more
significant in the Air Defense Troops as in any other branch of the Russian armed
forces. The Gulf war impact was felt in two different areas. The first area was
that of the importance of air power and is best characterized by the following
quote from a recent Voyennaya Mysl (Military Thought) journal.
Persian Gulf combat operations summed up wars of position involving
armies of millions. The possibility was demonstrated there of creating a
powerful air grouping in a relatively short time in any region of the world
capable of independently performing strategic missions during an air
-"
"Purpose, Missions and Makeup of Air Defense Troops Under
Present Conditions and in the Future," Moscow, Vovennava Mvsl , in
Russian, Jul 92, Special Edition, (signed to press 10 Jul 92), p.
64-68, (JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 September 1992, p. 34).
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campaign. Aerospace became a very important sphere of warfare
(emphasis added). 221
In addition to the loss of the critical permanent radars and installations
the PVO troops are to be among the first to completely vacate the Baltic region. 222
This has lead to the loss of the first echelon of air defenses in what was the
Western theater of military operations, and greatly reduced the time available to
make the decision to alert other forces. The PVO is also scheduled to be reduced
by more than one-third of its present strength in the reform program. 223 These
developments will also have a great impact on the PVO and may make it one of
the last branches to fully reform in the near future.
As stated earlier, the CIS temporarily appears to have come to some
agreement on maintaining the PVO network, most likely because of economic
considerations. There has been great investment in the systems of the PVO that
were responsible for the air security of the former USSR. Many of these assets are
permanent and cannot be removed or displaced easily. An example of this is the
part of the FVO responsible for defense of attacks from satellite weapons
platforms.
--•ibid.
^"Editorial Comment on Air Defense Troops' Day," Moscov
Vestznik Protivovozsushnov Oboronv , in Russian, no. 4-5, 1992, p. 1-




The Missile Attack Warning System (SPRN) that is part of the Air
Defense Forces monitors the orbital parameters of objects in near-earth orbits that
could threaten what was the former USSR. The radar sites are currently deployed
on what was the periphery of the former Soviet Union, and what is now the
territory of six independent countries."4 This system would be prohibitively
costly to move or to rebuild for Russia or any other republic. In this area the
WO troops could logically come under the auspices of the CIS command
structure because it possesses missiles armed with nuclear warheads that are
supposedly used to repel enemy air attacks and is clearly a strategic weapons
system.
Within this context and the new draft military doctrine, the PVO's new
mission statement and reform was defined recently at a special conference of
military reform. The restructuring/ reform of the PVO will be accomplished by:
optimizing the authorized organizational structure in accordance with the
nature of a possible war and the missions to be performed; the assets
warning of aggression and aerospace attack, ensuring the reliable repulsing
of enemy air-launched missile strikes, and delivering a retaliatory strike
against him; as well as mobile forces capable of operating in any sector
where a threat to Russia's security should arise. 22"
-""Col-Gen Prudnikov on Prospects for Air Defense Forces,"
Moscow, Arwiva . in Russian, no. 24, (Signed to press 13 Jan 92),
p. 7-11, ( JPRS-UMA-92-001-L, 16 March 1992, p. 22-23).
"'Presentation by Major-General A.S. Sumin, chief of a
scientific research institute, at the General Staff Military
Academy's Military-science Conference from 27-30 May 1992,
"Purpose, Missions and Makeup of Air Defense Troops Under Present
Conditions and in the Future, " Moscow, Vovennava Mvsl , in Russian,
July 92, Special Edition, (signed to press 10 July 1992), p. 64-58,
( JPRS-UMT-92-012-L, 30 September 1992) p. 35.
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In accordance with these goals the PVO will include the following systems:
unified reconnaissance and aerospace attack warning, command and control,
missile-space defense, and air defense. 22" The Air Defense Troops Reconnaissance
and Aerospace Attack Warning System will:
perform missions of providing information to the President and Supreme
High Command on the preparation and beginning of an aerospace attack,
as well as providing intelligence and tactical information to command and
control agencies and air defense weapons. It includes space, air, and ground
(including above-the-horizon and over-the-horizon) reconnaissance personnel
and equipment of the Air Defense Forces, General Staff Main Intelligence
Directorate, and assets of military districts.
The Missile-space Defense System will include the following:
Air Defense Troops large strategic formations for missile attack warning, for
ABM and space defense, and for space surveillance; EW equipment for anti-
satellite warfare of other branches of the Armed Forces deployed on and
outside of Russian territory and in outer space. Command and control of
mixed forces and equipment of missile-space defense must be exercised
centrally from the Air Defense Troops' Central Command Post via
corresponding system command posts. Political resolution of the question
of the status of groupings of missile-space defense assets deployed on
territories of sovereign states is a problem of today.
The third component, the Air Defense system itself will include:
large strategic formations of the Air Defense Troops, and the air defense
troops of the military districts and fleets. We assume it is advisable to build
Russian Federation air defense on a territorial principle, where all Russian
territory is divided into air defense zones. The zones include corps
(division) air defense areas, the boundaries of which correspond to
boundaries of responsibility of formations.
The last and most critical component of the future PVO will be the command and




must be exercised from the Central Command Post by the Air Defense
Troops Commander. Chiefs of air defense zones and areas exercise
command and control of all forces deployed or arriving in these zones and
areas regardless of subordination, and they bear total responsibility for the
performance of air defense missions, for operational preparation of the
territory in support of air defense, and for organizing battle management of
all forces within the established boundaries.
The PVO leadership apparently clearly understand that to realign this
branch within the economic constraints of the time, they will have to preserve the
costly intelligence and battle management system created and already constantly
functioning in peacetime, as well as attempting to provide the favorable
conditions for future establishment of an ABM defense in theaters of military
operations. Additionally, the command and control system of Air Defense, Air
Force and Navy fighter aviation (including command posts and vectoring posts)
established in the Air Defense Troops based on a unified radar field will be
preserved.
In specifics, the concept of the PVO proposal, after the re-structuring,
calls for an air defense district; several air defense armies and a missile attack
warning army; and separate air defense, ABM defense and space surveillance
corps, divisions and brigades.227 This order of battle was defined by maintaining
minimum defensive sufficiency, but most importantly, "cost effectiveness" criteria.
Also, this structure is attempting to come to grips with the likely possibility of
local/regional conflicts which will warrant a strategic flexibility of defense.
Surnin, 3
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There has been a movement afoot to eliminate the PVO as a branch of
the armed forces. The proposal is based on the fact that there is no such branch
as the PVO in the majority of the foreign armies. 228 Other arguments have been
presented but currently it appears that a compromise is taking place. The PVO
will still be a branch of the Russian military but some key assets will be shifted
to the Strategic Defense Forces and other assets will be transferred to the
commanders within the TVDs.
In summary, the near future will be determined by the economic
constraints placed on the PVO and can best be described with the words of
Major-General A.S. Sumin:
Maintaining a global military balance will require a significant additional
buildup of air defense forces, and we assume that at the present time this
is not dictated by the military-political situation and is unrealistic from an
economic standpoint.
E. THE AIR FORCES
1. Introduction
The former Soviet air assets consisted of the Soviet Air Forces (SAF),
the Aviation of Air Defense (APVO), and Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA). These
three organizations also subject to the vast re-structuring that will result from the
'Colonel-A. Dokuchayev, "Experts, Predictions,
Percentages .. .An Attempt to analyze Opinions on the Prospects of
Military Structural Development in the CIS," Moscow, Krasr.ava
Zvezda . in Russian, 8 May 92, First Edition, p. 1-2, ( JPRS-UMA-92-
019, 17 May 1992, p. 55-57).
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withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe, the military reform, the impact of the
Gulf war, and the nationalization of these assets by former republics. This section
will concentrate on the Russian Air Forces, which will basically shadow the future
of all the components that make up the air assets of Russia.
2. The Present and Future of the Russian Air Forces
The Russian Air Forces, just like every other branch, have been
devastated by the break-up of the Soviet Union. The one fact that has aided this
branch was that the main assets of the branch - aircraft, can and were displaced
easily after the break-up. Many units did nationalize in former Soviet Republics,
such as the prestigious Tu-160 Backfire Bomber (which has been compared to the
US Bl-B) regiment in the Ukraine that was unilaterally privatized by that
government. 22" These bombers were "secured" by the Ukrainian military not only
because of their strategic offensive capability, but more importantly they can be
sold for hard currency or fulfill the long range transportation mission.. 230
Unfortunately for Ukraine, the vast majority of the pilots did not swear allegiance
to Ukraine and returned to Russia This has been the case of most of the air forces
that found themselves outside of the Russian Federation. These air forces by and
large have pledged their loyalty to Russia and simply flew their planes back to
their "motherland." And in the rare cases that the planes were unable to be
"Face of Tu-160 Regiment in Ukraine Viewed," Moscow,
Krasnava Zvezda . in Russian, 4 Aug 92, p. 1, ( JPRS-UMA-92-03 2 , 26
August 1992




removed, the pilots left themselves and returned to serve the Russian Armed
Forces.
Secondly, the impact of the Gulf war and its connections with air
power was duly noted by the leaders of the former Soviet Air Forces and new
Russian Air Forces. This was exemplified in the force generation concept,
purpose and missions under present and future conditions, that was logically
presented in the July 1992 special edition of Military Thought . This method for
determining the future structure of the air forces was presented in a diagram that
made very strong references to the importance of technology in future air forces.
The approach is a very methodological and scientific method of reforming the Air
Forces, (which greatly resembles the Soviet scientific approach) and has clearly
taken into consideration the impending Ogarkov "scientific revolution." From
this method and diagram a few conclusions can be drawn. The first is that the
Air Forces will have to perform two groups of missions in future wars and armed
conflicts of varying intensity: air superiority and air interdiction.
Prevalent in this article was the concept of the fluidity of future wars
and their lack of clearly defined borders. In Russian terms this mobile nature of
modern war presumes rapid establishment of groupings of troops and aviation
with a transfer of their assets to other theaters of military operations or axes. This
problem will be solved with a mobile transportation structure using large-capacity
military aviation as its basis. Once again this was a reaction to the coalition
efforts during Gulf war.
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Future air forces of Russia will also attempt to integrate reserves units.
These units should be comprised of reserve aircraft and trained flight and
technical personnel. A problem will arise here because of the training required
for a fighter pilot. In the case of transport pilots, though, this makes good sense.
A good summary of the missions and basic structure of the air forces
in a future war was accurately stated by the chief of the Yuri Gagarin Air
Academy:
The performance of missions facing aviation in an air campaign as well as
in joint and independent operations is possible only with the presence of
large air units in the makeup of the Russian Air Forces, including formations
and units of various air arms capable of independently performing the full
set of missions in operations and, most importantly, ensuring attainment of
their goals. In our view, air armies meet these requirements. They can be
of two types: large strategic formations of Long Range Aviation, large
strategic formations of Front Aviation, and Military-Transport Aviation.
What this will probably mean in terms of commands is four aviation
commands in the authorized organizational structure: Long-range and Naval
Missile-Armed Aviation, Front Aviation, Military-Transport Aviation, and Cadres
and Reserve Training. The immense change here from the former Soviet Air
Forces is the presence of a cadres and reserve command. As noted above, this
will be difficult to accomplish in the fighter squadrons, yet is probable and
inevitable in other areas mainly because of the economic problems in the military
at large. Therefore an important intelligence indicator would be the evidence of
the formation of a serious air force reserve component. As for the importance of
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high-tech weapons, the chief of the Air Academy acknowledges the need for them
when he says;
The shift of emphasis in warfare to airspace and aerospace, especially in the
initial period of war, is becoming obvious. Operations and engagements are
acquiring a clear-cut three dimensional character with broad use of EW
equipment and precision weapons. A trend is clearly seen toward a
disproportionate change in the relative importance of branches of the armed
forces in achieving goals of operations and the war as a whole. The Air
Forces will steadily grow. It must become the nucleus of Russia's mobile
Armed Forces. 231
Future production of the Tu-160 Blackjack will stop at a level
equivalent to the Bl-B and that production of the Tu-142 Bear will stop
altogether.B2 However, other aircraft programs are expected to have been
preserved because oi the need for hard currency sales and to keep the
technological base alive. "These include two next-generation fighters, a major
upgrade to the Su-27 Flanker, and a jet trainer to replace the L-39." 233 The
emphasis on going ahead with the new fighter programs is again that they will
hopefully provide a source of hard currency, as advanced fighters have done in
the past.
- '"Purpose Missions and Makeup of the Air Force Under Present
Conditions," Moscow, Vovennava Mvsl , in Russian, July 92, Special
Edition, (signed to press 10 July 1992), p. 68-71, (Presentation by
Colonel-General of Aviation B.F. Korolkov, chief of the Air Academy
imeni Yu. A. Gagarin, at the General Staff Military Academy's
Military-science Conference from 27-30 May 1992) , ( JPRS-UMT-92 -012 -
L, 30 September 1992, p. 39).
-Jane's Defense Weekly , (08 Feb 92), 186.
-""CIS Plans Fighters for 21st Century," Jane ' s Defense
Weekly , (14 Mar 92), 430-31.
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The ability to reconstitute air assets will be virtually nonexistent
without a planned reserve component to build upon. Front-line aircraft will be
limited in numbers and those in storage will be in such a poor material condition
of readiness as to make them useless. Additional hardware would have to be
produced which would put a severe strain on an already weak economy, which
is explained in detail in the appendix. A critical, but often overlooked, area will
be the shortage of trained pilots and an inability to train additional pilots quickly-
Regarding the impact on US policy, one of the most serious
implications will be that although Russian pilot skill and training will likelv be
low, third world nations will be able to obtain advanced aircraft, particularly
fighters.
3. Air Forces Summary
The air forces in Russia, just like all the other branches, are rethinking
their role in the new geo-strategic environment of Russia, one that is founded on
local, small, regional conflicts that will be fought in a high technology
environment. The aviation transport assets that Russia currently owns will be
greatly utilized in the near future for purposes of moving equipment and men to
local "hot-spots" within the former Soviet Union. Additionally, the leadership in
the field of aviation technology will attempt to continue research and
development within the limited economic constraints. Some of the funding
needed for this may be provided for by hard currency sales of advanced aircraft.
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A quote from a senior division aviation inspector sums up some of the problems
in the Russian air forces today:
...the level of flight training for the personnel is the same today as before the
[Second Great Patriotic] war. There was no fuel then, either, there was not
enough spare parts.. In order to feel like a fighter a pilot must fly on a
regular basis, but we get into the air once a week at best. Even then, what
are the flights like? We must not deviate either to the right or to the left, as
though we are carrying not bombs and missiles but bowls filled to the brim
with borscht. When the squadron flies, it is always in 'skilled file,' aircraft
after aircraft at intervals of two-three minutes. We penetrate air defenses in
the same way. In a real situation all of the aircraft would be shot down.
It is like making a hole in the wall, putting a cat on one side and a bunch
of mice on the other [side] and letting the mice go through one at a
time.. ..Why repeat those errors?234
F. THE NAVAL FORCES
1. Introduction
The former Soviet Navy has been of special concern to US planners as
one of the services capable of projecting power, by nuclear or conventional means,
on a worldwide scale. The ability of the navy to still fulfill its conventional and
nuclear strategic missions is of great importance to the US. While it is true that
President Boris Yeltsin has declared that the US and UK are no longer the
- 'Lieutenant-Colonel V. Rudenko, "Fate of a Division: Like
That of People, It Is Mot Always Easy, " Moscow, in Russian,
Krasnava Zvezda . 4 July 92, First Edition, p. 3., ( JPRS-UMA-92-026
,
15 July 1992, p. 17-19) .
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enemy 23 ", it is still prudent for US programming and war-planning purposes to
study the evolution of the Russian Navy.
As the year 2000 approaches the Russian Navy will have evolved
beyond the current crisis into an as yet undetermined form, that may or may not
come into competition with the US navy. To examine the Russian Navy in the
year 2000 it is necessary to construct the force structure that it is likely to have at
that point. The decisions as to that force structure depend upon the
reduction/procurement cycles, military policy, doctrine and strategy established
by the Russian government. Determination of the military policy, doctrine and
strategy is also imperative in projecting the types of employment that the Russian
Navy may see at the turn of the century. This, of course, is the crux of the
matter for the US Navy, i.e., who will it face, what will they have for forces and
how will they employ them.
The Soviet Navy has in the most part been taken over by Russia. The
Caspian Flotilla is being divided between several former republics and the Black
Sea fleet will be divided between Russia and Ukraine. 236 The Baltic fleet, while
Russian, will become a training fleet with little to no strategic value. The rest of
"BBC Airs Interview With Yeltsin," London, BBC Television




- : The issue of the Black Sea Fleet division between Russia and
Ukraine was nominally settled with an agreement signed in Yalta on
3 August 1992 . It remains to be seen whether this agreement is the
final word on the issue. "'Full Text' of Black Sea Fleet
Agreement," Moscow, Itar-Tass World Service, in Russian, 1252 GMT,
6 Aug 92, ( FBIS-SOV- 92 - 15 3 , 7 August 1992, p. 14).
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the navy will belong to Russia. Therefore it is Russia's policy, doctrine and
strategy that will most directly affect the navy. We have already examined the
policy and doctrine of Russia, and the navy has never had a separate strategy in
Soviet experience. This will continue in the Russian era. 237 Therefore through the
doctrinal and operational-strategic contexts we will examine the naval policy for
the future.
James Tritten has examined the topic of the future of the Russian Navy
in the wake of the lessons learned from the Gulf War and come to some
conclusions as to best and worst case scenarios from the Russian and West's
points of view. 238 Tritten states that an article by Admiral Chernavin that
postulates a Russian Navy that is defensive but still sees the US as a threat should
be considered the worst case for the US and the best case for the Russian Navy. 239
Tritten then goes on to call an article by Konstantin Sorokin the worst case for the
Russian Navy and the best for the US. This article stressed coastal defense and
elimination of strategic ASW against US SSBN's.240 Tritten's conclusion that the
worst case scenario for the US as stated by Chernavin is unlikely due to resource
- :
"V. Chernavin "Chernavin on Missions, Composition, Continued
Strategic Value of Navy," Moscow, Morskov Sbornik . in Russian, No.
11, Nov 91, p. 3-12, (JPRS-UMA-92-003 , 29 January 1992, p. 55).
::James J. Tritten "The Changing Role Of Naval Forces: The
Russian View Of The Persian Gulf War", The Journal of Soviet
Military Studies , vol. 5, No. 4, December 19 92, p. 5 9S.
- ibid.
- 4 ibid, 599 .
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constraints is in our opinion correct. 241 His worst case scenario is also deemed
unlikely as seen by the increasingly conservative swing the government is taking
in Russia. There is a middle ground between these two cases that seems more
likely to be adopted.
The middle ground is seen in a recent presentation by Rear-Admiral
A. A. Pauk, chief of the Main Naval Staff for Operational-Tactical Studies, is
important to examine. Pauk begins his presentation to the General Staff Military
Academv science conference of May 1992, by explaining Russia's need for a strong
navy. These reasons are fairly classic in nature in his claim that Russia is a great
sea-power, the nature of the world requires a strong Russian Navy, the lack of
naval arms control agreements and that US maritime power has not changed. 242
What is new is the wrapping of the defense of lines of communication (LOO, in
terms of Russia's integration into the world market economy. 243 Pauk then goes
on to state that the navy must be capable of presenting a deterrent to aggression
and possess the ability to repulse that aggression if is not deterred. To do this he
presents wartime and peacetime sets of operational-strategic missions that the
navy must be able to perform. These missions tie in with the strategic missions
--ibid, 598.
- 4:Rear-Admiral A. A. Pauk "Purpose, Missions and Makeup of the
Navy Under Present Conditions and in the Future, " Moscow, Vovennava
Mvsl . in Russian, Jul 92, Special Edition, p. 71-75, ( JPRS-UMT-92-
012-L, 30 September 1992, p. 39).
""* ibid.
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for the armed forces that were contained in the May 1992 draft military doctrine.
They include:
In Wartime
- Repulse aggression together with other branches of the Armed Forces and deter
a possible enemy from initiating a nuclear war. In case he employs nuclear
weapons deliver strikes against the most important military installations as part
of the CIS nuclear triad;
- Ensure high combat stability of naval strategic nuclear forces in a non-nuclear
period of combat operations;
- Win superiority on contiguous seas and in operationally important areas, and
deprive the enemy of an opportunity to conduct offensive operations from the
sea;
- Defeat the enemy's principal naval attack groupings;
- Operate on enemy LOC and defend friendly coastal LOC;
- Blockade strait zones and the most important enemy ports and bases;
- Provide security and defense for fleet basing areas and facilities;
- Assist ground forces operating on maritime flanks of fronts, including by means
of landing amphibious assault forces.
In Peacetime
- Strengthen international security and global stability in the world, above all by
keeping naval strategic nuclear forces in constant readiness;
- Support joint foreign policy acts by states of the world community (naval
presence in particular regions, showing the flag, activity of forces and so on).
Participate in the activity of multilateral naval force elements under UN aegis to
keep or establish the peace in various regions;
- Maintain a favorable operational regime in contiguous and internal sea theaters;
- Assist naval units of Border Guard Troops in performing missions of securing
state borders and Russia's maritime economic zone;
- Participate in the fight against terrorism, smuggling and other violations of
international law and other laws, as well as in forming a global system of
measures for confidence-building and naval activity verification. 244
If we take these wartime missions as the sentiments of the navy's
higher echelon then we notice some problems in regards to the strictly defensive
doctrine called for by the Russian Defense Minister. The peacetime missions seem
ibid, (JPRS) 40
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to fall in line with the defensive and internationally interactive military that will
be most acceptable to the West. While the thrust of the new doctrine will
undoubtedly retain this defensive character the interpretation may leave more
leeway as we have stated before, for the navy. Will this leeway allow the
interdiction of enemy LOC and blockading of straits and ports? It would appear
from the conservative swing that is currently underway in doctrinal discussions
that it might. These actions will probably not be initiated until a severe threat has
been enunciated by the Russian Security Council, the problem will be how they
view possible threats.
Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin has stated that in the
context of forming a new Russian military the navy should be aim for: high
technology coupled with heavy downsizing; the importance of coastal defense;
own-SLOC defense; and defense of strategic missile carriers in bastions of the Sea
of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea. :4? These goals for the future navy look very
similar to Pauk's but do not go as far as Pauk in his call for blockading and SLOC
interdiction. The leeway spoken of earlier may well come into play for these
questions if circumstances warrant.
If these are then the missions of the navy we must now look at the
ability of the navy to fulfill them. The most obvious question to be dealt with is
the economy's impact on the navy's mission capabilities. Historically the Soviet
"
,: YeIena Agapova "Kokoshin Outlines Future Military Needs"
Moscow, Krasnava Zvezda , in Russian, 17 Mar 92, p. 1-2, (F3IS-S0V-
92-053, 18 March 1992, p. 25-23).
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military policy justified the military budget, now that has changed and it must be
justified in the context of the broadening definition of national security and
economic policy. The most noticeable areas for the effect this is having on the
navy is in training, readiness and future construction. The Soviet Union usually
kept about 15 percent of its fleet at sea at any time, while 30 percent were capable
of deploying at a moment's notice, another 30 percent within about 20 days and
the final 25 percent in overhaul. 246 The number of days a unit spent at sea
relative to the days it was available to go to sea is defined as operating tempo or
OPTEMPO. This has declined steadily since the late 1980's. 247 It is important to
realize that spending and training were designed for a relatively high level of out
of area deployments which supported a naval operational-strategic policy of
"offensive defense" that included anti-SLOC operations and a presence in the rest
of the world. Recently the lack of presence of any Russian surface vessels
anywhere outside of Russia itself attests to the deep affect the budget cutbacks
are having on the navy's ability to conduct training, and thus maintain a high
state of readiness. 248 The Northern and Black Sea Fleets have suffered fuel




-rRear Admiral Edward D. Sheafer, Jr.,USN, "Statement before
the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the
House Armed Services Committee", 5 February 1992, p. 24.
-"'M.Osokin, Teleradiokompaniya Oscankino Television First
Program Network, in Russian, 21 Jan 92, (FBIS-SOV-92 -018 , 28
January 1992, p. 14).
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shortages since late 1991, with the result that the ships are lying at anchor and not
carrying out any maneuvers. 244 Rear Admiral Sheafer has also stated that the :
Poor economic conditions have led the (Russian) Navy to reduce further the
scale of major exercises since 1989. Last year was the first year the navy did
not participate in any large scale fleet wide exercises. 2"
These and other instances of lack of fuel, spare parts and operating funds show
how deep the effects are on the Russian fleets of the economic woes of the
country. 2 "' The prospects for the future of the Russian Navy are rooted in these
budget problems.
The rising percentage of the budget addressed to servicemen and their
social protection will mean a consequent reduction in the allocation for future
acquisitions and research. Construction rates for all types of ships are drastically
reduced if not completely halted. Admiral Chernavin noted that shipbuilding in
classes other the Kuznetsov is towards small ships with displacements of 2-4,000
tons and surface craft that are used for coastal operations, the production of large
ships is not planned. Similarly no ballistic missile submarines will be constructed
-'Osokin, (FBIS) 14.
-" Sheafer, 23 .
:Admiral Chernavin has stated that since the beginning of the
year not one warship has put to sea and that repairs on over 13
ships has ceased. Vladimir Zelentsov "Admiral Chernavin Gives
Eriefing on Navy Issues," Moscow, Rossivskava Gazeta , in Russian,
10 Jul 92, First Edition, p. 2, ( FBIS-SOV-92-134 , p. 22).
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for at least the next ten years. 2
"2 With many vessels on the slips still in various
stages of construction it is difficult to ascertain which will be completed and
which will not. The aircraft carrier Ulyanovsk was cut up for scrap and the
carrier Varyag still awaits a decision as to her fate, possibly a sale to China.253
What construction does occur will most probably be for export254 and for
modernizing the submarine force. 25" Scrappings will probably increase
dramatically, although the disposal of nuclear reactors now poses a problem. 2 "6
"
"V. Chernavin "Time and Che Fleet: The Navy Problems of
Reduction and Development, " Moscow, Morskov Sbornik . in Russian,
Nov 91, p. 3-12 , ( JPRS-UMA-92-003 , 29 January 1992, p. 57).
-"'The fate of the aircraft carrying cruiser Varyag has been
variously reported as a sale to China or retention in the Russian
navy probably homeported in the Pacific Fleet. To date no
definitive word has been forthcoming from the Russia government.
"China To Euy Aircraft Carrier From Ukraine, " Tokyo, Sankei
Shimbun . in Japanese, 4 Aug 92, Morning Edition, p 1, ( FBIS-SOV-92-
152-A, 6 August 1992, p. 12); "Cruiser Varyag Destined for Pacific
Fleet," Moscow, Rossivskava Gazeta , in Russian, 12 Aug 92, First
Edition, p. 1, (FBIS-SOV-92-157, 13 August 1992, p. 13).
-
"In July Rear Admiral Leonid Belyshev, acting chief of navy
shipbuilding and armaments stated that there were "for sale only
two small antisubmarine ships, two fast-attack crafts, two patrol
crafts, one minesweeper, and one diesel submarine" and that ships
of similar classes would be constructed for export. Vyacheslav
Kocherov "Navy Aide on Selling Warships to Third World, " Moscow,
revest iva , in Russian, 16 Jul 92, Morning Edition, p. 3, (FBIS-SOV-
92-143, 24 July 1992, p. 23).
"V. Chernavin "Chernavin on Missions, Composition, Continued
Strategic Value of Navy, " Moscow, Morskov Sbornik , in Russian, Nov
91, p. 3-12, (JPRS -UMA-92-003, 29 January 1992, p. 54).
Admiral Chernavin alluded to the problems that Russia will
have to face as it retires nuclear vessels, when he emphasized the
extraordinary lengths that the navy is going to ensure the safety
of nuclear reactors on scrapped vessels. Zelentsov, (FBIS) 22.
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The conversion of some shipyards to civilian functions or their loss to other
republics will limit the ability oi Russia to reconstitute the navy quickly- This
budgetary crisis will be the determining factor for the Russian Navy as it heads
towards 2000. Now let us examine the submarine, surface and aviation forces a
little closer for our projection. The Naval Infantry was dealt with previously and
the KGB fleet will not be addressed as it is deemed of a non-strategic nature.257
2. Submarine Forces
The submarine force is the most important branch of the navy in
Russian strategic thinking. This of course has to do with the ballistic missile
submarines. Preservation and protection of this nuclear deterrent is the top
priority of the Russian navy. The SSBNs will patrol bastions in the Sea of
Okhotsk and the Barents Sea. This will provide the major mission for the attack
and guided missile submarines - defense of these bastions.
The three main missions for the attack and guided missile submarine
forces are: protection of those strategic missile systems, defense of Russian
interests and territory, and protection of SLOC. 258 If the conservative swing
The KGB fleet has an enormous amount of coastline to cover
for law enforcement and other duties, all of this is to be done
with a small number of assets. The KGB does have about 212 coastal
and patrol combatants with the 7 KrivaK Ill's being the largest
vessels but they are armed with only 100mm guns and carry a Ka-27
helicopter. With the missions it has and the limited assets
available Che fleet already has its hands full without trying to
enter the strategic arena. The Military Balance 1992-19 93 , p. 101.
-
C?
V. Chernavin, "Time and the Fleet: The Navy, Problems of
Reduction and Development", (JPRS) 55.
153
underway in the Russian government continues, the anti-SLOC and blockading
missions advocated by Rear-Admiral Pauk may be authorized in wartime. To
fulfill all ot these missions the Soviet Navy built up the largest attack submarine
force in the world. Now with the given budget constraints the numbers will most
surely fall but the quality per hull will increase as in the SSBN case. The attack
force today includes 163 submarines, 88 of which are nuclear powered. 2"9 The
funding for future construction of nuclear submarines is doubtful, but the
construction of diesel submarines will probably continue with the export of some
of these vessels. 260 Our projected numbers for the Russian attack submarines are:
7 Akulas; 3 Sierra I and lis; 18-22 Kilos, depending on the number of exports and
constructions; 26 Victor Ills; and 18 Tangos. The guided missile submarine will
fair little better with the total deceasing from 57 to 16. 261 It is assumed that only
Oscar I/IIs and some Charlie lis will be still operational. The possibility is still
open for bringing decommissioned but not scrapped vessels back into the force
-"'ibid.
As we have already seen Iran has purchased 2 Kilos and has
an option to buy a third.
"Submarine numbers are projected by the authors after taking
present order-of -battle information from several publications and
then arbitrarily deciding which classes will be scrapped and that
new construction will occur only on diesel submarines as stated
earlier. The publications consulted were: Combat Fleets of the
World , (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1988), p. 535-587;
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance
1992-1993
. (London: Brassey's 1992), p. 93-94; Understanding Soviet
Naval Developments , (Washington: Department of the Navy, 1990), p.
131-132, 135-136, 138-139.
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but this could well be prohibitively expensive. This is by no means a definitive
list but represents a best guess for the year 2000.
3. Surface Forces
The surface forces of the Russian Navy will be significantly reduced by
the year 2000. The quality per hull will increase as it will in the submarine case.
The division of the navy will continue between four fleets and the Caspian
Flotilla, but the overwhelming majority of the vessels will be Russian and located
in the Northern and Pacific Fleets. The reduction in force that will occur will
come from scrapping obsolete ships and selling others if possible. As seen earlier
construction will only be of vessels in the 2-4000 ton classes. The missions will
be in line with those expressed by Rear-Admiral Pauk; coastal and SLOC defense,
defense of strategic nuclear forces, superiority of contiguous seas, assisting ground
forces, etc. The numerical strength of the surface navy at present is: "483 surface
combatants (of which 72 are for the ocean zone), ...,310 various small
combatants" 2"2 of these surface combatants Pauk states that by the turn of the
century 300 will be up for decommissioning. This coupled with no new ship
construction in the near future and the further budget constraints will result in
a loss of 67-70 percent of the present ship totals. 2"3 These numbers are from the




for the Russians to ameliorate this trend is to appropriate more money, possible
if a more conservative government comes to power, or extend the life of the
vessels through some type of refit/overhaul. Neither of these two scenarios will
be enough to significantly enlarge the Russian surface forces by 2000. Therefore
we project a greatly smaller but more modern surface forces for the end of the
decade.
4. Soviet Naval Aviation
This section will attempt to accurately evaluate the posture of former
Soviet Naval Aviation as it will exist in the year 2000. A number of topics will
be discussed in the body of this section: mission/threat as viewed bv Russia;
disposition of forces; estimation of the aviation OOB; status of the CTOL carrier
program; status of aircraft production; evaluation of reconstitution ability; defense
agreements; and impacts on U.S. policy.
It is probably true that naval (aviation) missions will change very little
from those stated by Admiral Chernavin:
The principal missions of the general-purpose forces of our navy are in
essence reduced, first of all, to ensuring the physical preservation and sound
functioning of the naval strategic nuclear system under any conditions and,
second, creating and maintaining such operational conditions in the
maritime theaters that would be the least favorable for a likely adversary to
start and wage military operations. :,>4
Of particular interest for naval aviation, it appears that Russian:
-
4V. Chernavin "Chernavin on Missions, Composition, Continued
Strategic Value of Navy", (JPRS) 56.
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general-purpose forces face the task of inflicting defeat on enemy naval
strike groups and impeding the execution of broad-scale operations or those
in depth by him, as well as ensuring the creation of the necessary conditions
for the effective performance of defensive operations in the continental
theaters of military operations in conjunction with other branches oi the
armed forces. 2'"
Thus, land-based naval aviation will retain as primary missions the traditional
ones of reconnaissance and surveillance, anti-ship strike, anti-submarine warfare
(ASW), and aviation support, 26" with anti-ship strike constituting the core
capabilitv as a result of the above statement. In addition, as a result oi naval
aviation maintaining a fighter escort capability, it will have coastal defense and
intercept as a secondary mission.
With respect to disposition, Russia will retain almost all naval aviation
and will continue to maintain forces in all four fleet areas, albeit the presence in
the Baltic and Black Sea areas will be considerably diminished. The number of
aircraft across the board will have decreased with those remaining being of the
highest capability and quality available.
The continued support for the CTOL (conventional take-off and
landing) carrier program is not surprising. In a thesis written at the US Naval
Postgraduate School by Stanley G. Stefansky in 1985, he concluded that:
The Politburo has come to accept the role of attack aircraft carriers in the
pursuit of their foreign policy objectives in the developing world. The
- ibid.
- Harriet: F. Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of
the USSR , third ed . (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1934), p.
176.
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aircraft carrier complements well their apparent acceptance of a greater
military role in Third World crises. The Soviets realize that the attack
aircraft carrier provides certain military advantages not apparent in other
forms of weaponry. They perceive in aircraft carriers a means of projecting
Soviet airpower to distant areas of the world where access to land-based
airfields is not guaranteed. It is also a means of protecting naval assets at
sea and of competing for 'air supremacy/ a critical prerequisite for gaining
sea control in theaters of operations areas far removed from friendly fighter
bases.
The local war mission will not be the aircraft carrier's only role in the overall
Soviet military doctrine. The Soviets appreciate the mission flexibility of this
type oi ship and it will surely be tasked to perform many missions of which
defense of the homeland is primary. However, the local war mission appears
to be extremely important and probably provided one of the major rationales
for the decision to build it. :c,/
Although his thesis was written with communist regime in mind, the rationale
that justified its building then continues to exist and will continue to exist. The
argument for justification of a carrier program, from the Russian naval point of
view, can be made much stronger today in view oi the fact that the threat of
nuclear war has greatly diminished and as a result the threat of losing a carrier
during time of crisis has greatly diminished. This in essence would make the
now less vulnerable, multipurpose aircraft carrier a much more cost effective
platform because the chance of losing one would be much less.
Russia will retain all significant naval aviation. With respect to the
existing bomber and fighter/FGA (fighter/ground attack) aircraft of naval
aviation, only the most modern aircraft will be retained and marketed world wide
'Stefansky, Stanley G. , USSR Local War Doctrine as a
Rationale for rhe Development of the Soviet CTOL (Conventional
Take-off and Landing) Aircraft Carrier , Master's Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 1985.
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for hard currency while the older aircraft will be scrapped, or sold if buyers can
be located. The older aircraft if retained, will be excess and reduced to such a
poor material condition of readiness as to be useless.
Based on the above assumption: the Northern and Baltic Fleet will
retain the majority of the naval air assets while the Pacific Fleet will retain slightly
less naval air assets and the Black Sea fleet will have to split its assets with
Ukraine in 1995 as per their agreement. 25* The total number of bomber/strike and
fighter aircraft for the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea Fleets would be
approximately 300 aircraft. This is roughly 25% less than the number envisioned
by Chernavin:
As for aviation, we are realizing the decision to restrict the strike and fighter
aviation of shore-based naval units in the Northern, Baltic, and Black Sea
fleets to an overall level of 400 combat aircraft, which signifies a reduction
of 60 percent. 269
As Chernavin has stated, the long run missions of the Russian Navy
and thus naval aviation will not change. Naval aviation will maintain forces in
all four fleet areas; actual numbers of aircraft will be reduced with the highest
quality aircraft being retained. Two aircraft carriers will be operational but the
airwings will still be developing. Their primary missions will include fleet air
defense, power projection, and defense of the homeland. Although defense
r The Military Balance 1992-1993 , various.
Chernavin, "Chernavin on Missions", (JPRS) 58
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spending will be considerably reduced, emphasis will be placed on the quality of
advanced technology aircraft and air-delivered weapons, not the quantity.
5. Final Issues
Several issues are of crucial importance to the state the Russian Navy
will find itself in at the end of the decade. First and foremost is the economy and
the consequent budget crisis for the navy. The navy is a capital intensive service
that needs long lead times for development of new systems and copious amounts
of money for its maintenance and upkeep. 2 " With the present state of affairs in
Russia it does not appear that the resources will be available for the navy to
remain at a highly efficient level. The effect upon training and readiness is most
dangerous for the future of the navy. The loss of some obsolete ships and the
scaling back of acquisitions will hurt but, a leaner fairly modern navy will be the
end result. However the loss of training and maintenance funds may well leave
this force hollow. It is also important to note that this leaner force will be
operating in smaller areas along the coastline, this does not pose a threat to the
US. This bears close scrutiny for Western naval analysts over the next 8-10 years.
The other issue most affecting the navy is the state of political trends
in Russia today. This is interrelated with the budgetary question. The continued
swing of the present government in the conservative direction is a double edged
sword for the navy. The more conservative the government then the greater the
ibid, (JPRS) 40
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possibility of funds being increased and of the missions of the navy taking on the
more conservative tones expressed by Pauk. The other edge to this conservatism
is that the economic reform of the country will be drastically slowed, thus the
funds needed will be unavailable for any length of time. It remains to be seen
which way the government will go but the short term outlook to the year 2000
is for a much smaller, more modern, less ready and poorly trained fleet.
G. SUMMARY
The reform process the Russian military is undergoing will lead to a vastly
different force structure by the year 2000. Deep reductions in all branches will
occur forcing re-evaluation of force requirements and missions. This re-evaluation
is already underway as are the drawdowns in force levels. The exact makeup of
the Russian military in the year 2000 cannot of course be predicted but the trends
visible today can yield a reasonably accurate picture for our purposes. It is from
these trends that we have drawn our conclusions on force structure for the year
2000.
Russia will maintain strategic nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future
mainly for the deterrent factor against world class aggression. This will be
essential for Russia in a period in which she is primarily concerned with internal
and regional problems. During this period, the ability to ward off major extra-
regional aggression will allow the Russian military to concentrate on issues such
as protection of national minorities and conflicts with peripheral countries. This
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would seem to argue for maintenance of a strong nuclear potential that is not
threatening to the other nuclear powers. Large reductions in strategic nuclear
forces below START levels, publishing of a military doctrine that renounces first
use of nuclear weapons, joint inspection and cooperation agreements on research
and development would help lower the fears of other nations. The agreements
of Washington were a large step in this direction and furthermore, President
Yeltsin's desire to decrease the nuclear inventory may even lead to attempts at
even deeper reductions. 2,1
The most likely scenario is one in which START is fully implemented and
where negotiations will take place for the implementation of the new agreements.
These agreements will have to be substantially modified in the Russian view but
the principle of lowering strategic nuclear weapons has been accepted by most
players on the scene. Most likely, the pressure placed upon the government by
the more conservative elements of the military and the opposition parties will in
opinion prevent codification without major changes being included in the
agreement. President Yeltsin will be unable to withstand the political pressure
' "Grachev stated that reductions below this number of 3000-
3500 are possible but only if negotiations include China, France
and Great Britain. He also stated that the ABM treaty needed to be
strictly observed, no doubt a reference to SDI . This statement was
made shortly after the agreements were signed and before the
conservative tilt was so pronounced in Russian political circles.
This coupled with his previously conservative remarks at the May
conference leaves his true inclinations open to question. "Grachev
Says More Nuclear Cuts Possible," London, Financial Times , in
English, 25 Jul 92, p. 2, ( FBIS-SOV-92 - 152 -A, 6 August 1992, p. 1).
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to step back from the accelerated reductions he has already agreed to with
President Bush.
The re-negotiation of the agreements will not effect START which will be
adhered to, but the level of reduction over and above that treaty will have to wait
till beyond completion of START reductions, ie. the year 2000. The numbers of
strategic nuclear weapons will probably be in the range of 6000 warheads for
Russia, MIRVs will not be eliminated totally, and the structure of Russian nuclear
forces will remain weighted towards landbased systems. 272
When the reform process is complete ground forces will definitely resemble
the "meaner and leaner" concept and will attempt to become a genuine
professional military. This will be accomplished by the downsizing of personnel
and equipment in all parts of the ground forces to generate effective mobile type
forces to operate in the proposed three TVDs (Far East, South and West). The
internal transfer of newer combat equipment (cascading) and personnel will at a
minimum replace older assets and at a maximum greatly strengthen the combat
potential of the ground forces. The military will have a mostly professional force,
that is highly trained, very mobile, highly motivated and equipped with modern
conventional arms.273
-"-Volkov, (JPRS) 31.
In an "'Appended' Statement Issued" to the Resolution on
Military Priorities, it was stated "The Russian Armed Forces should
be designed exclusively for the protection of the independence and
territorial integrity of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet, and
also for the fulfillment of Russia's international
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The concept of operations of the ground forces will attempt to incorporate
much more combined arms integration and defense training aimed against
enemies with advanced conventional munitions, especially in the Western TVD.
Furthermore, the ground forces, as well as the other forces, will strive to develop
their own equipment in line with the "military-technical revolution.''
Although research and development for ground forces will be cut drastically
we can expect to see the deployment of weapon systems already developed, such
as the BMP-3 improved armored personnel carrier. The older equipment in the
inventory will either be destroyed, sold, or stored east of the Urals in compliance
with the CFE treaty.
The reconstitution capability of the ground forces will remain high since the
vast majority of TLE stored east of the Urals will not deteriorate due to the cold
dry climate. The exact number and type of these armored vehicles in unknown
though it will remain an important strategic asset. Much of this TLE is modern
equipment and will most likely be kept, while the obsolete TLE and excess
commitments ... the deterrent to the unleashing of large-scale
conflicts and local wars against Russia and other CIS member states
should be forces possessing high-accuracy weapons and means of
delivery. . .For the prompt neutralization of possible local military
conflicts, it is necessary to create highly mobile general purpose
forces consisting of several ground forces groupings and naval
groupings." Statement on the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet
Presidium on the Russian Federation's Military Policy Priorities,"
appended to 1 April 1992 resolution, carried by the Moscow,
Rossivskava Gazeta . in Russian, S April 92, (FBIS-SOV-92 -069 , 9
April 1992, p. 37-38).
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equipment will be destroyed or sold in the arms export business for hard
currency.
Training will be a problem with the smaller military budget, and therefore
more emphasis will be placed on extensive command post exercises for
headquarters elements combined with simulator training for vehicle crews.
Additionally, the airborne forces will undertake the peacekeeping/peacemaking
forces until other CIS forces are formed. This will translate into an emphasis on
low intensity conflict intervention in view of the problems arising in the new
multi-polar environment.
In the long run the ground forces, after a painful reform, could transform
into a force that would have the capability to execute the Pentagon's Lithuanian
invasion scenario on the Northern Flank of NATO, though this is unlikely.
Although the vast quantities of troops and equipment still present in Russia will
get smaller they will become more lethal for their size, defensive oriented, and
truly represent a variant three type doctrine. Again it is important to note that
this "leaner and meaner" look is only in the context of the local and regional
orientation of the new doctrine, not global in any sense.
The PVO reform proposal after the re-structuring, calls for an air defense
district; several air defense armies and a missile attack warning army; and
separate air defense, ABM defense and space surveillance corps, divisions and
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brigades. 2 ' 4 This order of battle was defined by maintaining minimum defensive
sufficiency, but most importantly, "cost effectiveness" criteria. Also, this structure
is attempting to come to grips with the likely possibility of local/regional conflicts
which will warrant a strategic flexibility of defense. The PVO will still be a
branch of the Russian military but some key assets will be shifted to the Strategic
Defense Forces and other assets will be transferred to the commanders within the
TVDs.
The Air Force assets in Russia, just like all the other branches, are rethinking
their role in the new geo-strategic environment of Russia, one founded on local,
small, regional conflicts that will be fought in a high technology environment.
The aviation transport assets that Russia currently owns will be greatly utilized
in the near future for purposes of moving equipment and men to local "hot-spots"
within the former Soviet Union. Additionally, the leadership in the field of
aviation technology will attempt to continue research and development within the
limited economic constraints, some funding may be provided for by hard
currency sales of advanced aircraft.
Several issues are of crucial importance to the state the Russian Navy will
find itself in at the end of the decade. First and foremost is the economy and the
consequent budget crisis for the navy. The navy is a capital intensive service that
needs long lead times for development of new systems and copious amounts of
; Sumin, 36
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money for its maintenance and upkeep.2> With the present state of affairs in
Russia it does not appear that the resources will be available for the navy to
remain at a highly efficient level. The effect upon training and readiness is most
dangerous for the future of the navy. The loss of some obsolete ships and the
scaling back of acquisitions will hurt but, a leaner fairly modern navy will be the
end result. However the loss of training and maintenance funds may well leave
this force hollow. It is also important to note that this leaner force will be
operating in smaller areas along the coastline, this does not pose a threat to the
US. This bears close scrutiny for Western naval analysts over the next 8-10 years.
The other issue most affecting the navy is the state of political trends in
Russia today. This is interrelated with the budgetary question. The continued
swing of the present government in the conservative direction is a double edged
sword for the navy. The more conservative the government then the greater the
possibility of funds being increased and of the missions of the navy taking on the
more conservative tones expressed by Pauk. The other edge to this conservatism
is that the economic reform of the country will be drastically slowed, thus the
funds needed will be unavailable for any length of time. It remains to be seen
which way the government will go but the short term outlook to the year 2000
is for a much smaller, more modern, less ready and poorly trained fleet.
ibid, (JPRS) 40
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As we have seen the Russian military is in for a very difficult transition
period, one of reductions in all branches. These reductions will leave a smaller,
more professional military by the year 2000, albeit a poorly trained one. It must
be stated again that this force will operate only in a local and regional context, not
a global one. Now we will look at the impact this reform of the Russian military
will have on the new regionally-focused national security strategy of the US.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
A. AMERICAS NEW NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
1. Introduction
President Bush's Aspen speech of August 1990 was the public
acknowledgement that the national security needs of the United States had
changed. For forty-five years the USSR had dominated US strategic and security
thinking, the Aspen speech admitted that that had changed. With that speech
President Bush launched the public enunciation of a "new national security
strategy", one that would take into account the changes that have occurred in the
world and in particular the USSR. However the question arises as to whether the
"new regionally-focused national security strategy" actually goes far enough in
addressing those changes. Are the changes in the former Soviet Union deep
seated and radical enough to justify the new strategy? The strategy was
formulated prior to the August 1991 coup and the subsequent dissolution of the
USSR, but the force structure advocated by the administration before these events
is still the force structure advocated today. The outcome of the 1992 election will
no doubt produce changes to the strategy. President-elect Bill Clinton has called
for a reduction of troops in Europe and deeper defense cuts but the specifics of
his proposals have not been entirely clear. Thus we are left with examining the
strategy as presented by the Bush administration and coming to some conclusions
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as to the viability of the strategy as it relates to Russia. In other words; has the
threat from the former Soviet Union disappeared or is Russia capable of a
renewed threat by the year 2000, can the new Russian military be used as any
justification for large defense expenditures by the US, and finally what should the
US reaction be to a renewed threat from Russia if one develops? Questions such
as these will tie our study the future of the Russian military to the future security
needs of the US.
2. The New Regionally-Focused National Security Strategy
The new regionally focused national security strategy is based upon
three basic assumptions as to the changed security environment of today's world;
the Soviet, now Russian threat is reduced to the point of originally providing at
least two years warning time prior to any possible invasion of Western Europe,
the new realities in the world coupled with the economic difficulties in the US
would necessitate a budget reduction for the military of 25-30%, and that NATO
would continue to operate as it always has. 27b Today these assumptions are for
the most part still valid, the recession in the US was deep enough to lead to the
defeat of President Bush, the economic tailspin of Russia and the avowedly
defensive bend of her doctrine appear to guarantee at least eight years warning
- For a thorough definition of the new strategy see James J.
Tritten's article "The Mew National Security Strategy and Base
Force" in Reconstituting America's Defense: The New U.S. National
Security Strategy . James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton (New York:
Praeger 1992), p. 11-29.
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time 27', and NATO still operates successfully. The questions about these
assumptions are ones of degree and depth. The assumptions were formulated
prior to the events of 1991 in Russia and may in fact not go far enough in their
interpretation of the condition of Russia. We will examine these assumptions in
more depth a little later. First we must examine the basic underlying principles
upon which the new strategy is built.
The new strategy has four basic principles for US security; deterrence,
forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution.278 The principles lay the
groundwork for future decisions on the whole range of security issues so we will
explain them all briefly. The principle of deterrence is seen as remaining the
"cornerstone of American defense strategy" 27" Interestingly the shift may be away
from a predominantly nuclear focus to one of conventional and even economic
deterrence. 28" This was dramatically emphasized by the 27 September 1992
actions of President Bush in removing the Strategic Air Command (SAC) and
other forces from alert status. The corresponding actions by the Soviet Union
underscored the diminished threat of immediate nuclear war. The signing of
START by the four nuclear states and the US along with the Washington
- Admiral Jeremiah has stated that warning time has actually
increased to at least eight years.
:7
'Tritten, 11-29.
"'James J. Tritten, Our New National Security Strategy:
America Promises to Come Back , (Westport: Praeger 1992) p. 20.
-' ibid.
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agreements of this summer hopefully reduce the threat even further. This
remains to be seen with the rising tide of conservatism in Russia today. If this
hope is realized the expenditures for US nuclear weapons and SDI will decrease
accordingly, unfortunately the reverse is probably also true.
The subject of conventional deterrence is one where significant changes
will occur on the Russian side as well. The division of the military between the
former republics will certainly lower the order-of-battle (OOB) for Russia although
she will receive the major strategic assets. As we have seen the economic troubles
of the nation will force major reductions in all branches by the year 2000. The
other problems of training and repairs all point to a smaller, less well trained
although more modern military for Russia by the year 2000. This could well
lower the perceived need for US conventional deterrent forces as well, especially
if Russia is used as any justification for these expenditures.
Forward presence is another of the four basic principles upon which
the new strategy rests. Forward presence has been given a very broad
definition 281 which distills down to participation in almost all facets of military
cooperation with nations around the world. Under this definition the issue of
large forces in Europe is called into question. While many reasons have been
given for the presence of US troops in Europe, forward presence has been one of
•James 'J. Tritten's, Our Mew National Security Strategy , p
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the most frequently used. 2* 2 If as the new strategy states that forward presence
can be achieved by as little as access and storage agreements, then why are the
large troop formations needed? The traditional explanation has been to deter
Soviet aggression into Europe by a show of US commitment to European security.
If the threat has indeed receded to at least eight years warning time then why
cannot troops be moved to meet up with equipment within that time frame?
Obviously they can so another explanation is needed for the forward presence of
troops in Europe. The Bush administration has used "uncertainty" as an
explanation of a new threat but this does not justify two army divisions and
three air wings. Jan Breemer's analysis of possible new justifications comes to the
conclusion that the best reason would be for out of area operations, especially in
the Middle East. 283 Thus the issue of forward presence in Europe cannot use the
Russians as any type of justification of this policy.
Forward presence does have uses in relation to Russia other than
troop level justification. The presence of US personnel in the form of exchange
programs, humanitarian efforts, nuclear weapon destruction and verification,
peacekeeping operations and military to military relations will offer big dividends
in fostering understanding and trust. The argument can also be made that the
"'"Material for this section is drawn from Jan Breemer's
article "U.S. Forces in Europe: The Search for a Mission",
Reconstituting America's Defense: The New U.S. National Security
Strategy , James J. Tritten and Paul N. Stockton, p. 137-152.
-' ibid.
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forward presence described will enhance deterrence by lowering antagonism on
both sides and by putting US personnel on the ground in Russia to sense any
policy shifts the US needs to be aware of. These arguments can be used for
forward presence in Russia and Eastern Europe but not for continued high troop
levels in Western Europe, in fact they argue against such.
The next principle of the new strategy is crisis response. The new
strategy speaks of the possible escalation of a security crisis in Europe as the most
complex type of crisis response that the US will have to face. 284 The crisis is no
longer the feared Soviet invasion of Europe but a lesser contingency- The crisis
response forces of the US and its allies will be able to handle this crisis even
without the large US troop presence in Europe. The fall of the Soviet Union and
the rise of national armies in the former republics put buffer zones between
Russia and the West an ironic twist to the Cold War's legacy. This coupled with
the fall in size and readiness of the Russian military will provide more than
enough warning time and security for the rest of Europe and the US to reinforce
its crisis response forces if the conflicts escalates. Pre-positioning equipment will
aid in this reinforcement. The US, France and Great Britain will still be able to
exercise nuclear deterrence for major short notice scenarios until reinforcement,
even with reduced forces in the field. The final argument that the instability that
could occur in Eastern Europe calls for US troops in Europe neglects the fact that
;Tritten, Our New National Security Strategy , p. 22
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the US and NATO have no legal right or commitment to intervene in the area and
are not likely to get or even seek it soon.
28q
It is also increasingly unlikely that the
US would commit troops in Eastern Europe for any reason, the case of Yugoslavia
is a good example. This lowers even more the rational for excessive troop levels
in Europe.
The final principle to examine is that of reconstitution. This principle
is directed specifically against a "resurgent/emergent global threat" (REGT) 286 .
The Washington Post article, which was leaked from the Defense Planning
Guidance (DPG), describes REGT developing:
Into an 'authoritarian and strongly anti-democratic' government over about three
years, beginning in 1994. After four or five years of military expansion, the
REGT is ready to begin 'a second Cold War' by the year 2001, or launch a major
global war that could last for years ...
While this is ostensibly a generic threat it clearly deals with Russia. The principle
assumes at least eight years warning time, a functioning NATO and the continued
inward focus of Russia. These assumptions go back to the basic assumptions of
the entire strategy as shown at the beginning of this section. The problems with
the principle itself involve the economic and political decisions that will have to
be made in the US to support this reconstitution. The political will to decide that
the threat is reemerging from Russia and to then re-channel US resources to an
- r
"john W.R. Lepingwell "Towards a Post-Soviet Army" Orbis ,
Winter 1992, p. 102-103.
- : Barton Gellman, "Pentagon War Scenario Spotlights Russia",
Washington Post , February 20, 1992, p. 1.
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arms buildup to counter it will most likely be too much for the principle and
doom it to failure.28'
As stated earlier the three basic assumptions of the strategy need to be
examined further. The functioning of NATO will be taken as a given and thus
will support the new strategy as elaborated. The economic difficulties of the US
will probably result in deeper cuts than 25% thus putting Base Force I in the trash
bin and calling for Base Force II or some other new force structure. Regardless
of the structure the US will face a much tougher task to meet aggression from a
resurgent Russian threat if it should occur. Thus the question that most concerns
the new strategy's chances of success is that of the possible resurgence of the
Russian military and whether there will indeed be eight years warning time.
As we have seen, the state of the Russian military is inherently
intertwined with that of the Russian economy and the experiment with
democracy. The threat to Western Europe and thus the impact upon US security
policy is dependent upon the state of the Russian military. Thus we can
extrapolate that the threat to the US will come from the success or failure of the
economic and democratic reforms now underway in Russia. The swing towards
conservatism occurring in Russia with the possible result of slowed reform,
authoritarian rule, and increased emphasis upon military solutions to ethnic and
Tritten, Our New National Security Strategy , p. 172
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nationalistic problems does not bode well for the future of relations with the
West.
As we have stated in previous sections the Russian government will
strive to keep the international arena appeased as much as possible to facilitate
concentration on regional and domestic issues. The problem for the West comes
when a conservative government comes to power in Russia. With this
conservative government the scenarios one could paint are grim: the ethnic and
nationalistic conflicts either spill into Eastern Europe bringing the turmoil right
to Europe's doorstep, the problems are resolved in the former Soviet Union and
the Russians can concentrate on international confrontations, or if the conflicts
actually bring down any sort of coherent government in Russia leaving the
nuclear weapons open to dangerous elements of the world. This conservative
government would rely on the military for resolution of these conflicts and would
thus become beholden to a strong military machine. This indebtedness to the
military would result in attempts to restore military capabilities for Russia.
If this all happens will the warning time for the West still be eight
years. In our view the answer is affirmative. The Russian economy is in a
shambles and it will take massive influxes of money from the West to rebuild it.
The continued support of the West will only happen if democratic reforms
continue. If these reforms stop so will most of the money. If the Western money
ceases to flow the ability of the Russian military to reconstitute itself will be
severely hampered. This is the basis for the United States' economic deterrence
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vis-a-vis Russia. It will take many years for a credible threat to emerge for the
West from the Russians except in the area of nuclear weapons. While the
Russians feel the possibility of nuclear war should forever be guarded against, the
threat to use them is something else. The possibility of the conservative
government not agreeing to the strategic nuclear cuts of Washington will leave
the Russians with a very credible force by the year 2000. The economic
difficulties of the country will leave this force still very formidable as opposed to
the other forces. If Russia is in a life or death situation she could very well turn
to these weapons. It is only in this area that the warning time for the West will
not exceed eight years. To counter this perceived need to repudiate the
Washington agreements the US and its allies will have to resort to the economic
deterrence mentioned above. The use of our military and a threatened buildup
as a deterrent could well send the wrong message to the Russians who are
already fearful of the West's military superiority.
3. Summary
As we have seen the new strategy was formulated prior to the August
1991 coup and the fall of the Soviet Union. The basis of the new strategy is
dependent as James Tritten states "upon the responsible, good behavior of the
Soviet Union". 288 In this study we attempt to provide a glimpse of the Russian
military in the year 2000. Through this study we have come to the realization
ibid, 171
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that the cuts in the military budget of Russia that Tritten states are essential to
success of the new strategy, will occur. Unfortunately the rise of a conservative
government in Russia may well doom the cuts in strategic nuclear weapons that
he also sees as essential to success. 289 This alone is cause for concern for US
security planners. The principle of economic deterrence may well be the one US
option that will help control or even solve this problem.
The question of what else represents "good behavior" is as Tritten
suggests open to interpretation 240 , and therein lies the problem. The interpretation
of this behavior and thus the threat from a resurgent Russia will for a large part
be left in the hands of the US President and Congress. The political will to turn
away from domestic economic programs, so central in this last election, and
concentrate resources on facing Russia may very well be hard to find. Defense
cuts will be a reality in the US as well as in Russia, will Congress be able to turn
about within the eight year warning time? Even with the extra warning time seen
by Admiral Jeremiah will the time be wasted? These questions are unsettling
ones to say the least. However it seems safe to say that cuts of at least 25°7< in the
US and even ones of up to 50% will not significantly affect the security of the US
as far as Russia is concerned. This may change after the year 2000 and thus must





The future of the Russian military will be determined by the national
security policy, military policy, doctrine and strategy adopted by the state. With
all the turmoil in Russia for the last year it is small wonder that the formulation
of these tenets of national security are under deep and controversy ridden review.
As we have seen the driving force for change is the economy. From the economic
perestroika of Gorbachev to the radical reforms of Gaydar the impact upon the
military of economic change has been enormous. This will continue for the
foreseeable future. The estimated budget from the appendix may be a rough
guess but if the figures are anywhere near correct the Russian military faces
continued inability to train, perform maintenance, construct new weapons and
even difficulty in research and development.
The political changes in Russia will also have an enormous effect upon the
policy and doctrine the military will operate under. The swing toward
conservatism by the Yeltsin government carries with it the seeds of even worse
economic and ethnic troubles. The question of defense of the expatriate Russians
in the former republics is especially dangerous, all the more so if Yeltsin shows
signs of shifting more towards the right. These factors will no doubt be reflected
in the drastic reductions called for in the latest doctrine and the emphasis upon
local and regional threats. The concern for the social welfare of the servicemen
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will also remain an important factor in Russian military policy and doctrine, as
the military is an important political constituency.
National security and military policy in Russia appears to be expanding its
definition and decreasing the importance or dominance of the military in security
planning. This is in part due to the greater role that the economy has assumed
in security thinking as well as the obvious decrease in tensions with the West.
The decreasing role of the military in security policy as well as the dire economic
situation of the country will lead to massive cuts in the military as well as strong
attempts at military-industrial complex conversion to civilian uses. Arms sales
will be used to bring hard currency into the country as much as possible but the
decreased demand for Russian equipment will limit sales to a few select items,
such as aircraft, ships and submarines. Much of this can also be drawn from
inventory as the Russian military draws down.
The defense of the homeland will be the primary mission of the military
establishment. The primary threat to this being seen as local and regional
conflicts. Worldwide military commitments will not arise outside of the United
Nations or other coalitions. Relations with the West will remain on at least a
neutral, if not positive level as it is definitely in Russia's interests to have no
security concerns outside of its immediate region, and the influx of Western
money is crucial to success of economic recovery whatever the pace of reform.
Collective security like the CIS will be expedient for Russia in Central Asia
but will not work in the West, most notably because of the differences with
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Ukraine. Even though the smaller republics will remain very cautious and wary
with respect to Russian power and their perceived threat of Russian imperialism,
defense agreements of various flavors will exist between them and Russia. It is
assumed that Russia will sign military support agreements with those republics
which do not form their own armed forces, particularly the weaker Asian
republics. Agreements, treaties, and alliances of a more intricate and complicated
nature will evolve between Russia and the republics which form their own armed
forces and possibly between Russia and some of the former Warsaw Pact nations.
Of primary importance will be agreements concerning the sharing and
cooperation of airborne early warning information. Other will likely concern
basing agreements, logistics support, spare parts, mutual support, and pilot
training. Also, involvement in peacekeeping forces will probably increase as the
number of regional conflicts arise. The peacekeeping operations will be both
internal, under the auspices of the CIS (as long as there is a CIS), and external as
part of United Nations peacekeeping forces. The major concern of the military
will be with these peripheral conflicts which will not necessarily assume the
character of war between nations but more that of civil and guerilla wars.
The comparison of the military reform of 1924-25 and the current military
reform reveals some similarities that foreshadow the direction and destination
of the current reform period. The most notable conclusion that can be drawn
from this use of a previous historical surrogate is the impact of economics on
military doctrine. This will force a more defensive strategy that is probably going
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to be based on trading ground for time while at the same time protecting valuable
strategic assets. Shrinking budgets will force the vast reduction and restructuring
of the military and force it to accept a manpower concept of a mixed conscript-
volunteer force that will be based on a combination of territorial and extra
territorial principles. The eventual outcome of the reform debate will most likely
lead to a defensive doctrine on the order of variant three. The armed forces also
will attempt to make the conversion from quantitative parameters to qualitative
ones, using the 1924-25 reform as a model.
Additionally, the military leadership seems to have decided on a smaller
more professional force and possibly even a cadre-militia system such as the one
that was implemented in the 1924-25 reform period. The establishment of a
cadre-militia system would also give the impression that Russia has abandoned
all offensive tendencies especially in terms of fighting a conventional war. The
military leadership will also strive to equip its forces with advanced weapons,
taking into account the impact of the Gulf War.
There is little doubt that the next decade of reform will be extremely painful
for the once strong and proud Red Army. From all available literature it appears
that the views of Svechin have indeed been rejuvenated and are permeating the
majority of the Russian military elite. If the trends that have been established
since the attempted putsch continue, the armed forces of Russia in the year 2000
will have the appearance of being "leaner and meaner" although they may in fact
be hollow due to training and readiness problems. The Russian military doctrine
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in the short run will have no other choice than to adhere to variant three, because
of the appalling economic situation in the country.
Undoubtedly Russia will maintain strategic nuclear weapons for the
foreseeable future. The deterrent factor of these weapons against world class
aggression, will be especially useful in the period where Russia is chiefly
concerned with its internal and regional problems. During this period the ability
to ward off major extra-regional aggression will allow the Russian military to
concentrate on issues such as protection of national minorities and conflicts with
peripheral countries.
The most likely future for strategic nuclear weapons is one in which START
is fully implemented and where negotiations will take place for the
implementation of the new Washington agreements of 17 June 1992. These
agreements will have to be substantially modified in the Russian view but the
principle of lowering strategic nuclear weapons has been accepted by most
players on the scene. The pressure placed upon the government by the more
conservative elements of the military and the opposition parties will in our
opinion prevent codification without major changes being included in the
agreement.
The re-negotiation of the agreements will not effect START which will be
adhered to, but the level of reduction over and above that treaty will have to wait
till beyond completion of START reductions, i.e. the year 2000. The numbers of
strategic nuclear weapons will probably be in the range of 6000 warheads for
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Russia, MIRVs will not be eliminated totally, and the structure of Russian nuclear
forces will remain weighted towards landbased systems. Return of strategic
nuclear systems from the other republics will be completed but only after much
negotiation with Ukraine. Research and development of future generations of
strategic nuclear systems will remain a priority and continue but will be
hampered by the greatly decreased budget. Russian strategy will be deterrence
by punishment through the threat of massive retaliatory strikes, but the
interpretation of when aggression actually begins and the use of nuclear weapons
is then permissible will remain ambiguous.
For the Ground Forces in the transitional period of reform (3-5 years) the
general trends that can be expected are sizable force reductions, degradation of
operational readiness, reduced mobilization potential, and most importantly an
inability to conduct large scale offensive operations. In the short run, the U.S.
military will not be perceived as a threat to Russia, even though the U.S. is still
considered to have an extensive military capability.
In the long run the ground forces, and the RNI specifically will transform
into a force that could easily have the capability to execute the Pentagon's
Lithuanian invasion scenario on the Northern Flank of NATO. This is predicated
on the assumption of the predicted size of NATO and the U.S. forces in Europe
in 1995. The bottom line is that although the vast quantities of troops and
equipment still present in Russia will get smaller they will become potentially
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more lethal. Again this new lethality is within the local and regional context, not
a global one.
Training will be a problem with the smaller military budget, and therefore
more emphasis will be placed on extensive command post exercises for
headquarters elements combined with simulator training for vehicle crews.
Additionally, the GPF, to include the RNI, might be inclined to volunteer their
forces for peace-keeping duties, if for no other reason than for minimal training
value, deferment of training costs, and the implied political gains of showing the
Russian flag. This training and readiness problem will limit the potential lethality
of the forces. There will also be a greater emphasis on low intensity conflict
intervention, in view of the problems arising from the dissolution of the USSR,
again lowering the potential threat to the US.
The future restructuring of the PVO will be one of the most difficult of all
the other branches because of the nature of its mission and the loss of key
facilities on the periphery of the former USSR. This branch, as explained above
has had its share of difficulty in adapting to the new geo-strategic position of
Russia. Plainly, the first needed change for the PVO is to revise the stated
mission statement to conform to the new doctrine and geo-strategic position of
Russia. Secondly the PVO will be a key player in the new "high-tech" war of the
future. The lessons of the Gulf war were far more significant for the Air Defense
Troops than any other branch of the Russian armed forces.
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As stated earlier, the CIS appears to have temporarily come to some
agreement on maintaining the PVO network, most likely because oi economic
considerations. There has been great investment in the systems of the PVO that
were responsible for the air security of the former USSR. Many of these assets are
permanent and cannot be removed or displaced easily. The PVO leadership
understands that to realign this branch within the economic constraints of the
time, they will have to preserve the costly intelligence and battle management
system created and already functioning in peacetime, as well as attempting to
provide the favorable conditions for future establishment of an ABM defense in
theaters of military operations.
Several issues are of crucial importance to the state the Russian Navy will
find itself in at the end of the decade. First and foremost is the economy and the
consequent budget crisis for the navy. With the present state of affairs in Russia
it does not appear that the resources will be available for the navy to remain at
a highly efficient level. The effect upon training and readiness is most dangerous
for the future of the navy. The loss of some obsolete ships and the scaling back
of acquisitions will hurt but, a leaner fairly modern navy will be the end result.
However the loss of training and maintenance funds may well leave this force
hollow. This bears close scrutiny for Western naval analysts over the next 8-10
years. The other issue most affecting the navy is the state of political trends in
Russia today. This is interrelated with the budgetary question. The continued
swing of the present government in the conservative direction may call for greater
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investment in the navy but the funds for this will not be available for the
foreseeable future. It remains to be seen which way the government will go but
the short term outlook to the year 2000 is for a much smaller, more modern, less
ready and poorly trained fleet.
As we have seen the new regionally focused security strategy was
formulated prior to the August 1991 coup and the fall of the Soviet Union. The
basis of the new strategy is dependent as James Tritten states "upon the
responsible, good behavior of the Soviet Union". 291 In this study we attempt to
provide a glimpse of the Russian military in the year 2000. Through this study
we have come to the realization that the cuts in the military budget of Russia that
Tritten states are essential to success of the new strategy, will occur.
Unfortunately the rise of a conservative government in Russia may well doom the
cuts in strategic nuclear weapons that he also sees as essential to success. 292 This
alone is cause for concern for US security planners. The principle of economic
deterrence may well be the one US option that will help control or even solve this
problem.
The question of what else represents "good behavior" is as Tritten suggests
open to interpretation293
,
and therein lies the problem. The interpretation of this
behavior and thus the threat from a resurgent Russia will for a large part be left




in the hands of the US President and Congress. The political will to turn away
from domestic economic programs, so central in this last election, and concentrate
resources on facing Russia may very well be hard to find. Defense cuts will be
a reality in the US as well as in Russia, will Congress be able to turn about within
the two year warning time? Even with the extra warning time seen by Admiral
Jeremiah will the time be wasted? These questions are unsettlingto say the least
United States national security appears to be safe from a Russian offensive in the
near term. In the long term if the Russian military continues on it's current trend,
it will have a reformed military that could again give Russia world-power status
but not at a level that could significantly threaten the US. This reformed "leaner
and meaner" military could be used in the future as an instrument for minimal
global projection of Russian interests but even this will most likely not occur prior
to 2000. The US would seem to be safe in taking at least the 25% military budget
cut envisioned by the new national security strategy. Cuts of up to 50% will
probably not lower the security of the US at least as far as Russia is concerned.
However constant re-evaluation of Russia's armed forces will be needed in order




If a fundamental thesis of military readiness is that a force "plays like it
practices," then examining the levels of activity within the Russian military may
provide insight into its ability to accomplish assigned missions by the turn of the
century. 2
"4
Traditionally, high levels of military training and readiness were not
particularly controversial within the Soviet Union and its war economy; now,
training and readiness appear to be constrained almost solely by the budget and
economic realities of a nation in transition. In the chaos of the current political
and economic situation in the former Soviet Union, it is of course difficult to
predict the future. Nonetheless, it seems obvious that budgetary constraints will
adversely affect the future training and readiness of the Russian military.
Historically, trying to assess accurately the percentage of the Soviet gross
national product (GNP) spent on defense has been notoriously difficult. "The
most respected and reliable sources estimate that Soviet defence spending
accounts for 15-17 percent of GNP." 2gR On the high side, a number of Soviet
dissidents, who included many of the hidden costs to the nation, argued that over
-
'
4The authors are grateful for the extensive work done on this
appendix by fellow classmates LT . P.. Poor and LT. J. Lewis during






40 percent of Soviet GNP was spent on the military. 296 In any case, it is important
to remember that spending and training were designed for a relatively high
profile, high expense operational-strategic policy of "offensive defense" that
included strategic defense, anti-SLOC operations, and a major presence in Eastern
Europe and the Third World. Even during the era of perestroika and glasnost,
when Soviet training levels dropped off slightly, these reductions were still a
function of doctrinal and operational-strategic needs, rather than economic
realities.
Whereas, historically, Soviet political/military policy justified the military
budget, now the military budget must justify itself within the context of the
changing national security and military policies, with all of their political and
economic realities. As economic growth stagnated during the 1980's, former
Soviet President Gorbachev attempted to exploit the "national investment in
defence, and treat the defence sector as a reservoir of managerial talent and
advanced technology which [could] be drawn on to revitalize the weak sector of
the civilian economy."297 Although this reform-within-the-system failed because
more drastic measures were needed, interestingly it appears that a "brain drain"
from the military to the civilian sector has begun to occur anyway. In response
to the current economic crisis, the Russian Parliament recently approved
"H.F. Scott and W.F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR
Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1984), p. 302.
-"Donnelly, 119.
191
draconian budget cuts for the military. At the end of January 1992, officials said
that the first quarter budget would total 420.5 Billion (B) rubles, of which about
50B would go to the military. That gives the military a 4.5 percent share of
GNP298, far below the aforementioned estimates of previous levels. Two months
later, speaking on Russian television, Russian Parliamentary Deputy Valerii
Shinko said that the draft budget under consideration called for defense
expenditures of 50.7B rubles for the first quarter of 1992, 118.8B in the second
quarter, and an average of 132.6B for each of the last two quarters of 1992. 2"9 We
presume these vastly higher amounts for future military spending in the draft will
not survive the budgetary review process. Rather, the huge jump in defense
spending after the first quarter suggests the military still has not fully come
aboard with the fiscal austerity program.
Even so, the effects of the current budget crisis on the military are astonishing.
For example, Russian television quoted a Washington Post article that said "no
Soviet surface warships are currently to be found anywhere in the world—not any,
absolutely none!"300 Additionally, the Northern and Black Sea Fleets have suffered
from major fuel shortages since late 1991. "The military-like everyone else-is
-"Fred Hiatt, "Moscow Slashes Military Spending," Washington
Post , 25 January 1992, p. A16.
-'"'Doug Clarke, "Details of Russian Armed Forces, Military
Budget," Radio Liberty Daily Report , 30 March 1992.
Osckiri, M. , Teleradiokompaniya Oscankino Television First
Program Network, in Russian, Moscow, 21 January 1992, (FBIS-SOV-
92-013, 28 January 1992, p. 14).
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desperately short of fuel. In order to maintain combat readiness while using as
little fuel as possible ships are lying at anchor and have to all intents and
purposes stopped carrying out maneuvers." 301
Another example comes from an officer on board a Northern Fleet Typhoon-
class ballistic-missile submarine:
Take a trivial example, for instance—the device for throwing waste containers
overboard has broken. How do you get it fixed? You cannot afford to wait
for civilian experts, and as for spare parts and tools—no, they do not get
delivered to the boat. You manage as best you can. But you cannot go to sea
with a fault like that. 302
The percentage of spending on logistics and training within the already drastically
reduced military budget has been significantly cut. In essence, this slashing of the
budget allotted for military hardware is being used to fund increased spending on
personnel and services. According to ITAR-TASS, expenditures on military equipment
are to be cut by 3.5 times in real terms (1991 expenditures were reported at 39.65B rubles
and the 1992 budget assigns only 11.2B).303 This figure matches the DIA assessment
stated by its director, LTGEN James R. Clapper, Jr., in testimony in front of the Senate
Armed Services Committee on January 22, 1992:
(Russia's military procurement) appears to have been cut by about 80% from the
former republic's allotment for procurement in the same period last year. 304
•ibid, 14.
-Litovkin, V., Moscow, Izvesr i va . in Russian, 3 March 1992,
p. 3, (FBIS-SOV-92-049, 12 March 1992, p. 2).
-John Tedstrom, "Budget Highlights," Radio Liberty Daily
Report , 9 March 1992.
^George Lardner, Jr., "Republics' Procurement of Arms Said to
Plunge," Washington Post . 23 January 1992, p. A20.
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Concurrently, drastic measures are planned to offset the adverse effects of the
country's economic woes on military personnel; a survey in the conservative paper,
Sovetskaya Rossiya
,
said that more than 300,000 servicemen's families were without
permanent housing. 30" And President Yeltsin, in a recent speech to 5,000 military
officers, promised that 60 percent of the new military budget would be used for housing
and other social services. 306 In fact, reportedly "all capital investment in the military
account will go to housing for officers, many of whom now live in abysmal
conditions." 3 Although this is perhaps an overstatement, nonetheless it points out the
changing priorities within the defense establishment.
Ultimately, as CIA Director Robert Gates recently testified, "Modernization programs
are likely to be delayed or abandoned, and training will be cut back," causing the
readiness of conventional forces in the former Soviet republics to be "at the lowest level
in many years," with naval deployments continuing to decline from already reduced
numbers and the combat capability of general purpose forces deteriorating because of
inadequate training. 308
Mary Dejevsky, "Yeltsin Wins Backing for Austerity
Programme, " The Times , London, 25 January 1992, p. All.
Serge Schmemann, "5,000 Angry Military Men Gather With
Complaints in the Kremlin, " New York Times , 18 January 1992, p.
Al , A4 .
"Fred Hiatt, "Moscow Slashes Military Spending," Washington
Post , 25 January 1992, p. A16.
'George Lardner, Jr., "Republics' Procurement of Arms Said to
Plunge, " Washington Post , 23 January 1992, p. A20.
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The future of the Russian military apparently will be a function of an increasing
percentage of funds for personnel and decreasing percentage for hardware and training.
At the same time, the overall naval budget will likely remain low to ease the financial
burden on the government and ease the changeover from a command economy to a free-
market economy. As A.G. Arbatov, (then) head of the Department of Disarmament
Problems of the World Economics and International Relations Institute of the USSR
Academy of Sciences, pointed out in April 1990 (to paraphrase), if you are going to make
military cuts, it makes more sense to cut future acquisitions rather than current
obligations.w The current civilian/legislative position is characterized by the chairman
of the Russian parliamentary budget commission, Alexander Pochinok, who, according
to ITAR-TASS , on 6 May 1992 criticized President Yeltsin's (and the military's) defense
spending plans. He suggested that President Yeltsin has been persuaded to continue
funding for a number of high-cost military products, including the construction of more
nuclear-powered submarines. But:
in the context of impending military manpower reductions and the difficulties faced
by the Russian government in even meeting the payroll for troops currently in
services, Pochinok asked where the government expected to find money to finance
such weapons procurement. 310
While it is unlikely that this debate will be resolved soon, some overall presumptions
about the future direction of military forces, specifically training and readiness, may be
'Arbatov, A.G., Defense Sufficiency and Security , Novove V
Zhizni Nauke Tekhnike Seriva "Mezhdunarodnava , " in Russian, Moscow,
4 April 90, ( JPRS-UMA-90-003-L, 20 June 1992, p. 11).
-Stephen Foye, "Parliamentarian Hits Military Spending,"
Radio Liberty Daily Report , 7 May 19 9 2.
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made with a useful degree of accuracy. The degree to which the Russian economy can
support future military expenditures while at the same time move toward a free-market
system will have, as stated earlier, a major impact on doctrine (offensive defense has
already been replaced by defensive defense). As General V. Lobov wrote, the military
must "unequivocally demonstrate its purely defensive character, and, at the same time,
be as economical as possible and be no burden for the country, which is in a difficult
economic position." 311
Additionally, the "difficult economic position" has had a drastic effect on military
personnel. Even in an era of personnel cuts, the General Staff of the Commonwealth
foresees manpower shortages when the Spring 1992 selection of conscripts begins.
According to the Komsomolskaya Pravda of 28 April 1992, "Only 28% of the total draft-age
contingent is even available for service this year, and expected high rates of evasion will
cut into the manpower pool even further." 312 While this will likely have a greater impact
on ground forces, it will surely reduce the navy's capability to man ships with competent
sailors. Political realities have also impacted on the officer corps of the navy. As one
Northern Fleet officer commented:
Unprecedented changes are taking place in the Army and Navy today ... particularly
in the officer's mentality. ... People are sick of everything. No one wants to have
•Lobov, V., "They Need Not Be Afraid of Us", Moscow, Trud , in
Russian, 1 Oct 91, p. 2, (FBIS-SOV-91-191, 2 October 1991, p. 53).
--Stephen Foye, "CIS Command Faces Draft Problems," Radio
Liberty Daily Report
, 5 May 19 9 2.
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to wait and hope for politicians to agree. So it is resign and get the hell out of this
service...
313
Initiatives such as large pay raises for the military only partially offset the debilitating
effects of the country's economic woes on military morale. Lack of housing, rapid
inflation, and other problems in the civilian sector also reach the military. Paraphrasing
Trotsky, the military feels all of society's ills, only at a hotter temperature. It is difficult
to quantify morale and its role in training and readiness. Nonetheless, poor morale
undoubtedly decreases readiness as much as esprit de corps serves as a force multiplier.
Similarly, the disintegration of the Soviet Union directly affects the institutions of
training in the military- The question of who should control the Black Sea Fleet, where:
the overwhelming majority of officers—nuclear scientists and rocketeers--are
trained. ..[has disrupted] the integrated organism of the Navy [and] will inevitably
lead to an appreciable reduction in the level of combat readiness, will affect the
reliability of guarding the sea lines of Russia, and will have a negative effect on the
morale of the sailors. 314
SUMMARY
Estimating the cohesion of the Russian military and the status of the Russian economy
by the year 2000 is virtually impossible. "Comparisons with past budgets are extremely
difficult because of rapid inflation, because this represents Russia's first post-Soviet
:
' Litovkin, 3 -4
.
)U
"How Should We Reform the Armed Forces?," Moscow, Krasnava
Zvezda . in Russian, 10 January 1992, p. 1, ( JPRS-UMA-92-0 04 , 6
February 1992, p. 33).
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budget and because Soviet officials never released reliable budget figures, especially
about the military."31
"1
Out-of-area deployments have decreased nearly to nothing, as doctrinal needs have
changed. As a result, the size and frequency of large-scale exercises have been
significantly reduced. Now, whether current levels of training are appropriate has
become a function of budget rather than mission. "The restructuring of this economic
system to provide financial-economic administrative controls and its reorientation toward
the urgent needs in improving the well-being of the people will hardly be effective
without a radical reduction and restructuring of the military-industrial complex."316
Therefore, due to the political and economic woes of the country, both training and
readiness are, as LTGEN Clapper testified, "in profound decline."317
Assuming past calls by then President Gorbachev for a fifteen-year "grace period" for
the transition from a planned economy to a free market were based on more than whim,
then economic growth during the 1990s will at best be slight. While admittedly dated,
a 1988 model of Soviet economic modernization may remain relevant. It projected a
best-case/ worst-case scenario for average annual growth rates; ultimately, in either case
"Fred Hiatt, "Moscow Slashes Military Spending," Washington
Post, 2 5 January 19 92, p. A16.
Arbatov, 4 5
.
-"George Lardner, Jr., "Republics' Procurement of Arms Said to
Plunge, " Washington Post , 23 January 1992, p. A20.
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the average annual growth between 1986 and 2000 was estimated to be 2.6 percent.318
This, it must be remembered, was written in the context of an "orderly" transition to a
decentralized economy, and did not foresee the complete demise of the USSR.
Therefore, it seems realistic to opine that even an annual growth rate of 2.6 percent is
extremely optimistic, and will more likely be closer to stagnancy, if not an actual decline.
Additionally, as indicated in a 1987 Rand study, any growth in (then-Soviet) GNP most
likely would have been dwarfed by a much higher growth rate in the West. 319
The likelihood of the Russian economy's growing in real terms seems doubtful.
Similarly, the military's percentage of the budget will "best case," from the Russian
military's point of view, remain at 4.5 percent. This money will more likely be used to
placate military personnel than to ready units to fulfill their missions. Those missions
themselves remain under discussion, further lowering morale and readiness.
Thus, the overall outlook for training and readiness of the Russian military in 2000
is cloudy. The return of a more conservative government could raise the priority of
military spending. Additionally, improvement in economic growth could lead to more
funds being available, even if funding remains at only 4.5 percent of GNP; rapid
inflation and the transformation of the military-industrial complex, however, suggest the
military's capability to fund programs will not increase. In any case, Russia's economic
;1:Robert L. Kellogg, "Modeling Soviet Modernization: An
Economy in Transition," Soviet Economy , (New York: V.H. Winston &
Sons, Inc. , 1988)
, p. 53
.
'Charles Wolf Jr. and others, Major Economic and Military
Trends, 1950-2010 , [draft], ( Santa Monica : Rand Corporation ) , p. 4.
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quandary points to a continued doctrine of defensive defense. Even this new doctrine,
in the context of the current chaotic economy, where simple training and readiness are
not being fulfilled, seems a difficult goal to achieve.
A QUANTITATIVE EXAMINATION
Trying to draw an accurate conclusion from the aforementioned figures is like trying
to complete the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel using a paint-by-numbers kit. However, as
a means of estimating the effects of budget reductions we have broken military spending
into five main categories:
- Research and Development of future systems
- Procurement of new systems
- Maintenance of existing systems
- OPTAR
- Personnel support: salaries, housing, etc...
These categories roughly correspond to the "four pillars of defense" used for budgetary






For our example, we intentionally separated personnel from hardware in order to
estimate the budget remaining for the four categories specifically related to hardware
(categories 1 through 4). We have presumed that previous military spending was indeed
approximately lb percent of the GNP, and future spending will be about 4.5 percent.
Additionally, we will presume that the GNP at the turn of the century will remain at
approximately current levels. As previously mentioned, President Yeltsin stated that 60
percent of military spending will be for personnel (category 5), which is apparently a
large increase. If we assume previous levels of spending on personnel were about 10
percent of the military budget, and the other 90 percent was dispersed between
categories 1, 2, 3, and 4, then the following is true:
[Let M = total military budget and let G = total GNP]
Previous
.10M x .16G = .016G for personnel (i.e., 1.6 percent of GNP previously was spent on
personnel)
.90M x .16G = .144G for hardware (i.e., 14.4 percent of GNP previously was spent on
research and development of future systems, procurement of nezv systems,
maintenance of existing systems, and operations of the systems (OPTAR).
Current and Future
.60M x .045G = .027G for personnel (nearly 3 percent of GNP will be spent on
personnel, or nearly 1.7 times previous levels)
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Therefore, the remaining forty percent of the (smaller) military budget must be split
between research and development of future systems, procurement of new systems,
maintenance of existing systems, and operations of the systems (OPTAR):
.40M x .045G = .018G for hardware (less than 2 percent of GNP spent on hardware,
about one-seventh of previous levels, which were 14.4% of GNP)
This level of one-seventh interestingly coincides with levels published in a recent
Washington Post article, which reported that the Russian parliament approved a budget
that contained one-seventh the level of spending for procurement/20 If procurement
levels are at one-seventh (14 percent) of previous levels, then spending on maintenance,
research and development, and OPTAR probably will also be significantly reduced.
While it may be foolish to suggest that readiness of the entire military is at 14 percent
of the level estimated during the Soviet military's heyday, it is safe to point out that
current out-of-area deployments are at less than 14 percent of previous levels. Of course,
a more efficient use of existing resources as well as a reduction in unnecessary systems,
which are expensive to maintain and equip, could skew upwards the readiness levels
of the rest of the military. However, the previously stated anecdotal evidence suggests
that "efficiency" and "management" of Russian military assets are words that do not
belong in the same sentence.
-Fred Hiatt, "Moscow Slashes Military Spending," Washington
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